CVE-2026-56164 — Microsoft SharePoint Server Pre-Auth Zero-Day

Unauthenticated network privilege escalation → RCE on on-prem SharePoint. Actively exploited in-the-wild; IIS machine-key theft & deserialization persistence.
Threat
CVE-2026-56164 (SharePoint "ToolShell"-class)
Severity
EXPLOITED ITW
Type
Web app / on-prem SharePoint RCE
Access
Pre-auth, zero-click, network
Version
v0.2 (Draft)
Author
HuntPack
Confidence
High (intel) · Medium (atomic IOCs pending)
01

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-56164 is an actively-exploited zero-day in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server 2016, 2019, and Subscription Edition, patched in the July 2026 "Patch Tuesday" (the largest Microsoft release on record, 570–622 CVEs). Microsoft classifies it as "missing authentication for a critical function" allowing an unauthorized attacker to elevate privilege over the network. It requires no authentication and no user interaction (pre-auth, zero-click) and was discovered by Mandiant / Google FLARE incident responders during real-world intrusions — which is why its base CVSS of 5.3 badly understates operational risk. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-07-14 with a remediation due date of 2026-07-17.

Per CISA and Microsoft, post-exploitation establishes remote code execution and then performs classic on-prem SharePoint tradecraft: stealing IIS machine keys (the ASP.NET ValidationKey/DecryptionKey), performing deserialization to forge __VIEWSTATE payloads for durable, patch-surviving access, dropping ASPX web shells, and deploying follow-on malware. Because the stolen machine key lets an attacker regenerate valid signed ViewState at will, patching alone does not evict them — machine keys MUST be rotated.

The defensive value of this pack is that exploitation surfaces on the endpoint as a small set of high-fidelity behaviors even when the exploit payload itself is opaque: the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning a command interpreter, ASPX/ASHX files being written into the SharePoint LAYOUTS/web directories, and commands touching machine keys or web.config. These are the anchor hunts below.

Defender priority: Treat any internet-facing on-prem SharePoint as presumed-compromised until proven clean. Do three things today — (1) apply the July 2026 SharePoint updates, (2) rotate IIS/ASP.NET machine keys and restart IIS (patching without rotation leaves signed-ViewState persistence intact), and (3) enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning. Then hunt with Q1–Q6.

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

TierSourceKey FindingCarry Fwd
1 · GovCISA KEV / Alert (2026-07-14)Added to KEV; active exploitation confirmed; post-ex = IIS machine-key theft + deserialization for persistence + malware deploy; guidance: rotate machine keys, hunt for intrusions, AMSI.Yes
1 · VendorMicrosoft MSRC / July 2026 Patch Tuesday"Missing authentication for critical function"; unauth network EoP; affects SP 2016/2019/Subscription; SP 2016/2019 hit end-of-extended-support the same day (2026-07-14); interim mitigation = AMSI Full Request Body scan.Yes
1 · IRMandiant / Google FLARE (via advisories)Discovered the flaw in-the-wild during real-world attacks; pre-auth zero-click.Yes
2 · ResearchOrca Security blog (2026-07)CVSS 5.3 understates risk; danger concentrated on internet-facing front ends with broad identity permissions on underlying compute; prioritize any internet-facing instance.Yes
2 · NewsBleepingComputer / SecurityWeek / Help Net (2026-07-15)Actively exploited; remotely exploitable, low complexity; patch also fixes CVE-2026-50522, CVE-2026-58644 (RCE) and CVE-2026-55040 (security-feature bypass).Partial

Intel gap (perishability): As of the pack date no vendor has published atomic IOCs (web-shell filenames, hashes, C2 IPs) specific to CVE-2026-56164. This pack is therefore behavior-anchored; the IOC appendix ships REPLACE_WITH_… placeholders to fill the moment your IR team or a vendor report yields campaign atomics. No atomic indicator here is fabricated.

