PayoutsKing (STAC4713 / GOLD ENCOUNTER) — Hidden-QEMU Ransomware

GOLD ENCOUNTER runs the PayoutsKing ransomware operation by hiding tradecraft inside a QEMU virtual machine: a TPMProfiler scheduled task launches a hidden Alpine VM as SYSTEM (disks disguised as .db/.dll), forwards ports over a reverse-SSH tunnel, and runs AdaptixC2 / Chisel / Rclone inside the VM to evade endpoint security. Defensive hunt & harden pack — no offensive code.
Threat
PayoutsKing · STAC4713 · GOLD ENCOUNTER
Severity
RANSOMWARE · EDR-EVASION VM
Type
Ransomware · hidden-VM backdoor · ESXi-targeting
Access
SonicWall VPN (no MFA) · SolarWinds WHD CVE-2025-26399
Related
QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse (sibling pack)
Version
v0.4 · 2026-06-12
Author
HuntPack
01

Executive Summary

PayoutsKing is a ransomware operation run by GOLD ENCOUNTER; Sophos tracks the intrusion set as STAC4713 (first seen November 2025). Its signature evasion is abusing the legitimate QEMU emulator to run a hidden virtual machine on the victim host — moving the attacker's tooling inside the VM, where the host EDR can't see it. A scheduled task named TPMProfiler launches the hidden QEMU VM as SYSTEM, using virtual-disk files disguised as databases and DLLs and setting up port forwarding to a reverse-SSH tunnel for covert access.

The guest is Alpine Linux 3.22.0 pre-loaded with attacker tools: AdaptixC2 (C2), Chisel (tunneling), BusyBox, and Rclone (exfil). Initial access has come from internet-exposed SonicWall VPNs without MFA and (Jan 2026) a SolarWinds Web Help Desk vulnerability (CVE-2025-26399). For credential theft the actor uses vssuirun.exe to create a shadow copy, then the print command over SMB to copy NTDS.dit, SAM, and SYSTEM hives to temp. GOLD ENCOUNTER also targets VMware/ESXi hypervisors for encryption.

Defender priority: The hidden VM blinds host EDR, so hunt the host-visible scaffolding, not the guest: Q1 (qemu-system running on a non-virtualization host) and Q2 (the TPMProfiler scheduled task). Q5 (NTDS/SAM theft via VSS + SMB print) is the "domain compromise imminent" signal — escalate immediately. See the companion QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack for the broader technique.

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

TierSourceKey FindingCarry
1 · Vendor researchSophos — QEMU abused for ransomware delivery (STAC4713)TPMProfiler task; hidden Alpine VM; AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone; reverse-SSH; GOLD ENCOUNTERyes
1 · News of recordBleepingComputer — Payouts King uses QEMU VMsHidden VM bypasses EDR; disks disguised as .db/.dll; SonicWall/SolarWinds accessyes
2 · Vendor / newsSecurityWeek / Security Affairs / Cybersecurity NewsCVE-2025-26399 (SolarWinds WHD); NTDS via VSS + SMB print; ESXi targetingyes
1 · Cross-packHuntPack — QEMU Hidden-VM AbuseBroader QEMU-as-backdoor technique (STAC4713 + STAC3725)yes

Decisions: host-scaffolding-first detection (the guest VM is opaque to EDR — hunt qemu-system + TPMProfiler + the credential-theft + access vectors on the host); cross-references the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse sibling pack (same technique/campaign); lead defenses with SonicWall MFA + SolarWinds patch (the front doors).

03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Working hypothesis: GOLD ENCOUNTER enters via SonicWall VPN or SolarWinds WHD, stands up a hidden QEMU VM (via a TPMProfiler task as SYSTEM) to run C2/tunneling/exfil out of EDR's sight, steals NTDS/SAM, and deploys PayoutsKing (incl. ESXi).

