CVE-2026-56164 — Microsoft SharePoint Server Pre-Auth Zero-Day
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-56164 is an actively-exploited zero-day in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server 2016, 2019, and Subscription Edition, patched in the July 2026 "Patch Tuesday" (the largest Microsoft release on record, 570–622 CVEs). Microsoft classifies it as "missing authentication for a critical function" allowing an unauthorized attacker to elevate privilege over the network. It requires no authentication and no user interaction (pre-auth, zero-click) and was discovered by Mandiant / Google FLARE incident responders during real-world intrusions — which is why its base CVSS of 5.3 badly understates operational risk. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-07-14 with a remediation due date of 2026-07-17.
Per CISA and Microsoft, post-exploitation establishes remote code execution and then performs classic on-prem SharePoint tradecraft: stealing IIS machine keys (the ASP.NET ValidationKey/DecryptionKey), performing deserialization to forge __VIEWSTATE payloads for durable, patch-surviving access, dropping ASPX web shells, and deploying follow-on malware. Because the stolen machine key lets an attacker regenerate valid signed ViewState at will, patching alone does not evict them — machine keys MUST be rotated.
The defensive value of this pack is that exploitation surfaces on the endpoint as a small set of high-fidelity behaviors even when the exploit payload itself is opaque: the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning a command interpreter, ASPX/ASHX files being written into the SharePoint LAYOUTS/web directories, and commands touching machine keys or web.config. These are the anchor hunts below.
Defender priority: Treat any internet-facing on-prem SharePoint as presumed-compromised until proven clean. Do three things today — (1) apply the July 2026 SharePoint updates, (2) rotate IIS/ASP.NET machine keys and restart IIS (patching without rotation leaves signed-ViewState persistence intact), and (3) enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning. Then hunt with Q1–Q6.
Source Review & Web Hunter Notes
| Tier | Source | Key Finding | Carry Fwd |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Gov | CISA KEV / Alert (2026-07-14) | Added to KEV; active exploitation confirmed; post-ex = IIS machine-key theft + deserialization for persistence + malware deploy; guidance: rotate machine keys, hunt for intrusions, AMSI. | Yes |
| 1 · Vendor | Microsoft MSRC / July 2026 Patch Tuesday | "Missing authentication for critical function"; unauth network EoP; affects SP 2016/2019/Subscription; SP 2016/2019 hit end-of-extended-support the same day (2026-07-14); interim mitigation = AMSI Full Request Body scan. | Yes |
| 1 · IR | Mandiant / Google FLARE (via advisories) | Discovered the flaw in-the-wild during real-world attacks; pre-auth zero-click. | Yes |
| 2 · Research | Orca Security blog (2026-07) | CVSS 5.3 understates risk; danger concentrated on internet-facing front ends with broad identity permissions on underlying compute; prioritize any internet-facing instance. | Yes |
| 2 · News | BleepingComputer / SecurityWeek / Help Net (2026-07-15) | Actively exploited; remotely exploitable, low complexity; patch also fixes CVE-2026-50522, CVE-2026-58644 (RCE) and CVE-2026-55040 (security-feature bypass). | Partial |
Intel gap (perishability): As of the pack date no vendor has published atomic IOCs (web-shell filenames, hashes, C2 IPs) specific to CVE-2026-56164. This pack is therefore behavior-anchored; the IOC appendix ships REPLACE_WITH_… placeholders to fill the moment your IR team or a vendor report yields campaign atomics. No atomic indicator here is fabricated.