03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Hunt hypotheses (fidelity-ordered)

#HypothesisMITREConf
H1An internet-facing SharePoint server's IIS worker (w3wp.exe) spawns a command interpreter — the signature of a successful pre-auth RCE / web shell.T1190, T1505.003, T1059HIGH
H2An ASPX/ASHX file is written into the SharePoint LAYOUTS or web-application directory by the IIS worker — web-shell drop.T1505.003HIGH
H3A process on the SharePoint host runs commands referencing machine keys / web.config — key theft to forge signed ViewState.T1552.001, T1606.001MED
H4The IIS worker (or a child) pulls a payload via a LOLBIN download utility — ingress tool transfer.T1105HIGH
H5The SharePoint host makes anomalous outbound connections from w3wp.exe or a spawned shell — C2 / staging.T1071.001MED
H6A scheduled task or service is registered on the SharePoint/IIS server post-exploit — persistence beyond the web shell.T1053.005, T1543.003MED

Attack chain

StepBehaviorTelemetryHunt angle
1 · Initial accessUnauth POST to a vulnerable SharePoint endpoint; missing-auth check bypassed → RCE.IIS access logs; SharePoint ULSNative audit (S7); AMSI
2 · Executionw3wp.exe executes attacker code / spawns shell.ProcessRollup2Q1
3 · Web shellASPX/ASHX shell dropped into web root / LAYOUTS.File-write eventsQ2
4 · Credential/key theftSteal ASP.NET machine keys from web.config to forge ViewState.ProcessRollup2 (CommandLine)Q3
5 · Tooling / C2Pull follow-on payload; beacon out.ProcessRollup2 / NetworkConnectIP4Q4, Q5
6 · PersistenceSigned-ViewState re-entry (survives patch) + scheduled task / service.ScheduledTaskRegistered / ServiceInstalledQ6 + machine-key rotation
04

Consolidated IOC Table

This is a behavior-first pack. The atomic rows below are placeholders to be populated from your IR findings or a vendor report; the behavioral rows are the operative indicators today.

TypeValueConfActionContext
Behaviorw3wp.execmd/powershell/cscript/mshtahighdetectPost-exploit RCE / web shell (H1)
BehaviorASPX/ASHX write under SharePoint LAYOUTS/web dir by IIS workerhighhuntWeb-shell drop (H2)
BehaviorCommandLine referencing machineKey / ValidationKey / web.configmediumhuntKey theft → ViewState forgery (H3)
CVECVE-2026-56164 (+ chained CVE-2026-50522 / -58644 / -55040)highdetectPatch state = exposure signal
SHA256REPLACE_WITH_SHA256 (web shell / dropped payload)detectPopulate from IR
IPv4REPLACE_WITH_C2_IP (exploit source / C2)huntPopulate from IIS logs / IR
FilenameREPLACE_WITH_ASPX_NAME.aspxhuntPopulate from LAYOUTS review
05

Affected Surface & Telemetry Matrix

SurfaceRequired telemetryPriorityGap risk
On-prem SharePoint 2016 / 2019 / Subscription (internet-facing)Falcon sensor on the web front end (ProcessRollup2, file, network)CRITICALLow if sensor deployed
IIS worker process behaviorProcessRollup2 / SyntheticProcessRollup2HIGHLow
Web-directory file writes (ASPX)File-write events (FileCreateInfo / NewExecutableWritten)HIGHMedium — non-PE writes may not always emit
Exploit request itselfIIS access logs / SharePoint ULS / WAF (non-Falcon)MEDIUMHigh — needs IIS log forwarding
Machine-key persistenceweb.config change auditing + config driftHIGHHigh — often unmonitored
06

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueBehaviorQuery / Control
Initial AccessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing AppPre-auth RCE on SharePointS7, Patch/Hardening
PersistenceT1505.003 Web ShellASPX shell in LAYOUTSQ2
ExecutionT1059 Command & Scripting Interpreterw3wp spawns cmd/powershellQ1
Credential AccessT1552.001 Creds in FilesMachine keys from web.configQ3
Defense EvasionT1606.001 Forge Web Credentials (ViewState)Signed-ViewState forgery via stolen keyMachine-key rotation (S12)
Command & ControlT1071.001 Web ProtocolsHTTP(S) beacon from web tierQ5
IngressT1105 Ingress Tool Transfercertutil/bitsadmin/curl downloadQ4
PersistenceT1053.005 / T1543.003 Task / ServiceScheduled task / service post-exploitQ6
07

