Qilin (Agenda) — Ransomware-as-a-Service Hunt & Hardening Pack

Edge-VPN / Veeam access → AD recon → Mimikatz cred theft → defense evasion (log clearing, service kill, symlink-eval) → PsExec/vCenter self-propagation → backup destruction → Rust/C double-extortion encryptor. The most active RaaS of 2026 (~500 victims YTD). Defensive hunt & harden pack — no offensive code.
Threat
Qilin · aka Agenda · "Hastalamuerte"
Severity
MOST-ACTIVE RaaS 2026
Type
Ransomware · double extortion · self-propagating
Primary access
FortiGate/VPN · Veeam CVE-2023-27532 / CVE-2024-40711 · Check Point CVE-2026-50751
Victims
~1,500 to date · 500+ in 2026 (MOXFIVE)
Version
v0.4 · 2026-06-12
Author
HuntPack
01

Executive Summary

Qilin (aka Agenda) is a Russian-speaking double-extortion RaaS and, per MOXFIVE, the most active ransomware operation of 2026 — ~1,500 victims to date and 500+ in 2026 alone, on an affiliate model paying 80–85%. Affiliates favor edge access: compromised/brute-forced FortiGate & SSL-VPN credentials, Veeam Backup & Replication exploitation (CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711) to dump stored credentials, ScreenConnect/RMM phishing, and — in June 2026 — a Qilin affiliate was tied to the Check Point VPN zero-day (CVE-2026-50751).

Post-access the playbook is consistent: AD reconnaissance (Get-ADComputer, net group "Domain Admins", nltest /dclist), embedded Mimikatz targeting lsass.exe/winlogon.exe/wininit.exe, defense evasion via systematic event-log clearing and service/process termination, and a tell-tale fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1 R2L:1. The encryptor (w.exe, run from C:\temp with a SHA-256 password argument from a .conf) self-propagates via an embedded PsExec v2.43 (randomized filename, -accepteula \\HOST -c -f -h -d) and a -spread-vcenter option, sets MaxMpxCt=65535, destroys backups (delete tape jobs, vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet, reboot backup/VPN servers), and encrypts with AES-256-CTR or ChaCha20 + RSA-4096.

Defender priority: The earliest reliable signal is the AD-recon burst from a VPN-assigned host within ~60 min of logon (Q1). The "impact imminent" signals are Q3 (VSS/backup destruction) and Q2 (PsExec self-propagation) — escalate any hit immediately. Patch Veeam + force VPN MFA to close the front door.

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

TierSourceKey FindingCarry
1 · Vendor researchPicus — Qilin Ransomware AnalysisFull chain: Veeam/VPN access, Mimikatz, log-clearing thread, PsExec spread (-accepteula/-spread-vcenter), VSS deletion, AES/ChaCha encryptor, fsutil symlink-evalyes
1 · Vendor researchMOXFIVE — Qilin 2026 TTPs & Victims~1,500 victims / 500+ in 2026 (most active); VPN + phishing access; affiliate splityes
2 · VendorSANS / Dexpose / CyberEspionageAgenda lineage, w.exe execution, .conf password arg, MaxMpxCt, RaaS structureyes
1 · Cross-pack intelHelp Net / BleepingComputer — Check Point CVE-2026-50751June-2026 Qilin affiliate tied to Check Point VPN zero-day (new initial-access vector)yes

Decisions: behavior-first across the kill chain (the affiliate model means atomic IOCs vary per intrusion); fold in the June-2026 Check Point VPN initial-access vector (cross-references the CVE-2026-50751 pack); lead defenses with Veeam patching + VPN MFA + immutable backups, since the destructive phase is fast once inside.

03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Working hypothesis: An affiliate enters via VPN/Veeam, performs AD recon from the beachhead, dumps credentials with Mimikatz, clears logs and kills defenses, propagates the encryptor via PsExec/vCenter, destroys backups, then encrypts — typically within hours to days.