StepBehaviorTelemetryHunt Angle
1 · AccessSonicWall VPN (no MFA) / SolarWinds WHD CVE-2025-26399VPN/WHD logs; ProcessRollup2N1; Q6
2 · Hidden VMTPMProfiler scheduled task launches qemu-system as SYSTEM; disks disguised as .db/.dllScheduledTaskRegistered; ProcessRollup2Q1 / Q2 / Q3
3 · Covert channelPort forwarding → reverse-SSH tunnel; ChiselNetworkConnectIP4/ListenQ4
4 · In-VM toolingAdaptixC2 / Chisel / BusyBox / Rclone run inside the Alpine guest(opaque to host EDR)N3; off-host network
5 · Cred theftvssuirun.exe shadow copy → SMB print copies NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM to tempProcessRollup2Q5
6 · ImpactPayoutsKing encryption (incl. VMware/ESXi)ProcessRollup2; ESXi logsransomware detections

Affected surface & telemetry

SurfaceRequired TelemetryPriorityGap Risk
Windows endpoints / serversProcess lineage + scheduled tasks (ProcessRollup2)CriticalLow — host scaffolding visible
QEMU guest (Alpine)LowGap opaque to host EDR by design
Edge (SonicWall / SolarWinds WHD)VPN + WHD logsHighMedium — appliance/app logs
Network egress / tunnelsListening ports; reverse-SSH; ChiselHighMedium — tunnels blend
04

Consolidated IOC Table

The attacker's tooling lives inside the QEMU guest (EDR-opaque) — the durable host signals are the VM scaffolding (qemu-system + TPMProfiler) and the credential-theft / access vectors. Copy-ready blocks in §9.
TypeValueConfActionContext
Behaviorqemu-system-x86_64.exe running on a non-virtualization hosthighdetectHidden VM — flagship
Persistencescheduled task "TPMProfiler" launching QEMU as SYSTEMhighdetectVM launcher
Filevirtual-disk files disguised as .db / .dll (QEMU qcow2/raw)mediumhuntDisguised guest disk
Behaviorvssuirun.exe shadow + SMB "print" copy of NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEMhighdetectDomain-cred theft
CVECVE-2025-26399 (SolarWinds WHD) · SonicWall VPN w/o MFAhighdetectInitial access
05

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueObserved BehaviorQuery / Control
Initial AccessT1133 / T1190 — External VPN / exploit public appSonicWall (no MFA); SolarWinds WHD CVE-2025-26399Q6; N1
Defense EvasionT1564.006 — Run Virtual Instance (hidden QEMU VM)Attacker tooling inside an Alpine guestQ1, Q3
Persistence / ExecutionT1053.005 — Scheduled Task (TPMProfiler, SYSTEM)VM launcherQ2; N2
Command & ControlT1572 / T1090 — Protocol tunneling (reverse SSH / Chisel)Port-forward tunnel from the guestQ4
Credential AccessT1003.003 — NTDS / SAM via VSSvssuirun.exe shadow + SMB print copyQ5
ImpactT1486 — Data Encrypted (incl. ESXi)PayoutsKing encryptorransomware detections
06

Native Audit-Log Hunts

HuntSourceLogicResponse
N1 · Edge accessSonicWall VPN / SolarWinds WHD logsVPN logon without MFA; WHD exploitation (CVE-2025-26399) indicatorsPatch; enforce MFA; hunt the host
N2 · TPMProfiler taskTask Scheduler / EID 4698A task named TPMProfiler (or any task launching qemu-system as SYSTEM)Remove; isolate; escalate
N3 · Disguised VM disksFile inventoryLarge .db/.dll files that are actually QEMU disk images (qcow2/raw magic)Recover for forensics; isolate
N4 · NTDS/SAM theftSecurity 4688 / 1102vssuirun.exe shadow copy + print over SMB targeting NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEMTreat as domain compromise; reset krbtgt
N5 · ESXi targetingvCenter / ESXi logsSSH enabled, rogue accounts, mass VM power-off, encryptor on datastoresIsolate hypervisors; restore from backup
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Field names validated against the Falcon event reference; process hunts include SyntheticProcessRollup2. The guest VM is opaque to host EDR — these hunt the host-visible scaffolding. If QEMU is sanctioned anywhere, allow-list those hosts in Q1.
Q1 · qemu-system running on a non-virtualization host
CONF HIGHFP LOW-MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: qemu-system-* executing (esp. with hidden/headless + netdev/hostfwd args). Accomplishes: the hidden-VM scaffolding — the flagship signal. FP: sanctioned virtualization hosts (allow-list).