Hunt Brief & Attack Chain
Hunt hypotheses (fidelity-ordered)
| # | Hypothesis | MITRE | Conf |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | An internet-facing SharePoint server's IIS worker (w3wp.exe) spawns a command interpreter — the signature of a successful pre-auth RCE / web shell. | T1190, T1505.003, T1059 | HIGH |
| H2 | An ASPX/ASHX file is written into the SharePoint LAYOUTS or web-application directory by the IIS worker — web-shell drop. | T1505.003 | HIGH |
| H3 | A process on the SharePoint host runs commands referencing machine keys / web.config — key theft to forge signed ViewState. | T1552.001, T1606.001 | MED |
| H4 | The IIS worker (or a child) pulls a payload via a LOLBIN download utility — ingress tool transfer. | T1105 | HIGH |
| H5 | The SharePoint host makes anomalous outbound connections from w3wp.exe or a spawned shell — C2 / staging. | T1071.001 | MED |
| H6 | A scheduled task or service is registered on the SharePoint/IIS server post-exploit — persistence beyond the web shell. | T1053.005, T1543.003 | MED |
Attack chain
| Step | Behavior | Telemetry | Hunt angle |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Initial access | Unauth POST to a vulnerable SharePoint endpoint; missing-auth check bypassed → RCE. | IIS access logs; SharePoint ULS | Native audit (S7); AMSI |
| 2 · Execution | w3wp.exe executes attacker code / spawns shell. | ProcessRollup2 | Q1 |
| 3 · Web shell | ASPX/ASHX shell dropped into web root / LAYOUTS. | File-write events | Q2 |
| 4 · Credential/key theft | Steal ASP.NET machine keys from web.config to forge ViewState. | ProcessRollup2 (CommandLine) | Q3 |
| 5 · Tooling / C2 | Pull follow-on payload; beacon out. | ProcessRollup2 / NetworkConnectIP4 | Q4, Q5 |
| 6 · Persistence | Signed-ViewState re-entry (survives patch) + scheduled task / service. | ScheduledTaskRegistered / ServiceInstalled | Q6 + machine-key rotation |
Consolidated IOC Table
This is a behavior-first pack. The atomic rows below are placeholders to be populated from your IR findings or a vendor report; the behavioral rows are the operative indicators today.
| Type | Value | Conf | Action | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | w3wp.exe → cmd/powershell/cscript/mshta | high | detect | Post-exploit RCE / web shell (H1) |
| Behavior | ASPX/ASHX write under SharePoint LAYOUTS/web dir by IIS worker | high | hunt | Web-shell drop (H2) |
| Behavior | CommandLine referencing machineKey / ValidationKey / web.config | medium | hunt | Key theft → ViewState forgery (H3) |
| CVE | CVE-2026-56164 (+ chained CVE-2026-50522 / -58644 / -55040) | high | detect | Patch state = exposure signal |
| SHA256 | REPLACE_WITH_SHA256 (web shell / dropped payload) | — | detect | Populate from IR |
| IPv4 | REPLACE_WITH_C2_IP (exploit source / C2) | — | hunt | Populate from IIS logs / IR |
| Filename | REPLACE_WITH_ASPX_NAME.aspx | — | hunt | Populate from LAYOUTS review |
Affected Surface & Telemetry Matrix
| Surface | Required telemetry | Priority | Gap risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-prem SharePoint 2016 / 2019 / Subscription (internet-facing) | Falcon sensor on the web front end (ProcessRollup2, file, network) | CRITICAL | Low if sensor deployed |
| IIS worker process behavior | ProcessRollup2 / SyntheticProcessRollup2 | HIGH | Low |
| Web-directory file writes (ASPX) | File-write events (FileCreateInfo / NewExecutableWritten) | HIGH | Medium — non-PE writes may not always emit |
| Exploit request itself | IIS access logs / SharePoint ULS / WAF (non-Falcon) | MEDIUM | High — needs IIS log forwarding |
| Machine-key persistence | web.config change auditing + config drift | HIGH | High — often unmonitored |
ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | Behavior | Query / Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App | Pre-auth RCE on SharePoint | S7, Patch/Hardening |
| Persistence | T1505.003 Web Shell | ASPX shell in LAYOUTS | Q2 |
| Execution | T1059 Command & Scripting Interpreter | w3wp spawns cmd/powershell | Q1 |
| Credential Access | T1552.001 Creds in Files | Machine keys from web.config | Q3 |
| Defense Evasion | T1606.001 Forge Web Credentials (ViewState) | Signed-ViewState forgery via stolen key | Machine-key rotation (S12) |
| Command & Control | T1071.001 Web Protocols | HTTP(S) beacon from web tier | Q5 |
| Ingress | T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer | certutil/bitsadmin/curl download | Q4 |
| Persistence | T1053.005 / T1543.003 Task / Service | Scheduled task / service post-exploit | Q6 |
Native Audit-Log Hunts (non-CQL)
- IIS access logs: Review POSTs to SharePoint
_layoutsendpoints with anomalous, oversized, or Base64-heavy request bodies, and requests bearing a craftedReferer. Correlate suspicious client IPs against the same window as any Falcon hit. - SharePoint ULS logs: Search for deserialization / ViewState MAC validation errors and unexpected application-pool identity actions.