Native Audit-Log Hunts (non-CQL)

  • IIS access logs: Review POSTs to SharePoint _layouts endpoints with anomalous, oversized, or Base64-heavy request bodies, and requests bearing a crafted Referer. Correlate suspicious client IPs against the same window as any Falcon hit.
  • SharePoint ULS logs: Search for deserialization / ViewState MAC validation errors and unexpected application-pool identity actions.
  • AMSI: After enabling AMSI Full Request Body scanning, monitor Defender/AMSI events on the SharePoint servers for blocked request bodies — a direct exploitation signal.
  • web.config integrity: Baseline machineKey values; alert on any change to ValidationKey/DecryptionKey outside a planned rotation. An attacker-known key = live persistence.
  • Filesystem sweep: Enumerate *.aspx/*.ashx under the SharePoint web root and LAYOUTS folders; diff against a known-good file list and creation timestamps.
08

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Q1 · IIS worker (w3wp.exe) spawns a command interpreter
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: the canonical post-exploit tell — the SharePoint/IIS worker process spawning a shell or script host. On a healthy SharePoint server this is rare, making it high-fidelity.

// HUNT: SharePoint/IIS worker spawning a command interpreter (post-auth RCE / web shell)
// MITRE: T1190, T1505.003, T1059
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^w3wp\.exe$/i
| FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|cscript|wscript|mshta|whoami|nltest|net1?)\.exe$/i
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Q2 · ASPX/ASHX web shell written into SharePoint web directories
CONF HIGHFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: the IIS worker writing a web-servable file into LAYOUTS / wwwroot / TEMPLATE. FP: legitimate SharePoint solution (WSP) deployment, patching, and provisioning also write .aspx — scope to internet-facing servers and correlate with Q1 in the same window; exclude known maintenance windows and the SharePoint timer service account.

// HUNT: ASPX/ASHX written into SharePoint LAYOUTS / web-app dir by the IIS worker
// MITRE: T1505.003
// CONF: high  FP: med  COST: low | REQUIRES: file-write telemetry
// TUNING: exclude planned WSP/solution deploys & patch windows; scope to web front ends
#event_simpleName=/PeFileWritten|NewExecutableWritten|FileCreateInfo|NewFileWritten/
| ContextBaseFileName=/^w3wp\.exe$/i
| TargetFileName=/\\(LAYOUTS|wwwroot|TEMPLATE|VirtualDirectories)\\.*\.(aspx|ashx|asmx|asax)$/i
| table([ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, TargetFileName, aid], limit=200)
Q3 · Commands referencing machine keys / web.config (key theft)
CONF HIGHFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: a process reading or referencing ASP.NET machine keys or web.config — the material an attacker steals to forge signed ViewState and persist across patches. FP: administrators and config-management tooling legitimately read web.config — pivot on parent = w3wp/shell (from Q1) and non-admin/service context.

// HUNT: machine-key / web.config access — ViewState-forgery persistence prep
// MITRE: T1552.001, T1606.001
// CONF: high  FP: med  COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2
// TUNING: exclude sanctioned admin hosts & config-mgmt agents; require w3wp/shell parent
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/(machineKey|MachineKeySection|ValidationKey|DecryptionKey|Get-SPMachineKey|web\.config)/i
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Q4 · LOLBIN download utility under the IIS worker tree
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: ingress tool transfer — certutil / bitsadmin / curl pulling a payload, parented by the IIS worker or a shell it spawned. Very rare on a web server.

// HUNT: LOLBIN download utility executed under the IIS worker / shell tree
// MITRE: T1105
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(w3wp|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/i
| FileName=/^(certutil|bitsadmin|curl|mpcmdrun)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine=/(http|ftp|-urlcache|Invoke-WebRequest|DownloadString|DownloadFile)/i
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Q5 · Anomalous outbound from w3wp / spawned shell (C2)
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST MED

Looks for: outbound connections initiated by the web tier's worker or a shell — SharePoint front ends should rarely originate egress. FP: legitimate outbound to Microsoft update/telemetry endpoints and internal SharePoint farm/SQL traffic — exclude RFC1918 farm ranges and known Microsoft ASNs; focus on shell-parented connections.