// HUNT: PayoutsKing hidden QEMU VM (qemu-system on a non-virtualization host)
// MITRE: T1564.006 | CONF: high  FP: low-med  COST: low
// TUNING: allow-list sanctioned virtualization host group
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| FileName=/^qemu-system-(x86_64|i386|aarch64)\.exe$/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, AuthenticationId], limit=200)
Q2 · TPMProfiler (or QEMU-launching) scheduled task
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: a scheduled task named TPMProfiler or any task whose action launches qemu-system. Accomplishes: the VM launcher / persistence. FP: none expected.

// HUNT: PayoutsKing VM-launcher scheduled task
// MITRE: T1053.005, T1564.006 | CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=ScheduledTaskRegistered
| (TaskName=/TPMProfiler/i or CommandLine=/qemu-system/i)
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, TaskName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q3 · QEMU disk image disguised as .db / .dll
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: a qemu-system command line referencing a disk image with a .db/.dll extension (disguised guest disk). Accomplishes: the disguised-disk indicator. FP: low — verify the file is a qcow2/raw image.

// HUNT: PayoutsKing disguised QEMU disk (.db/.dll as a VM image)
// MITRE: T1564.006, T1036 | CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: confirm the referenced file is a qcow2/raw image (magic)
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| FileName=/^qemu-system/i
| CommandLine=/(-drive|-hda|file=).+\.(db|dll|dat|bin)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q4 · Reverse-SSH / Chisel tunnel from the QEMU host
CONF MED-HIGHFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: reverse-SSH (ssh -R), Chisel, or QEMU hostfwd port-forwarding establishing a covert channel. Accomplishes: the tunnel. FP: some admin SSH — flag -R + external + a same-host Q1 hit.

// HUNT: PayoutsKing covert tunnel (reverse-SSH / Chisel / QEMU hostfwd)
// MITRE: T1572, T1090 | CONF: med-high  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: correlate to Q1; flag ssh -R / chisel / hostfwd to external hosts
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/(ssh(\.exe)?\s+.*-R\s|chisel(\.exe)?\s+(client|server)|hostfwd=tcp::|netcat\s+-e)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q5 · NTDS / SAM theft via VSS + SMB print
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: vssuirun.exe/vssadmin shadow creation, or print/copy of NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM over SMB. Accomplishes: domain-credential theft — escalate immediately. FP: very low.

// HUNT: PayoutsKing NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print)
// MITRE: T1003.003 | CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| (CommandLine=/(vssuirun|vssadmin.+create\s+shadow|wmic\s+shadowcopy)/i
   or CommandLine=/(print|copy).+(ntds\.dit|\\SAM\b|\\SYSTEM\b|\\\\.+\\(C\$|ADMIN\$))/i)
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q6 · Initial-access surface (SonicWall / SolarWinds WHD)
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: the SolarWinds Web Help Desk process spawning shells/odd children (CVE-2025-26399 exploitation). Accomplishes: initial access. FP: verify; pair with N1 (VPN/WHD logs).

// HUNT: SolarWinds Web Help Desk exploitation (CVE-2025-26399)
// MITRE: T1190 | CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: pair with N1 (SonicWall VPN / WHD logs); flag WHD/java spawning shells
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentImageFileName=/(WebHelpDesk|whd|tomcat|java)/i
| FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|whoami|net|net1)\.exe$/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentImageFileName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
08

CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations

IOA NameField PatternsBenign ExclusionsDeployment Path
PayoutsKing — qemu-system on a non-virt hostImage *\qemu-system-*.exe outside the sanctioned virtualization host groupSanctioned virtualization hostsEndpoint Security → Custom IOA → Process Creation, Detect+Block
PayoutsKing — NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print)CmdLine vssuirun/vssadmin create shadow + print/copy ntds.dit|SAM|SYSTEMSanctioned DC backup ops (rare)Custom IOA → Process Creation, high severity
Q1, Q2, Q5 are strong Detect+Block promotions. Q3/Q4/Q6 stay correlated hunts. See the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack for additional QEMU-technique detections.
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Grouped IOC Quick-Copy

One-click blocks for detection and patch audit. The guest tooling is EDR-opaque — these target the host scaffolding + access + cred-theft. Atomic IOCs vary per intrusion.