StepBehaviorTelemetryHunt Angle
1 · Initial accessFortiGate/VPN creds; Veeam CVE-2023-27532/CVE-2024-40711; Check Point CVE-2026-50751; ScreenConnect phishingVPN/Veeam logs; UserLogonN1, N2
2 · AD reconGet-ADComputer, net group "Domain Admins", nltest /dclistProcessRollup2Q1
3 · Cred accessEmbedded Mimikatz → lsass/winlogon/wininitProcessRollup2Q6
4 · Defense evasionEvent-log clearing; service/process kill; fsutil … SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1 R2L:1ProcessRollup2Q4 / Q5
5 · Lateral / spreadEmbedded PsExec v2.43 (-accepteula \\HOST -c -f -h -d); MaxMpxCt=65535; -spread-vcenterProcessRollup2, registryQ2 / Q7
6 · Backup destructionDelete tape jobs; vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet; reboot backup/VPN serversProcessRollup2Q3
7 · Encryptw.exe from C:\temp w/ SHA-256 password arg; AES-256-CTR / ChaCha20 + RSA-4096; cipher /wProcessRollup2Q7

Affected surface & telemetry

SurfaceRequired TelemetryPriorityGap Risk
Edge appliances (Fortinet/Check Point) + VeeamVPN/appliance + Veeam logs to SIEMCriticalHigh — appliance logs often unforwarded
Windows endpoints / DCsProcess lineage + command line (ProcessRollup2)CriticalLow — standard sensor
Backup & virtualization (Veeam / vCenter)Server process + admin-action logsHighMedium — ensure servers are sensored
LSASS credential theftProcess access to lsass; Falcon Identity ProtectionHighLow — high-fidelity
04

Consolidated IOC Table

Qilin is a RaaS — atomic IOCs (hashes, IPs, note names) vary per affiliate/intrusion. The behaviors below are the durable signal; capture per-incident atoms during triage. Copy-ready blocks in §9.
TypeValueConfActionContext
Behaviorfsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1 R2L:1highdetectTell-tale Qilin evasion config
Behaviorembedded PsExec (random name) -accepteula \\HOST -c -f -h -dhighdetectEncryptor self-propagation
Behaviorvssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet + reboot backup/VPN servershighdetectBackup destruction — impact imminent
Behaviorw.exe from C:\temp with SHA-256 password arg / -spread-vcenterhighdetectEncryptor execution
CVECVE-2023-27532 · CVE-2024-40711 · CVE-2026-50751highdetectVeeam + Check Point VPN initial access
05

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueObserved BehaviorQuery / Control
Initial AccessT1190 / T1133 / T1078 — Exploit public app / external VPN / valid accountsVeeam CVE, FortiGate/Check Point VPN, brute forceN1, N2; patch
DiscoveryT1087.002 / T1018 / T1482 — AD account / system / trust discoveryGet-ADComputer, net group, nltestQ1
Credential AccessT1003.001 — LSASS Memory (Mimikatz)lsass/winlogon/wininit token theftQ6
Defense EvasionT1070.001 — Clear Windows Event LogsGet-WinEvent/wevtutil log clearingQ4
Defense EvasionT1562.001 / T1222 — Disable tools / symlink-evalService kill; fsutil SymlinkEvaluation R2R/R2LQ5
Lateral MovementT1021.002 / T1570 — SMB admin shares / tool transferEmbedded PsExec; -spread-vcenterQ2, Q7
ImpactT1490 — Inhibit System Recoveryvssadmin delete shadows; tape-job deletion; rebootsQ3
ImpactT1486 — Data Encrypted for Impactw.exe AES-256-CTR / ChaCha20 + RSA-4096; cipher /wQ7
06