- AMSI: After enabling AMSI Full Request Body scanning, monitor Defender/AMSI events on the SharePoint servers for blocked request bodies — a direct exploitation signal.
- web.config integrity: Baseline
machineKeyvalues; alert on any change toValidationKey/DecryptionKeyoutside a planned rotation. An attacker-known key = live persistence. - Filesystem sweep: Enumerate
*.aspx/*.ashxunder the SharePoint web root and LAYOUTS folders; diff against a known-good file list and creation timestamps.
CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries
Looks for: the canonical post-exploit tell — the SharePoint/IIS worker process spawning a shell or script host. On a healthy SharePoint server this is rare, making it high-fidelity.
// HUNT: SharePoint/IIS worker spawning a command interpreter (post-auth RCE / web shell) // MITRE: T1190, T1505.003, T1059 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^w3wp\.exe$/i | FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|cscript|wscript|mshta|whoami|nltest|net1?)\.exe$/i | table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Looks for: the IIS worker writing a web-servable file into LAYOUTS / wwwroot / TEMPLATE. FP: legitimate SharePoint solution (WSP) deployment, patching, and provisioning also write .aspx — scope to internet-facing servers and correlate with Q1 in the same window; exclude known maintenance windows and the SharePoint timer service account.
// HUNT: ASPX/ASHX written into SharePoint LAYOUTS / web-app dir by the IIS worker // MITRE: T1505.003 // CONF: high FP: med COST: low | REQUIRES: file-write telemetry // TUNING: exclude planned WSP/solution deploys & patch windows; scope to web front ends #event_simpleName=/PeFileWritten|NewExecutableWritten|FileCreateInfo|NewFileWritten/ | ContextBaseFileName=/^w3wp\.exe$/i | TargetFileName=/\\(LAYOUTS|wwwroot|TEMPLATE|VirtualDirectories)\\.*\.(aspx|ashx|asmx|asax)$/i | table([ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, TargetFileName, aid], limit=200)
Looks for: a process reading or referencing ASP.NET machine keys or web.config — the material an attacker steals to forge signed ViewState and persist across patches. FP: administrators and config-management tooling legitimately read web.config — pivot on parent = w3wp/shell (from Q1) and non-admin/service context.
// HUNT: machine-key / web.config access — ViewState-forgery persistence prep // MITRE: T1552.001, T1606.001 // CONF: high FP: med COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 // TUNING: exclude sanctioned admin hosts & config-mgmt agents; require w3wp/shell parent #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | CommandLine=/(machineKey|MachineKeySection|ValidationKey|DecryptionKey|Get-SPMachineKey|web\.config)/i | table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Looks for: ingress tool transfer — certutil / bitsadmin / curl pulling a payload, parented by the IIS worker or a shell it spawned. Very rare on a web server.