// HUNT: SharePoint web-tier egress from w3wp or a spawned shell (C2 / staging)
// MITRE: T1071.001
// CONF: med  FP: med  COST: med | REQUIRES: NetworkConnectIP4
// TUNING: exclude internal farm/SQL subnets & Microsoft update endpoints; keep shell-parented
#event_simpleName=/NetworkConnectIP4/
| ContextBaseFileName=/^(w3wp|cmd|powershell|pwsh|certutil|bitsadmin)\.exe$/i
| RemotePort=/^(80|443|8080|8443|4444|53)$/
| table([ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, aid], limit=200)
Q6 · Scheduled task / service created on a SharePoint host
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: post-exploit persistence beyond the web shell. Scope the result set to your SharePoint/IIS server group. FP: patch agents, backup, and monitoring tools register tasks/services legitimately — exclude known management software by image path and author.

// HUNT: scheduled task / service registration on a SharePoint/IIS server (persistence)
// MITRE: T1053.005, T1543.003
// CONF: med  FP: med  COST: low | REQUIRES: ScheduledTaskRegistered / ServiceInstalled
// TUNING: exclude patch/backup/monitoring agents by ServiceImagePath & TaskAuthor
#event_simpleName=/ScheduledTaskRegistered|CreateService|ModifyServiceBinary/
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ScheduledTaskName, ServiceName, ServiceImagePath, aid], limit=200)
09

CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations

IOAPatternActionExclusions
SharePoint IIS shell spawnParent Image ends \w3wp.exe AND Grandparent in SharePoint/IIS tree AND Image = cmd/powershell/cscript/wscript/mshtaDetect → Block (high conf)SharePoint timer service maintenance jobs (validate first)
Web-tier LOLBIN downloadParent w3wp.exe/shell AND Image = certutil/bitsadmin/curl AND CommandLine contains URLBlockNone expected on web front end
Machine-key access from web tierParent w3wp.exe/shell AND CommandLine contains machineKey/ValidationKeyDetectSanctioned rotation runbook host

Promote Q1 and Q4 to blocking IOAs after a short baseline; keep Q2/Q3/Q5/Q6 as investigate-only scheduled searches until tuned to your farm.

10

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Falcon IOC Management CSVbulk import
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
sha256,REPLACE_WITH_SHA256,prevent,critical,2027-01-16,CVE-2026-56164 web shell / payload,campaign:SharePoint-56164
ipv4,REPLACE_WITH_C2_IP,detect,high,2026-10-16,CVE-2026-56164 exploit source / C2,campaign:SharePoint-56164
domain,REPLACE_WITH_C2_DOMAIN,detect,high,2026-10-16,CVE-2026-56164 C2,campaign:SharePoint-56164
Behavioral Signaturesoperative today
w3wp.exe -> cmd.exe|powershell.exe|cscript.exe|mshta.exe   (IIS worker shell spawn)
*.aspx|*.ashx written into \LAYOUTS\ or \wwwroot\ by w3wp    (web shell drop)
CommandLine ~ machineKey|ValidationKey|DecryptionKey|web.config   (key theft)
certutil|bitsadmin|curl with URL, parent w3wp/shell         (ingress tool transfer)
Named CVEs (this chain)patch signal
CVE-2026-56164   SharePoint missing-auth EoP -> RCE (KEV 2026-07-14, exploited)
CVE-2026-50522   SharePoint RCE (patched same cycle)
CVE-2026-58644   SharePoint RCE (patched same cycle)
CVE-2026-55040   SharePoint security-feature bypass (patched same cycle)
Patch / Mitigation Auditexposure check
# On each SharePoint server:
Get-HotFix | Sort-Object InstalledOn -Descending | Select-Object -First 5
# Confirm July 2026 SharePoint update present; confirm AMSI Full Request Body enabled;
# confirm machine keys rotated AFTER patch (see Playbooks). Enumerate web-servable aspx:
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.aspx,*.ashx "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions" |
  Sort-Object CreationTime -Descending | Select-Object FullName,CreationTime -First 40
11