Native Audit-Log Hunts

HuntSourceLogicResponse
N1 · VPN/Veeam access anomalyFortiGate/Check Point VPN + Veeam logsVPN brute-force / new-geo logon; Veeam credential-DB access (CVE-2023-27532); CVE-2026-50751 indicatorsPatch; reset appliance + stored creds; hunt the host
N2 · Interactive logon from VPN pool → reconWindows Security 4624/4672Interactive logon from a VPN-assigned IP followed within ~60 min by AD discoveryIsolate beachhead; escalate (pairs with Q1)
N3 · Event-log clearsSecurity 1102 / System 104Audit-log cleared on endpoints/DCs (pre/post-encryption)Treat as active intrusion; preserve forwarded logs
N4 · Backup-job tamperingVeeam / backup-appliance logsBackup/tape jobs disabled or deleted; backup server rebootIsolate backups; verify immutability; escalate
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Field names validated against the Falcon event reference; process hunts include SyntheticProcessRollup2. Q1/Q2 require an env edit (your VPN CIDRs / deploy allow-list). Run 30–90 days for historical sweeps — dwell can be days to weeks.
Q1 · AD discovery burst (Domain Admin / DC / trust enumeration)
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: built-in AD enumeration post-compromise. Accomplishes: earliest reliable signal — pair with an interactive VPN logon (N2). FP: sysadmin/helpdesk scripts — allow-list admin AIDs / PAW.

// HUNT: Qilin AD discovery (T1087.002 / T1018 / T1482)
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low | TIMEFRAME: last 7d
// FP NOTES: net.exe by admins from PAW/JIT; nltest in AD health scripts
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| in(field=FileName, values=["net.exe","net1.exe","nltest.exe","dsquery.exe","adfind.exe","whoami.exe"], ignoreCase=true)
| CommandLine=/(group\s+"?Domain Admins"?|group\s+"?Enterprise Admins"?|\/dclist|\/domain_trusts|Get-ADComputer|Get-ADUser)/i
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName], function=[count(), collect([FileName, CommandLine], limit=20)])
| sort(_count, order=desc)
Q2 · PsExec self-propagation (-accepteula \\HOST -c -f -h -d)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: the embedded-PsExec command pattern (randomized binary name, UNC target, copy-and-run flags). Accomplishes: catches the encryptor spreading over SMB — impact imminent. FP: sanctioned PsExec deploys — allow-list known admin tooling/AIDs.

// HUNT: Qilin encryptor self-propagation via embedded PsExec (T1021.002, T1570)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low | ENV EDIT: allow-list sanctioned PsExec admin AIDs
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/-accepteula\s+\\\\[^\s]+\s+-c\s+-f\s+-h\s+-d/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q3 · Backup / shadow-copy destruction (inhibit recovery)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: VSS deletion / recovery-inhibition commands. Accomplishes: the "impact imminent" signal — escalate immediately. FP: rare admin maintenance — alert regardless and verify.

// HUNT: Qilin recovery inhibition (T1490)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/vssadmin(\.exe)?\s+delete\s+shadows|wmic\s+shadowcopy\s+delete|win32_shadowcopy.{0,20}delete|bcdedit.{0,40}recoveryenabled\s+no|wbadmin\s+delete\s+catalog|cipher\s+\/w:/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q4 · Windows event-log clearing
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: bulk event-log clearing via wevtutil/Get-WinEvent/Clear-EventLog. Accomplishes: catches the forensic-obstruction stage. FP: very rare legit clears — alert and verify.

// HUNT: Qilin event-log clearing (T1070.001)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low | pair with native Security 1102 / System 104
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/(wevtutil(\.exe)?\s+(cl|clear-log)|Clear-EventLog|Get-WinEvent.{0,40}-ListLog.{0,40}(ClearLog|RecordCount)|Limit-EventLog.{0,20}-OverflowAction)/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q5 · fsutil SymlinkEvaluation R2R/R2L enable (Qilin evasion)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1 / R2L:1 — a tell-tale Qilin step. Accomplishes: high-fidelity, near-zero FP. FP: none expected — alert on any hit.

