PayoutsKing (STAC4713 / GOLD ENCOUNTER) — Hidden-QEMU Ransomware
TPMProfiler scheduled task launches a hidden Alpine VM as SYSTEM (disks disguised as .db/.dll), forwards ports over a reverse-SSH tunnel, and runs AdaptixC2 / Chisel / Rclone inside the VM to evade endpoint security. Defensive hunt & harden pack — no offensive code.Executive Summary
PayoutsKing is a ransomware operation run by GOLD ENCOUNTER; Sophos tracks the intrusion set as STAC4713 (first seen November 2025). Its signature evasion is abusing the legitimate QEMU emulator to run a hidden virtual machine on the victim host — moving the attacker's tooling inside the VM, where the host EDR can't see it. A scheduled task named TPMProfiler launches the hidden QEMU VM as SYSTEM, using virtual-disk files disguised as databases and DLLs and setting up port forwarding to a reverse-SSH tunnel for covert access.
The guest is Alpine Linux 3.22.0 pre-loaded with attacker tools: AdaptixC2 (C2), Chisel (tunneling), BusyBox, and Rclone (exfil). Initial access has come from internet-exposed SonicWall VPNs without MFA and (Jan 2026) a SolarWinds Web Help Desk vulnerability (CVE-2025-26399). For credential theft the actor uses vssuirun.exe to create a shadow copy, then the print command over SMB to copy NTDS.dit, SAM, and SYSTEM hives to temp. GOLD ENCOUNTER also targets VMware/ESXi hypervisors for encryption.
qemu-system running on a non-virtualization host) and Q2 (the TPMProfiler scheduled task). Q5 (NTDS/SAM theft via VSS + SMB print) is the "domain compromise imminent" signal — escalate immediately. See the companion QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack for the broader technique.
Source Review & Web Hunter Notes
| Tier | Source | Key Finding | Carry |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Vendor research | Sophos — QEMU abused for ransomware delivery (STAC4713) | TPMProfiler task; hidden Alpine VM; AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone; reverse-SSH; GOLD ENCOUNTER | yes |
| 1 · News of record | BleepingComputer — Payouts King uses QEMU VMs | Hidden VM bypasses EDR; disks disguised as .db/.dll; SonicWall/SolarWinds access | yes |
| 2 · Vendor / news | SecurityWeek / Security Affairs / Cybersecurity News | CVE-2025-26399 (SolarWinds WHD); NTDS via VSS + SMB print; ESXi targeting | yes |
| 1 · Cross-pack | HuntPack — QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse | Broader QEMU-as-backdoor technique (STAC4713 + STAC3725) | yes |
Decisions: host-scaffolding-first detection (the guest VM is opaque to EDR — hunt qemu-system + TPMProfiler + the credential-theft + access vectors on the host); cross-references the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse sibling pack (same technique/campaign); lead defenses with SonicWall MFA + SolarWinds patch (the front doors).
Hunt Brief & Attack Chain
Working hypothesis: GOLD ENCOUNTER enters via SonicWall VPN or SolarWinds WHD, stands up a hidden QEMU VM (via a TPMProfiler task as SYSTEM) to run C2/tunneling/exfil out of EDR's sight, steals NTDS/SAM, and deploys PayoutsKing (incl. ESXi).