Detection Validation Gates

  • Telemetry ready: Confirm Falcon sensors are installed and reporting on every on-prem SharePoint web front end (not just app/DB tiers).
  • Benign baseline: Run Q2 and Q6 across a normal patch/maintenance window first to learn legitimate WSP-deploy and agent noise, then apply the TUNING exclusions before alerting.
  • Positive test: In a lab, launch cmd.exe as the SharePoint app-pool identity from w3wp context and confirm Q1 fires; drop a benign .aspx into LAYOUTS and confirm Q2 fires.
  • Promotion: Promote Q1/Q4 to blocking IOAs only after the baseline shows zero benign hits for a rolling week.
12

Hardening — Tiered

Immediate (this week — no compatibility risk)
  • Patch: Apply the July 2026 SharePoint security updates to all SP 2016/2019/Subscription servers (fixes CVE-2026-56164 and the chained CVE-2026-50522/-58644/-55040). MITRE M1051.
  • Rotate IIS/ASP.NET machine keys on every SharePoint server after patching, then restart IIS — this is what evicts signed-ViewState persistence. Patch-without-rotate leaves the attacker in. Per CISA guidance; MITRE M1015/M1027.
  • Enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning on SharePoint (Microsoft interim mitigation) so request-body exploit attempts are inspected/blocked. MITRE M1050.
Near term (1–4 weeks — pilot first)
  • Remove SharePoint from direct internet exposure — front with a WAF / reverse proxy and require pre-auth (VPN/ZTNA) for external access. MITRE M1035.
  • Constrain the app-pool identity — run SharePoint pools as least-privileged service accounts; deny them local admin and outbound internet where feasible. MITRE M1026, M1037 (egress).
  • web.config integrity monitoring — file-integrity alerting on machineKey changes. MITRE M1022.
Strategic (1–3 months)
  • Migrate off end-of-support versions — SP 2016/2019 reached end-of-extended-support on 2026-07-14; plan migration to SharePoint Subscription Edition or SharePoint Online. MITRE M1051 (lifecycle).
  • Application allow-listing (WDAC/AppLocker) on web servers so w3wp cannot launch cmd/powershell/LOLBINs. MITRE M1038.
13

Deployable Playbooks

Rotate ASP.NET machine keys on a SharePoint farm (run after patching)

# Rotate the farm ViewState/machine keys via SharePoint management shell.
# Do this on ONE server; the farm propagates. Then IISRESET on each WFE.
Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.SharePoint.PowerShell -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Set-SPMachineKey -WebApplication (Get-SPWebApplication)   # rotate per web app
Update-SPMachineKey -WebApplication (Get-SPWebApplication) # push new key to farm
# On EACH web front end:
iisreset /noforce
# Verify old key no longer accepted: forged ViewState from the stolen key now fails MAC validation.

Enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning (interim mitigation)

# SharePoint Subscription / patched builds expose AMSI request-body scanning.
# Enable and set to Full Request Body mode, then recycle the app pools.
Set-SPManagedAccountAmsi -EnableAmsi $true    # where supported
# In Central Admin: Security -> Configure AMSI -> enable, mode = Full Request Body.
# Confirm Microsoft Defender / a compatible AV with AMSI is running on each WFE.
Restart-Service W3SVC

Enumerate suspect ASPX under the SharePoint web root

$roots = @(
  "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS",
  "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\wss\VirtualDirectories"
)
Get-ChildItem -Path $roots -Recurse -Include *.aspx,*.ashx,*.asmx -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Sort-Object LastWriteTime -Descending |
  Select-Object FullName, CreationTime, LastWriteTime, Length | Format-Table -Auto
# Investigate any file whose CreationTime is recent / outside a patch window.
14