// HUNT: LOLBIN download utility executed under the IIS worker / shell tree // MITRE: T1105 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low | REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^(w3wp|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/i | FileName=/^(certutil|bitsadmin|curl|mpcmdrun)\.exe$/i | CommandLine=/(http|ftp|-urlcache|Invoke-WebRequest|DownloadString|DownloadFile)/i | table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, aid], limit=200)
Looks for: outbound connections initiated by the web tier's worker or a shell — SharePoint front ends should rarely originate egress. FP: legitimate outbound to Microsoft update/telemetry endpoints and internal SharePoint farm/SQL traffic — exclude RFC1918 farm ranges and known Microsoft ASNs; focus on shell-parented connections.
// HUNT: SharePoint web-tier egress from w3wp or a spawned shell (C2 / staging) // MITRE: T1071.001 // CONF: med FP: med COST: med | REQUIRES: NetworkConnectIP4 // TUNING: exclude internal farm/SQL subnets & Microsoft update endpoints; keep shell-parented #event_simpleName=/NetworkConnectIP4/ | ContextBaseFileName=/^(w3wp|cmd|powershell|pwsh|certutil|bitsadmin)\.exe$/i | RemotePort=/^(80|443|8080|8443|4444|53)$/ | table([ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, aid], limit=200)
Looks for: post-exploit persistence beyond the web shell. Scope the result set to your SharePoint/IIS server group. FP: patch agents, backup, and monitoring tools register tasks/services legitimately — exclude known management software by image path and author.
// HUNT: scheduled task / service registration on a SharePoint/IIS server (persistence) // MITRE: T1053.005, T1543.003 // CONF: med FP: med COST: low | REQUIRES: ScheduledTaskRegistered / ServiceInstalled // TUNING: exclude patch/backup/monitoring agents by ServiceImagePath & TaskAuthor #event_simpleName=/ScheduledTaskRegistered|CreateService|ModifyServiceBinary/ | table([ComputerName, UserName, ScheduledTaskName, ServiceName, ServiceImagePath, aid], limit=200)
CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations
| IOA | Pattern | Action | Exclusions |
|---|---|---|---|
| SharePoint IIS shell spawn | Parent Image ends \w3wp.exe AND Grandparent in SharePoint/IIS tree AND Image = cmd/powershell/cscript/wscript/mshta | Detect → Block (high conf) | SharePoint timer service maintenance jobs (validate first) |
| Web-tier LOLBIN download | Parent w3wp.exe/shell AND Image = certutil/bitsadmin/curl AND CommandLine contains URL | Block | None expected on web front end |
| Machine-key access from web tier | Parent w3wp.exe/shell AND CommandLine contains machineKey/ValidationKey | Detect | Sanctioned rotation runbook host |
Promote Q1 and Q4 to blocking IOAs after a short baseline; keep Q2/Q3/Q5/Q6 as investigate-only scheduled searches until tuned to your farm.
Machine-Readable IOC Appendix
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags sha256,REPLACE_WITH_SHA256,prevent,critical,2027-01-16,CVE-2026-56164 web shell / payload,campaign:SharePoint-56164 ipv4,REPLACE_WITH_C2_IP,detect,high,2026-10-16,CVE-2026-56164 exploit source / C2,campaign:SharePoint-56164 domain,REPLACE_WITH_C2_DOMAIN,detect,high,2026-10-16,CVE-2026-56164 C2,campaign:SharePoint-56164
w3wp.exe -> cmd.exe|powershell.exe|cscript.exe|mshta.exe (IIS worker shell spawn) *.aspx|*.ashx written into \LAYOUTS\ or \wwwroot\ by w3wp (web shell drop) CommandLine ~ machineKey|ValidationKey|DecryptionKey|web.config (key theft) certutil|bitsadmin|curl with URL, parent w3wp/shell (ingress tool transfer)
CVE-2026-56164 SharePoint missing-auth EoP -> RCE (KEV 2026-07-14, exploited) CVE-2026-50522 SharePoint RCE (patched same cycle) CVE-2026-58644 SharePoint RCE (patched same cycle) CVE-2026-55040 SharePoint security-feature bypass (patched same cycle)
# On each SharePoint server: Get-HotFix | Sort-Object InstalledOn -Descending | Select-Object -First 5 # Confirm July 2026 SharePoint update present; confirm AMSI Full Request Body enabled; # confirm machine keys rotated AFTER patch (see Playbooks). Enumerate web-servable aspx: Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.aspx,*.ashx "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions" | Sort-Object CreationTime -Descending | Select-Object FullName,CreationTime -First 40
Detection Validation Gates
- Telemetry ready: Confirm Falcon sensors are installed and reporting on every on-prem SharePoint web front end (not just app/DB tiers).