// HUNT: Qilin enabling remote symlink evaluation (T1222 / evasion)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/fsutil\s+behavior\s+set\s+SymlinkEvaluation\s+R2(R|L):1/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName], limit=200)
Q6 · LSASS credential access (Mimikatz / MiniDump)
CONF HIGHFP LOW-MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: comsvcs.dll MiniDump of LSASS or Mimikatz-style command lines. Accomplishes: the credential-theft stage. FP: some IR/EDR tooling dumps LSASS — allow-list sanctioned tools. (Falcon CredTheft IOAs also fire here.)

// HUNT: Qilin LSASS credential theft (T1003.001)
// CONF: high  FP: low-med  COST: low | TUNING: allow-list sanctioned IR/EDR dumpers
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/(comsvcs\.dll.{0,20}MiniDump|sekurlsa|lsadump|privilege::debug|rundll32.{0,30}lsass|procdump.{0,20}lsass|nanodump)/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q7 · Encryptor execution & vCenter spread (w.exe / -spread-vcenter / MaxMpxCt)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: the encryptor binary from C:\temp, its -spread-vcenter flag, or the MaxMpxCt tuning. Accomplishes: the encryption stage. FP: low — verify any hit immediately.

// HUNT: Qilin encryptor execution / vCenter spread / SMB tuning (T1486, T1570)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| (ImageFileName=/\\(Temp|temp)\\w\.exe$/i
   or CommandLine=/-spread-vcenter|-no-vm-snapshot|--password\s+[A-Fa-f0-9]{64}/i
   or CommandLine=/reg(\.exe)?\s+add.{0,40}MaxMpxCt/i)
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
08

CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations

IOA NameField PatternsBenign ExclusionsDeployment Path
Qilin — recovery inhibition (VSS delete)CmdLine vssadmin delete shadows / wbadmin delete catalog / cipher /wSanctioned backup-maintenance AIDs (rare)Custom IOA → Process Creation, high severity, Detect+Block
Qilin — embedded-PsExec spreadCmdLine -accepteula \\* -c -f -h -dAllow-list known admin PsExec AIDsCustom IOA → Process Creation
Qilin — fsutil SymlinkEvaluation R2R/R2LCmdLine fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1|R2L:1None expectedCustom IOA → Process Creation
Q3, Q5, Q7 are strong Detect+Block promotions (near-zero FP, high impact). Q1/Q6 stay Detect/investigate with allow-lists.
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Grouped IOC Quick-Copy

One-click blocks for Falcon IOC Management, detection, and patch audit. Qilin is RaaS — atomic IOCs vary per affiliate; behavior + the access CVEs are durable.

Falcon IOC Management CSVbulk import (seed)
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
sha256,REPLACE_WITH_ENCRYPTOR_SHA256,prevent,critical,2027-06-12,Qilin encryptor (w.exe),campaign:Qilin
sha256,REPLACE_WITH_PSEXEC_HASH,detect,high,2027-06-12,Qilin embedded PsExec v2.43 (renamed),campaign:Qilin
ipv4,REPLACE_WITH_C2_IP,detect,medium,2026-09-12,Qilin C2 / exfil (per-affiliate),campaign:Qilin
Behavioral Signatureskill-chain detection
AD recon: net group "Domain Admins" / nltest /dclist / Get-ADComputer (from VPN host, <60min of logon)
Mimikatz: comsvcs.dll MiniDump of lsass / sekurlsa / privilege::debug
Log clearing: wevtutil cl / Get-WinEvent -ListLog * | clear (Security 1102, System 104)
Evasion: fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1 R2L:1
Spread: PsExec (random name) -accepteula \\HOST -c -f -h -d ; reg add ... MaxMpxCt 65535 ; -spread-vcenter
Recovery inhibition: vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet ; wbadmin delete catalog ; cipher /w
Encrypt: w.exe from C:\temp with 64-hex --password arg ; AES-256-CTR / ChaCha20 + RSA-4096
Initial-Access CVEspatch audit
CVE-2023-27532   # Veeam Backup & Replication — credential retrieval (PRIMARY)
CVE-2024-40711   # Veeam Backup & Replication — RCE / cred access
CVE-2026-50751   # Check Point VPN — June-2026 Qilin affiliate access (see CVE-2026-50751 pack)
# Plus: FortiGate/SSL-VPN brute force; ScreenConnect/RMM phishing (auth-alert lures)
# Patch Veeam + FortiOS now; force VPN MFA; immutable/offline backups
Named Toolingprocess names
w.exe                # Qilin encryptor (run from C:\temp, SHA-256 password arg from .conf)
PsExec v2.43         # embedded, renamed to a random filename (self-propagation)
Mimikatz             # embedded credential theft (lsass/winlogon/wininit)
net.exe / nltest.exe / Get-ADComputer   # AD discovery
vssadmin / wbadmin / cipher              # backup & recovery destruction
# Aliases: Qilin = Agenda = "Hastalamuerte" ; RaaS affiliate split 80-85%
10