| Step | Behavior | Telemetry | Hunt Angle |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Access | SonicWall VPN (no MFA) / SolarWinds WHD CVE-2025-26399 | VPN/WHD logs; ProcessRollup2 | N1; Q6 |
| 2 · Hidden VM | TPMProfiler scheduled task launches qemu-system as SYSTEM; disks disguised as .db/.dll | ScheduledTaskRegistered; ProcessRollup2 | Q1 / Q2 / Q3 |
| 3 · Covert channel | Port forwarding → reverse-SSH tunnel; Chisel | NetworkConnectIP4/Listen | Q4 |
| 4 · In-VM tooling | AdaptixC2 / Chisel / BusyBox / Rclone run inside the Alpine guest | (opaque to host EDR) | N3; off-host network |
| 5 · Cred theft | vssuirun.exe shadow copy → SMB print copies NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM to temp | ProcessRollup2 | Q5 |
| 6 · Impact | PayoutsKing encryption (incl. VMware/ESXi) | ProcessRollup2; ESXi logs | ransomware detections |
Affected surface & telemetry
| Surface | Required Telemetry | Priority | Gap Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows endpoints / servers | Process lineage + scheduled tasks (ProcessRollup2) | Critical | Low — host scaffolding visible |
| QEMU guest (Alpine) | — | Low | Gap opaque to host EDR by design |
| Edge (SonicWall / SolarWinds WHD) | VPN + WHD logs | High | Medium — appliance/app logs |
| Network egress / tunnels | Listening ports; reverse-SSH; Chisel | High | Medium — tunnels blend |
Consolidated IOC Table
| Type | Value | Conf | Action | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | qemu-system-x86_64.exe running on a non-virtualization host | high | detect | Hidden VM — flagship |
| Persistence | scheduled task "TPMProfiler" launching QEMU as SYSTEM | high | detect | VM launcher |
| File | virtual-disk files disguised as .db / .dll (QEMU qcow2/raw) | medium | hunt | Disguised guest disk |
| Behavior | vssuirun.exe shadow + SMB "print" copy of NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM | high | detect | Domain-cred theft |
| CVE | CVE-2025-26399 (SolarWinds WHD) · SonicWall VPN w/o MFA | high | detect | Initial access |
ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | Observed Behavior | Query / Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1133 / T1190 — External VPN / exploit public app | SonicWall (no MFA); SolarWinds WHD CVE-2025-26399 | Q6; N1 |
| Defense Evasion | T1564.006 — Run Virtual Instance (hidden QEMU VM) | Attacker tooling inside an Alpine guest | Q1, Q3 |
| Persistence / Execution | T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (TPMProfiler, SYSTEM) | VM launcher | Q2; N2 |
| Command & Control | T1572 / T1090 — Protocol tunneling (reverse SSH / Chisel) | Port-forward tunnel from the guest | Q4 |
| Credential Access | T1003.003 — NTDS / SAM via VSS | vssuirun.exe shadow + SMB print copy | Q5 |
| Impact | T1486 — Data Encrypted (incl. ESXi) | PayoutsKing encryptor | ransomware detections |
Native Audit-Log Hunts
| Hunt | Source | Logic | Response |
|---|---|---|---|
| N1 · Edge access | SonicWall VPN / SolarWinds WHD logs | VPN logon without MFA; WHD exploitation (CVE-2025-26399) indicators | Patch; enforce MFA; hunt the host |
| N2 · TPMProfiler task | Task Scheduler / EID 4698 | A task named TPMProfiler (or any task launching qemu-system as SYSTEM) | Remove; isolate; escalate |
| N3 · Disguised VM disks | File inventory | Large .db/.dll files that are actually QEMU disk images (qcow2/raw magic) | Recover for forensics; isolate |
| N4 · NTDS/SAM theft | Security 4688 / 1102 | vssuirun.exe shadow copy + print over SMB targeting NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM | Treat as domain compromise; reset krbtgt |
| N5 · ESXi targeting | vCenter / ESXi logs | SSH enabled, rogue accounts, mass VM power-off, encryptor on datastores | Isolate hypervisors; restore from backup |
CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries
SyntheticProcessRollup2. The guest VM is opaque to host EDR — these hunt the host-visible scaffolding. If QEMU is sanctioned anywhere, allow-list those hosts in Q1.Looks for: qemu-system-* executing (esp. with hidden/headless + netdev/hostfwd args). Accomplishes: the hidden-VM scaffolding — the flagship signal. FP: sanctioned virtualization hosts (allow-list).