- Benign baseline: Run Q2 and Q6 across a normal patch/maintenance window first to learn legitimate WSP-deploy and agent noise, then apply the TUNING exclusions before alerting.
- Positive test: In a lab, launch
cmd.exeas the SharePoint app-pool identity from w3wp context and confirm Q1 fires; drop a benign.aspxinto LAYOUTS and confirm Q2 fires. - Promotion: Promote Q1/Q4 to blocking IOAs only after the baseline shows zero benign hits for a rolling week.
Hardening — Tiered
- Patch: Apply the July 2026 SharePoint security updates to all SP 2016/2019/Subscription servers (fixes CVE-2026-56164 and the chained CVE-2026-50522/-58644/-55040). MITRE M1051.
- Rotate IIS/ASP.NET machine keys on every SharePoint server after patching, then restart IIS — this is what evicts signed-ViewState persistence. Patch-without-rotate leaves the attacker in. Per CISA guidance; MITRE M1015/M1027.
- Enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning on SharePoint (Microsoft interim mitigation) so request-body exploit attempts are inspected/blocked. MITRE M1050.
- Remove SharePoint from direct internet exposure — front with a WAF / reverse proxy and require pre-auth (VPN/ZTNA) for external access. MITRE M1035.
- Constrain the app-pool identity — run SharePoint pools as least-privileged service accounts; deny them local admin and outbound internet where feasible. MITRE M1026, M1037 (egress).
- web.config integrity monitoring — file-integrity alerting on machineKey changes. MITRE M1022.
- Migrate off end-of-support versions — SP 2016/2019 reached end-of-extended-support on 2026-07-14; plan migration to SharePoint Subscription Edition or SharePoint Online. MITRE M1051 (lifecycle).
- Application allow-listing (WDAC/AppLocker) on web servers so w3wp cannot launch cmd/powershell/LOLBINs. MITRE M1038.
Deployable Playbooks
Rotate ASP.NET machine keys on a SharePoint farm (run after patching)
# Rotate the farm ViewState/machine keys via SharePoint management shell. # Do this on ONE server; the farm propagates. Then IISRESET on each WFE. Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.SharePoint.PowerShell -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Set-SPMachineKey -WebApplication (Get-SPWebApplication) # rotate per web app Update-SPMachineKey -WebApplication (Get-SPWebApplication) # push new key to farm # On EACH web front end: iisreset /noforce # Verify old key no longer accepted: forged ViewState from the stolen key now fails MAC validation.
Enable AMSI Full Request Body scanning (interim mitigation)
# SharePoint Subscription / patched builds expose AMSI request-body scanning. # Enable and set to Full Request Body mode, then recycle the app pools. Set-SPManagedAccountAmsi -EnableAmsi $true # where supported # In Central Admin: Security -> Configure AMSI -> enable, mode = Full Request Body. # Confirm Microsoft Defender / a compatible AV with AMSI is running on each WFE. Restart-Service W3SVC
Enumerate suspect ASPX under the SharePoint web root
$roots = @( "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS", "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\wss\VirtualDirectories" ) Get-ChildItem -Path $roots -Recurse -Include *.aspx,*.ashx,*.asmx -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Sort-Object LastWriteTime -Descending | Select-Object FullName, CreationTime, LastWriteTime, Length | Format-Table -Auto # Investigate any file whose CreationTime is recent / outside a patch window.