Hardening — Tiered & Deployable

The destructive phase is fast once inside — close the edge front door and make recovery un-destroyable.

Immediate — Close the front door
  • Patch Veeam (CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711) & FortiOS; verify Check Point CVE-2026-50751M1051. Rotate appliance + Veeam-stored credentials.
  • Force MFA on all VPN auth (FIDO2 preferred)M1032. SMS is inadequate against brute force/cookie theft. Rate-limit/geo-fence SSL-VPN logins.
  • Immutable / offline backups (3-2-1)M1053. Not deletable by a Domain Admin credential; isolate the backup server's management plane.
  • Enable Falcon Tamper Protection + vulnerable-driver blocklist (HVCI)M1054 / M1038. Resist service/process kill.
Detect — Identity & endpoint telemetry (pilot first)
  • Falcon Identity ProtectionM1047. The built-in-binary AD recon chain lights up identity policies immediately.
  • PowerShell ScriptBlock (4104) + Module logging; forward Security 1102 / System 104M1040 / M1047. Feeds Q4/N3.
  • Restrict ADMIN$/C$ from non-management hosts; monitor remote service creationM1037 / M1018. Disrupts PsExec spread (Q2).
  • LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) + Credential GuardM1043. Neuters Mimikatz LSASS dumping (Q6).
Strategic — Reduce attack surface
  • Tier 0/1/2 admin model + LAPSM1026. Limit lateral reach of a stolen Domain Admin credential; Auth Policy Silos for VPN-pool accounts.
  • App allowlisting (WDAC/AppLocker); restrict PsExec/RMM to sanctioned IR hostsM1038. Blocks the encryptor & abused admin tooling.
  • Segment backup & virtualization (vCenter) management networksM1030. Disrupts -spread-vcenter and backup destruction.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
IsolateNetwork-contain the beachhead + any Q2/Q7 hosts; cut VPN access for the implicated account; isolate backup/vCenter management planeSOC L2Containment timestamps; Q1/Q2 events
TriageMap the AD-recon → Mimikatz → spread timeline; identify compromised accounts; confirm whether VSS/backups were destroyed (Q3/N4)IRProcess timeline; backup status
EradicateKill the encryptor + renamed PsExec; remove persistence; reset all credentials touched (esp. Domain Admin); revoke VPN sessionsIRCred-reset log; removed artifacts
RecoverRestore from immutable/offline backups; rebuild DCs/backup servers if needed; verify integrity before reconnectingIR + ITRestore evidence; integrity checks
HardenPatch Veeam/VPN; force MFA; deploy Q3/Q5/Q7 IOAs in Detect+Block; LSA Protection + immutable backupsDetection EngPatch + IOA status
12

Detection Coverage Map & Validation

TechniqueBehaviorCQLIOACoverage
T1190 / T1133Veeam/VPN initial accessGAP patch + appliance/Veeam logs (N1)
T1087.002 / T1018AD discoveryQ1Partial needs VPN CIDRs (N2)
T1003.001Mimikatz LSASSQ6Good (+ Falcon CredTheft IOA)
T1070.001Event-log clearingQ4Good (+ 1102/104)
T1222 / T1562.001SymlinkEval enable / tool killQ5IOA-3Good
T1021.002 / T1570PsExec / vCenter spreadQ2, Q7IOA-2Good tune deploy allow-list
T1490VSS / backup destructionQ3IOA-1Good
T1486Encryption (w.exe)Q7Good