Behavioral Signatureshost scaffolding
qemu-system-x86_64.exe running on a non-virtualization endpoint (hidden VM)
Scheduled task "TPMProfiler" launching QEMU as SYSTEM
QEMU -drive/-hda referencing a .db/.dll file (disguised qcow2/raw disk)
ssh -R / chisel client/server / QEMU hostfwd=tcp:: (reverse tunnel)
vssuirun.exe shadow + print/copy of NTDS.dit / SAM / SYSTEM over SMB
SolarWinds Web Help Desk (java/tomcat) spawning cmd/powershell (CVE-2025-26399)
In-VM Tooling (Alpine guest)EDR-opaque
# Guest: Alpine Linux 3.22.0 (runs inside the hidden QEMU VM)
AdaptixC2     # command & control
Chisel        # TCP tunneling / port forwarding
BusyBox       # toolbox
Rclone        # data exfiltration
# These run INSIDE the VM (invisible to host EDR) -> detect the VM, network egress, and tunnels
# Group: GOLD ENCOUNTER (also targets VMware/ESXi encryptors)
Initial-Access Auditpatch / MFA
CVE-2025-26399   # SolarWinds Web Help Desk (Jan 2026 incident) — PATCH
SonicWall SSL-VPN without MFA   # exposed VPN brute-force/credential access — ENFORCE MFA
# Cred theft on host: vssuirun.exe -> shadow copy -> SMB 'print' -> NTDS.dit/SAM/SYSTEM to %TEMP%
# Impact: PayoutsKing encryptor, including VMware/ESXi datastores
Hardening / Blockdeny hidden VMs
# Deny the hidden-VM technique:
WDAC/AppLocker: block qemu-system / QEMU binaries on non-virtualization endpoints
Alert on ANY new scheduled task launching a virtualization binary as SYSTEM
Patch SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399); enforce MFA on SonicWall + all VPN
LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) + restrict VSS/DC backup ops to sanctioned admins
Immutable/offline backups; segment + harden ESXi/vCenter management
Egress control: block reverse-SSH / Chisel / unexpected outbound tunnels
10

Hardening — Tiered & Deployable

Deny QEMU where it doesn't belong, close the edge doors, and make recovery un-destroyable.

Immediate — Deny hidden VMs & close the doors
  • WDAC/AppLocker: block qemu-system/QEMU on non-virtualization endpointsM1038. Directly defeats Q1.
  • Patch SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399); enforce MFA on SonicWall + all VPNM1051 / M1032. Closes the front doors.
  • Alert on any new task launching a virtualization binary as SYSTEMM1047. Catches TPMProfiler-style launchers.
  • Immutable / offline backups; segment ESXi/vCenter managementM1053 / M1030.
Detect — Cred theft & tunnels (pilot first)
  • LSA Protection (RunAsPPL); restrict VSS / DC backup opsM1043 / M1026. Blunts NTDS/SAM theft (Q5).
  • Egress control: block reverse-SSH / Chisel / unexpected tunnelsM1037. Disrupts the covert channel (Q4).
  • Forward 1102/4698 + DC backup logs; alert on event-log clearsM1047.
Strategic — Reduce surface
  • Application allowlisting enterprise-wideM1038. Denies QEMU + encryptors.
  • Harden ESXi: lockdown mode, MFA, no direct internet, restricted SSHM1030 / M1032. GOLD ENCOUNTER targets hypervisors.
  • Tier 0/1/2 admin model + LAPSM1026.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
IsolateNetwork-contain the QEMU host + any Q4/Q5 hosts; cut VPN access for implicated accounts; isolate ESXi/vCenter mgmtSOC L2Containment timestamps; Q1/Q2 events
TriageCapture the qemu-system command line + the disguised disk image (forensics on the guest); confirm NTDS/SAM theft (Q5/N4); map the tunnelIRQEMU cmdline; disk image; cred-theft evidence
EradicateRemove the TPMProfiler task + QEMU + disk; kill the tunnel; reset all credentials (assume domain compromise → reset krbtgt twice)IRRemoval log; krbtgt reset
RecoverRestore from immutable backups; rebuild compromised hosts/DCs/ESXi; verify integrityIR + ITRestore evidence; integrity checks
HardenBlock QEMU on endpoints; patch WHD; SonicWall MFA; LSA Protection; promote Q1/Q2/Q5 IOAsDetection EngControl status; IOA enabled
12