// HUNT: PayoutsKing hidden QEMU VM (qemu-system on a non-virtualization host) // MITRE: T1564.006 | CONF: high FP: low-med COST: low // TUNING: allow-list sanctioned virtualization host group #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | FileName=/^qemu-system-(x86_64|i386|aarch64)\.exe$/i | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, AuthenticationId], limit=200)
Looks for: a scheduled task named TPMProfiler or any task whose action launches qemu-system. Accomplishes: the VM launcher / persistence. FP: none expected.
// HUNT: PayoutsKing VM-launcher scheduled task // MITRE: T1053.005, T1564.006 | CONF: high FP: low COST: low #event_simpleName=ScheduledTaskRegistered | (TaskName=/TPMProfiler/i or CommandLine=/qemu-system/i) | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, TaskName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Looks for: a qemu-system command line referencing a disk image with a .db/.dll extension (disguised guest disk). Accomplishes: the disguised-disk indicator. FP: low — verify the file is a qcow2/raw image.
// HUNT: PayoutsKing disguised QEMU disk (.db/.dll as a VM image) // MITRE: T1564.006, T1036 | CONF: medium FP: medium COST: low // TUNING: confirm the referenced file is a qcow2/raw image (magic) #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | FileName=/^qemu-system/i | CommandLine=/(-drive|-hda|file=).+\.(db|dll|dat|bin)/i | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Looks for: reverse-SSH (ssh -R), Chisel, or QEMU hostfwd port-forwarding establishing a covert channel. Accomplishes: the tunnel. FP: some admin SSH — flag -R + external + a same-host Q1 hit.
// HUNT: PayoutsKing covert tunnel (reverse-SSH / Chisel / QEMU hostfwd) // MITRE: T1572, T1090 | CONF: med-high FP: medium COST: low // TUNING: correlate to Q1; flag ssh -R / chisel / hostfwd to external hosts #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | CommandLine=/(ssh(\.exe)?\s+.*-R\s|chisel(\.exe)?\s+(client|server)|hostfwd=tcp::|netcat\s+-e)/i | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Looks for: vssuirun.exe/vssadmin shadow creation, or print/copy of NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM over SMB. Accomplishes: domain-credential theft — escalate immediately. FP: very low.
// HUNT: PayoutsKing NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print) // MITRE: T1003.003 | CONF: high FP: low COST: low #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | (CommandLine=/(vssuirun|vssadmin.+create\s+shadow|wmic\s+shadowcopy)/i or CommandLine=/(print|copy).+(ntds\.dit|\\SAM\b|\\SYSTEM\b|\\\\.+\\(C\$|ADMIN\$))/i) | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Looks for: the SolarWinds Web Help Desk process spawning shells/odd children (CVE-2025-26399 exploitation). Accomplishes: initial access. FP: verify; pair with N1 (VPN/WHD logs).