Validation gates: (1) confirm ProcessRollup2 w/ command line on DCs + servers, and forward 1102/104 + Veeam/VPN logs; (2) populate VPN CIDRs (Q1/N2) and PsExec allow-list (Q2); (3) lab-test benign equivalents (a sanctioned vssadmin list, a benign fsutil behavior query) to confirm Q3/Q5 logic without firing on read-only ops; (4) promote Q3/Q5/Q7 to Custom IOA Detect+Block; keep Q1/Q6 Detect with allow-lists.

13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Hunt — Qilin (Agenda) Ransomware-as-a-Service
SEVERITY:     Critical (most-active RaaS 2026; double extortion; backup destruction)
SCOPE:        FortiGate/Check Point/Veeam-exposed orgs; Windows/AD/ESXi estates
HYPOTHESIS:   VPN/Veeam access -> AD recon -> Mimikatz -> log clear + service kill ->
              PsExec/vCenter spread -> backup destruction -> w.exe encrypt (double extortion).
DWELL:        hours-to-days (hunt 30-90d historical)
QUERIES RUN:  Q1 AD recon* | Q2 PsExec spread (IOA) | Q3 VSS/backup destroy (IOA) |
              Q4 log clearing | Q5 fsutil SymlinkEval (IOA) | Q6 Mimikatz LSASS |
              Q7 encryptor/vCenter spread
              (* = requires env edit: VPN CIDRs / PsExec allow-list)
DO FIRST:     Q3, Q2, Q5, Q1 — escalate any hit immediately
FINDINGS:     <pending analyst execution>
GAPS:         T1190/T1133 pre-endpoint (patch + appliance/Veeam logs)
ACTIONS:      Patch Veeam/FortiOS/Check Point + VPN MFA; immutable backups; LSA Protection;
              deploy Q3/Q5/Q7 IOAs in Detect+Block
OWNER:        HuntPack
VERSION:      v0.4 - 2026-06-12
14

Changelog

v0.42026-07-24CQL correctness pass. All table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.
v0.32026-06-12Re-hunt + reformatted to the review-v2 gold layout (fixed left-sidebar scrollspy TOC, collapsible, cloud selector inside the CQL section, per-card Copy/Open-in-Falcon, Grouped IOC Quick-Copy grid, coverage+validation, .ticket). Refreshed from Picus/MOXFIVE/SANS: full kill-chain TTPs (Mimikatz, log-clearing, PsExec/-spread-vcenter, MaxMpxCt, VSS destruction, w.exe encryptor, fsutil SymlinkEvaluation), ~500 victims YTD, and the June-2026 Check Point VPN (CVE-2026-50751) affiliate access vector. 7 CQL + 4 native hunts, 3 IOA candidates.
v0.12026-05-26Initial pack: Qilin overview from Red Canary 2026 trend page; Veeam CVEs; hunts. Pre-gold top-bar layout.
15

References

TierSourceUsed For
1Picus — Qilin Ransomware AnalysisFull kill-chain TTPs, command patterns, encryptor internals
1MOXFIVE — Qilin 2026 TTPs & VictimsScale (~1,500 / 500+ in 2026), access vectors, affiliate model
2SANS — Evolution of Qilin RaaS · Dexpose — Group Profile/TTPs/IOCsAgenda lineage, RaaS structure, defense guidance
1Help Net — Qilin affiliate exploited Check Point VPN (CVE-2026-50751)June-2026 initial-access vector (cross-pack)

HuntPack v0.3 · Qilin (Agenda) · Generated 2026-06-12 · Defensive use only — no offensive code. Atomic IOCs vary by affiliate; the behavioral kill-chain detections are the durable signal. Validate field names and tune VPN-CIDR / PsExec allow-lists in your tenant before promoting any query to alerting.