Detection Coverage Map & Validation

TechniqueBehaviorCQLIOACoverage
T1564.006Hidden QEMU VMQ1, Q3IOA-1Good with allow-list
T1053.005TPMProfiler launcher taskQ2Good
T1572 / T1090Reverse-SSH / Chisel tunnelQ4Partial correlate to Q1
T1003.003NTDS/SAM theftQ5IOA-2Good
T1190 / T1133SolarWinds / SonicWall accessQ6Partial + appliance logs (N1)
In-VM tooling (AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone)GAP EDR-opaque — detect VM + egress

Validation gates: (1) confirm process + scheduled-task telemetry + SonicWall/SolarWinds logs; (2) enumerate sanctioned virtualization hosts (allow-list for Q1); (3) lab-test a benign qemu-system run on a test host (Q1) and a benign task launching it (Q2); (4) promote Q1/Q2/Q5 to Custom IOA Detect+Block; keep Q3/Q4/Q6 correlated. Pair with the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack.

13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Hunt — PayoutsKing / STAC4713 (GOLD ENCOUNTER hidden-QEMU ransomware)
SEVERITY:     Critical (ransomware; EDR-evasion VM; ESXi targeting)
SCOPE:        Windows endpoints/servers; SonicWall/SolarWinds-exposed orgs; ESXi estates
HYPOTHESIS:   SonicWall VPN / SolarWinds WHD (CVE-2025-26399) -> TPMProfiler task launches a
              hidden QEMU Alpine VM as SYSTEM (AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone inside) -> reverse-SSH
              tunnel -> NTDS/SAM theft (VSS + SMB print) -> PayoutsKing encrypt (incl. ESXi).
QUERIES RUN:  Q1 qemu-system on non-virt host (IOA) | Q2 TPMProfiler task | Q3 disguised disk |
              Q4 reverse-SSH/Chisel | Q5 NTDS/SAM theft (IOA) | Q6 SolarWinds WHD exploit
              + Native N1-N5 (edge logs, task, disk inventory, NTDS theft, ESXi)
DO FIRST:     Q1, Q2, Q5 — escalate any hit (Q5 = domain compromise imminent)
FINDINGS:     <pending analyst execution>
GAPS:         In-VM tooling EDR-opaque -> detect the VM + egress; edge needs appliance logs
ACTIONS:      Block QEMU on endpoints; patch WHD; SonicWall MFA; LSA Protection; immutable
              backups; harden ESXi; promote Q1/Q2/Q5; see QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack
OWNER:        HuntPack
VERSION:      v0.4 - 2026-06-12
14

Changelog

v0.42026-07-24CQL correctness pass. All table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.
v0.32026-06-12Re-hunt + reformatted to the review-v2 gold layout (fixed left-sidebar scrollspy TOC, collapsible, cloud selector inside the CQL section, per-card Copy/Open-in-Falcon, Grouped IOC Quick-Copy grid, coverage+validation, .ticket). Refreshed from Sophos/BleepingComputer: STAC4713/GOLD ENCOUNTER attribution, TPMProfiler task + hidden Alpine VM, AdaptixC2/Chisel/Rclone in-guest, disguised .db/.dll disks, SonicWall/SolarWinds (CVE-2025-26399) access, vssuirun NTDS/SAM theft, ESXi targeting. Cross-linked the QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack. 6 CQL + 5 native hunts, 2 IOA candidates.
v0.12026-05-26Initial pack: PayoutsKing ransomware overview + hunts. Pre-gold top-bar layout.
15

References

TierSourceUsed For
1Sophos — QEMU abused for ransomware (STAC4713)TPMProfiler, hidden Alpine VM, in-guest tooling, GOLD ENCOUNTER
1BleepingComputer — Payouts King uses QEMU VMsEDR bypass; disguised disks; access vectors
2Security Affairs — Hidden VMs via QEMU · SecurityWeek — QEMU defense evasionCVE-2025-26399; NTDS via VSS + SMB print; ESXi
1HuntPack — QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse (sibling pack)Broader QEMU-as-backdoor technique (STAC4713 + STAC3725)

HuntPack v0.3 · PayoutsKing / STAC4713 · Generated 2026-06-12 · Defensive use only — no offensive code. The attacker's tooling runs inside an EDR-opaque QEMU guest; hunt the host scaffolding (qemu-system, TPMProfiler), the credential theft, and the access vectors. See the companion QEMU Hidden-VM Abuse pack. Validate field names + virtualization allow-lists before promoting any query.