// HUNT: SolarWinds Web Help Desk exploitation (CVE-2025-26399) // MITRE: T1190 | CONF: medium FP: medium COST: low // TUNING: pair with N1 (SonicWall VPN / WHD logs); flag WHD/java spawning shells #event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/ | ParentImageFileName=/(WebHelpDesk|whd|tomcat|java)/i | FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|whoami|net|net1)\.exe$/i | table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentImageFileName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations
| IOA Name | Field Patterns | Benign Exclusions | Deployment Path |
|---|---|---|---|
| PayoutsKing — qemu-system on a non-virt host | Image *\qemu-system-*.exe outside the sanctioned virtualization host group | Sanctioned virtualization hosts | Endpoint Security → Custom IOA → Process Creation, Detect+Block |
| PayoutsKing — NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print) | CmdLine vssuirun/vssadmin create shadow + print/copy ntds.dit|SAM|SYSTEM | Sanctioned DC backup ops (rare) | Custom IOA → Process Creation, high severity |
Machine-Readable IOC Appendix
Grouped IOC Quick-Copy
One-click blocks for detection and patch audit. The guest tooling is EDR-opaque — these target the host scaffolding + access + cred-theft. Atomic IOCs vary per intrusion.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe running on a non-virtualization endpoint (hidden VM) Scheduled task "TPMProfiler" launching QEMU as SYSTEM QEMU -drive/-hda referencing a .db/.dll file (disguised qcow2/raw disk) ssh -R / chisel client/server / QEMU hostfwd=tcp:: (reverse tunnel) vssuirun.exe shadow + print/copy of NTDS.dit / SAM / SYSTEM over SMB SolarWinds Web Help Desk (java/tomcat) spawning cmd/powershell (CVE-2025-26399)
# Guest: Alpine Linux 3.22.0 (runs inside the hidden QEMU VM) AdaptixC2 # command & control Chisel # TCP tunneling / port forwarding BusyBox # toolbox Rclone # data exfiltration # These run INSIDE the VM (invisible to host EDR) -> detect the VM, network egress, and tunnels # Group: GOLD ENCOUNTER (also targets VMware/ESXi encryptors)
CVE-2025-26399 # SolarWinds Web Help Desk (Jan 2026 incident) — PATCH SonicWall SSL-VPN without MFA # exposed VPN brute-force/credential access — ENFORCE MFA # Cred theft on host: vssuirun.exe -> shadow copy -> SMB 'print' -> NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM to %TEMP% # Impact: PayoutsKing encryptor, including VMware/ESXi datastores
# Deny the hidden-VM technique: WDAC/AppLocker: block qemu-system / QEMU binaries on non-virtualization endpoints Alert on ANY new scheduled task launching a virtualization binary as SYSTEM Patch SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399); enforce MFA on SonicWall + all VPN LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) + restrict VSS/DC backup ops to sanctioned admins Immutable/offline backups; segment + harden ESXi/vCenter management Egress control: block reverse-SSH / Chisel / unexpected outbound tunnels
Hardening — Tiered & Deployable
Deny QEMU where it doesn't belong, close the edge doors, and make recovery un-destroyable.
- WDAC/AppLocker: block
qemu-system/QEMU on non-virtualization endpoints — M1038. Directly defeats Q1. - Patch SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399); enforce MFA on SonicWall + all VPN — M1051 / M1032. Closes the front doors.
- Alert on any new task launching a virtualization binary as SYSTEM — M1047. Catches TPMProfiler-style launchers.
- Immutable / offline backups; segment ESXi/vCenter management — M1053 / M1030.
- LSA Protection (RunAsPPL); restrict VSS / DC backup ops — M1043 / M1026. Blunts NTDS/SAM theft (Q5).
- Egress control: block reverse-SSH / Chisel / unexpected tunnels — M1037. Disrupts the covert channel (Q4).
- Forward 1102/4698 + DC backup logs; alert on event-log clears — M1047.
- Application allowlisting enterprise-wide — M1038. Denies QEMU + encryptors.
- Harden ESXi: lockdown mode, MFA, no direct internet, restricted SSH — M1030 / M1032. GOLD ENCOUNTER targets hypervisors.
- Tier 0/1/2 admin model + LAPS — M1026.