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
IsolateNetwork-contain the SharePoint host in Falcon; pull it from the load balancer / block external ingress. Do NOT power off (preserve memory/web shells).SOC / IRFalcon host timeline; IIS logs
EradicateRemove identified web shells; kill malicious tasks/services; rotate machine keys + IISRESET (mandatory — otherwise persistence survives); patch to July 2026 build.SharePoint admin / IRFile hashes; web.config diff
Credential resetReset the SharePoint app-pool / farm service account and any secrets that lived in web.config; assume machine key + those secrets are attacker-known.IAMReset tickets
RecoverReturn to service only after clean scan + rotated keys + patched build; monitor Q1–Q6 for reinfection for 30 days.SOCClean hunt runs
ReportFederal civilian agencies: track against KEV due date 2026-07-17; document per internal IR policy.IR leadKEV compliance record
15

Detection Coverage Map

TechniqueBehaviorCQLIOACoverage
T1190 Exploit Public AppPre-auth RCE request— (IIS/ULS native)Partial
T1059 Executionw3wp spawns shellQ1YesGood
T1505.003 Web ShellASPX dropQ2Good
T1552.001 / T1606.001 Key theft & ViewState forgerymachineKey/web.config accessQ3YesPartial
T1105 Ingress Tool TransferLOLBIN downloadQ4YesGood
T1071.001 C2Web-tier egressQ5Partial
T1053.005 / T1543.003 PersistenceTask/serviceQ6Partial
Signed-ViewState re-entryForged ViewState with stolen keyGAPGAP

Gaps: The exploit request itself is only visible in IIS/ULS logs (S7), and re-use of a stolen machine key produces valid-looking traffic that endpoint telemetry cannot distinguish — the only reliable control there is key rotation, not detection. Populate the atomic IOC placeholders (S10) once IR yields them to close the CVE-to-atomic gap.

16

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:      CVE-2026-56164 — SharePoint pre-auth zero-day (exploited ITW)
SEVERITY:   Critical (KEV 2026-07-14, due 2026-07-17)
SCOPE:      All on-prem SharePoint 2016/2019/Subscription, internet-facing first
HYPOTHESIS: Pre-auth RCE -> w3wp shell / ASPX web shell / machine-key theft -> ViewState persistence
QUERIES:    Q1 w3wp shell spawn | Q2 aspx drop | Q3 machineKey access | Q4 LOLBIN dl | Q5 web egress | Q6 task/service
DO FIRST:   (1) Patch July 2026 build  (2) ROTATE machine keys + IISRESET  (3) enable AMSI Full Request Body
FINDINGS:   ____ (populate: hosts, shells, key-rotation status)
GAPS:       Exploit request = IIS/ULS only; stolen-key reuse not endpoint-detectable (rotate to remediate)
ACTIONS:    Contain -> eradicate web shells -> rotate keys/secrets -> patch -> 30-day watch
OWNER:      ____   VERSION: v0.2 (2026-07-16)
17

Changelog

v0.22026-07-24CQL correctness pass. All table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.
v0.12026-07-16Initial pack. 6 behavior-anchored CQL hunts, 3 Custom IOA recs, tiered hardening (patch + mandatory machine-key rotation + AMSI), playbooks and containment. Atomic IOCs seeded as placeholders pending a vendor/IR report.
18

References

TierSourceUsed ForAccessed
1 · GovCISA — Adds Four KEV (2026-07-14)KEV listing, due date, active exploitation2026-07-16
1 · GovCISA — Urges SharePoint HardeningPost-ex (machine-key theft, deserialization), rotate-keys guidance2026-07-16
1 · VendorMicrosoft July 2026 Patch Tuesday (BleepingComputer)Vuln class, affected versions, zero-day status2026-07-16
2 · ResearchOrca Security — SharePoint zero-day analysisPre-auth zero-click, Mandiant discovery, risk framing2026-07-16
2 · NewsSecurityWeek — CISA urges immediate patchingMachine-key theft / deserialization confirmation, chained CVEs2026-07-16
2 · NewsHelp Net Security — CVE-2026-56164AMSI mitigation, chained SharePoint CVEs2026-07-16