Containment Runbook
| Phase | Actions | Owner | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isolate | Network-contain the SharePoint host in Falcon; pull it from the load balancer / block external ingress. Do NOT power off (preserve memory/web shells). | SOC / IR | Falcon host timeline; IIS logs |
| Eradicate | Remove identified web shells; kill malicious tasks/services; rotate machine keys + IISRESET (mandatory — otherwise persistence survives); patch to July 2026 build. | SharePoint admin / IR | File hashes; web.config diff |
| Credential reset | Reset the SharePoint app-pool / farm service account and any secrets that lived in web.config; assume machine key + those secrets are attacker-known. | IAM | Reset tickets |
| Recover | Return to service only after clean scan + rotated keys + patched build; monitor Q1–Q6 for reinfection for 30 days. | SOC | Clean hunt runs |
| Report | Federal civilian agencies: track against KEV due date 2026-07-17; document per internal IR policy. | IR lead | KEV compliance record |
Detection Coverage Map
| Technique | Behavior | CQL | IOA | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 Exploit Public App | Pre-auth RCE request | — (IIS/ULS native) | — | Partial |
| T1059 Execution | w3wp spawns shell | Q1 | Yes | Good |
| T1505.003 Web Shell | ASPX drop | Q2 | — | Good |
| T1552.001 / T1606.001 Key theft & ViewState forgery | machineKey/web.config access | Q3 | Yes | Partial |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer | LOLBIN download | Q4 | Yes | Good |
| T1071.001 C2 | Web-tier egress | Q5 | — | Partial |
| T1053.005 / T1543.003 Persistence | Task/service | Q6 | — | Partial |
| Signed-ViewState re-entry | Forged ViewState with stolen key | GAP | — | GAP |
Gaps: The exploit request itself is only visible in IIS/ULS logs (S7), and re-use of a stolen machine key produces valid-looking traffic that endpoint telemetry cannot distinguish — the only reliable control there is key rotation, not detection. Populate the atomic IOC placeholders (S10) once IR yields them to close the CVE-to-atomic gap.
Hunt Summary Ticket
TITLE: CVE-2026-56164 — SharePoint pre-auth zero-day (exploited ITW) SEVERITY: Critical (KEV 2026-07-14, due 2026-07-17) SCOPE: All on-prem SharePoint 2016/2019/Subscription, internet-facing first HYPOTHESIS: Pre-auth RCE -> w3wp shell / ASPX web shell / machine-key theft -> ViewState persistence QUERIES: Q1 w3wp shell spawn | Q2 aspx drop | Q3 machineKey access | Q4 LOLBIN dl | Q5 web egress | Q6 task/service DO FIRST: (1) Patch July 2026 build (2) ROTATE machine keys + IISRESET (3) enable AMSI Full Request Body FINDINGS: ____ (populate: hosts, shells, key-rotation status) GAPS: Exploit request = IIS/ULS only; stolen-key reuse not endpoint-detectable (rotate to remediate) ACTIONS: Contain -> eradicate web shells -> rotate keys/secrets -> patch -> 30-day watch OWNER: ____ VERSION: v0.2 (2026-07-16)
Changelog
table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.References
| Tier | Source | Used For | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Gov | CISA — Adds Four KEV (2026-07-14) | KEV listing, due date, active exploitation | 2026-07-16 |
| 1 · Gov | CISA — Urges SharePoint Hardening | Post-ex (machine-key theft, deserialization), rotate-keys guidance | 2026-07-16 |
| 1 · Vendor | Microsoft July 2026 Patch Tuesday (BleepingComputer) | Vuln class, affected versions, zero-day status | 2026-07-16 |
| 2 · Research | Orca Security — SharePoint zero-day analysis | Pre-auth zero-click, Mandiant discovery, risk framing | 2026-07-16 |
| 2 · News | SecurityWeek — CISA urges immediate patching | Machine-key theft / deserialization confirmation, chained CVEs | 2026-07-16 |
| 2 · News | Help Net Security — CVE-2026-56164 | AMSI mitigation, chained SharePoint CVEs | 2026-07-16 |