Containment Runbook
| Phase | Actions | Owner | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isolate | Network-contain the QEMU host + any Q4/Q5 hosts; cut VPN access for implicated accounts; isolate ESXi/vCenter mgmt | SOC L2 | Containment timestamps; Q1/Q2 events |
| Triage | Capture the qemu-system command line + the disguised disk image (forensics on the guest); confirm NTDS/SAM theft (Q5/N4); map the tunnel | IR | QEMU cmdline; disk image; cred-theft evidence |
| Eradicate | Remove the TPMProfiler task + QEMU + disk; kill the tunnel; reset all credentials (assume domain compromise → reset krbtgt twice) | IR | Removal log; krbtgt reset |
| Recover | Restore from immutable backups; rebuild compromised hosts/DCs/ESXi; verify integrity | IR + IT | Restore evidence; integrity checks |
| Harden | Block QEMU on endpoints; patch WHD; SonicWall MFA; LSA Protection; promote Q1/Q2/Q5 IOAs | Detection Eng | Control status; IOA enabled |
Detection Coverage Map & Validation
| Technique | Behavior | CQL | IOA | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1564.006 | Hidden QEMU VM | Q1, Q3 | IOA-1 | Good with allow-list |
| T1053.005 | TPMProfiler launcher task | Q2 | — | Good |
| T1572 / T1090 | Reverse-SSH / Chisel tunnel | Q4 | — | Partial correlate to Q1 |
| T1003.003 | NTDS/SAM theft | Q5 | IOA-2 | Good |
| T1190 / T1133 | SolarWinds / SonicWall access | Q6 | — | Partial + appliance logs (N1) |
| — | In-VM tooling (AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone) | — | — | GAP EDR-opaque — detect VM + egress |
Validation gates: (1) confirm process + scheduled-task telemetry + SonicWall/SolarWinds logs; (2) enumerate sanctioned virtualization hosts (allow-list for Q1); (3) lab-test a benign qemu-system run on a test host (Q1) and a benign task launching it (Q2); (4) promote Q1/Q2/Q5 to Custom IOA Detect+Block; keep Q3/Q4/Q6 correlated. Pair with the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack.
Hunt Summary Ticket
TITLE: Hunt — PayoutsKing / STAC4713 (GOLD ENCOUNTER hidden-QEMU ransomware)
SEVERITY: Critical (ransomware; EDR-evasion VM; ESXi targeting)
SCOPE: Windows endpoints/servers; SonicWall/SolarWinds-exposed orgs; ESXi estates
HYPOTHESIS: SonicWall VPN / SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399) -> TPMProfiler task launches a
hidden QEMU Alpine VM as SYSTEM (AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone inside) -> reverse-SSH
tunnel -> NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print) -> PayoutsKing encrypt (incl. ESXi).
QUERIES RUN: Q1 qemu-system on non-virt host (IOA) | Q2 TPMProfiler task | Q3 disguised disk |
Q4 reverse-SSH/Chisel | Q5 NTDS/SAM theft (IOA) | Q6 SolarWinds WHD exploit
+ Native N1-N5 (edge logs, task, disk inventory, NTDS theft, ESXi)
DO FIRST: Q1, Q2, Q5 — escalate any hit (Q5 = domain compromise imminent)
FINDINGS: <pending analyst execution>
GAPS: In-VM tooling EDR-opaque -> detect the VM + egress; edge needs appliance logs
ACTIONS: Block QEMU on endpoints; patch WHD; SonicWall MFA; LSA Protection; immutable
backups; harden ESXi; promote Q1/Q2/Q5; see QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack
OWNER: HuntPack
VERSION: v0.4 - 2026-06-12
Changelog
table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.References
| Tier | Source | Used For |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sophos — QEMU abused for ransomware (STAC4713) | TPMProfiler, hidden Alpine VM, in-guest tooling, GOLD ENCOUNTER |
| 1 | BleepingComputer — Payouts King uses QEMU VMs | EDR bypass; disguised disks; access vectors |
| 2 | Security Affairs — Hidden VMs via QEMU · SecurityWeek — QEMU defense evasion | CVE-2025-26399; NTDS via VSS + SMB print; ESXi |
| 1 | HuntPack — QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse (sibling pack) | Broader QEMU-as-backdoor technique (STAC4713 + STAC3725) |
HuntPack v0.3 · PayoutsKing / STAC4713 · Generated 2026-06-12 · Defensive use only — no offensive code. The attacker's tooling runs inside an EDR-opaque QEMU guest; hunt the host scaffolding (qemu-system, TPMProfiler), the credential theft, and the access vectors. See the companion QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack. Validate field names + virtualization allow-lists before promoting any query.