PaperCut NG/MF Pre-Authentication RCE

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 · behavioral hunt, response, and hardening
Threat
PaperCut pre-auth RCE
CVE
CVE-2026-81578 / CVE-2026-82078
Severity
Critical · active exploitation
Version
v0.3 Draft · 2026-09-04
Author
cybersecurity analyst
Confidence
High
STATIC REVIEW PASSED
01

Executive Summary

What happened: PaperCut and Huntress reported on 27–28 August 2026 that attackers were actively exploiting PaperCut NG/MF Application Servers. The chain combines CVE-2026-81578, an authentication bypass that lets unauthenticated requests alter trusted configuration, with CVE-2026-82078, unsafe dynamic loading of a configured Java database-driver class. Together they yield pre-authentication code execution in the PaperCut server process. PaperCut released Emergency Patch Release 2 for supported v24, v25, and v26 branches and advised older installations to upgrade.

How it works in observed incidents: Huntress recovered five-character Java class payloads such as Udydn.class and Moo97.class under server/lib. The class executed system-discovery commands under pc-app.exe, used transient command/output files under server/data/content, initialized a Derby in-memory database named pwn, then deleted its own files and server.log. PaperCut later documented activity that downloaded ace.exe, installed SimpleHelp as an auto-start LocalSystem “Remote Access Service,” and downloaded AnyDesk.

Where detection belongs: the most durable Falcon signal is unexpected shell, discovery, downloader, or remote-support execution beneath pc-app.exe. Five-character filenames and the published download URL can rotate; use them as scoped pivots. Application-log strings are valuable but require tenant-specific ingestion of PaperCut server.log and Derby logs. File-write event coverage and Linux field variants also require tenant verification.

Defender priority: restrict public access and apply Release 2 first, then run Q02 and Q06 across the retrospective window and preserve PaperCut/Derby logs before restarting or rebuilding.
PriorityWhy nowCoverage deliveredKey limitation
Patch, restrict, and hunt pc-app lineageConfirmed active exploitation of a pre-auth RCE chain6 CQL queries: 1 inventory, 2 hunts, 3 alert candidatesStatic review only; PaperCut log schema and tenant parsing remain unverified
02

Source and Claim Review

Five sanitized, current-run snapshots preserve vendor, incident-response, CVE, and government evidence. PaperCut/CVE records share one CNA independence group; Huntress and the Canadian Cyber Centre are independent.

IDPublisherTierIndependence groupAccessedStatus
S01PaperCut Softwareprimary-vendorpapercut-cna2026-08-31T14:50:00Zcomplete-sanitized
S02Huntressprimary-incident-responsehuntress-observations2026-08-31T14:50:00Zcomplete-sanitized
S03CVE Program / PaperCut CNAprimary-cvepapercut-cna2026-08-31T14:50:00Zcomplete-sanitized
S04CVE Program / PaperCut CNAprimary-cvepapercut-cna2026-08-31T14:50:00Zcomplete-sanitized
S05Canadian Centre for Cyber Securitygovernment-advisorycanada-cyber-centre2026-08-31T14:50:00Zcomplete-sanitized

Claim ledger

ClaimStatementSourcesConfidenceContradiction
C01PaperCut NG/MF is affected by the CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078 chain.S01, S03, S04, S05highnone
C02The chain combines unauthenticated configuration modification with unsafe dynamic Java class loading to execute code in the PaperCut server process.S01, S03, S04highnone
C03PaperCut and Huntress reported active exploitation and confirmed customer incidents.S01, S02, S05highnone
C04Emergency Patch Release 2 mitigates supported major versions 24, 25, and 26; earlier versions require upgrade.S01, S05highnone
C05Huntress observed pc-app.exe launching system-discovery commands and found five-character Java class payloads under server/lib.S02mediumnone
C06Observed payload behavior created cmd/out artifacts under server/data/content and deleted those files plus server.log.S02mediumnone
C07Derby logs retained a memory database path containing pwn shortly before code execution.S02mediumnone
C08PaperCut later observed download of ace.exe from sendit.sh followed by SimpleHelp service installation and AnyDesk download.S01mediumnone
C09The vendor recommends reviewing pc-app child shells, class/cmd/out files, log deletion, and database error strings.S01, S02highnone
C10PaperCut recommends restricting public web access immediately and rebuilding from a known-clean backup when compromise is suspected.S01mediumnone
C11The emergency patch can disrupt external Card/ID lookups and requires compatibility review before enabling that feature.S01mediumnone
Contradiction handled: Huntress reported no secondary malware or persistence in two initial cases, while PaperCut later documented SimpleHelp and AnyDesk in other activity. The pack presents these as separate observations, not a single universal chain.
03

Hunt Brief and Attack Chain

The hunt separates asset inventory, exploit consequences, post-exploitation retrieval, persistence, and an application-log gap.

StepClaimsBehaviorPlatformDetection goal
1C02Unauthenticated configuration modificationPaperCut web applicationRecover request and configuration evidence
2C02, C05Dynamic Java class executionPaperCut JVMFind class writes and pc-app child processes
3C05, C07System discovery and Derby memory database useWindows/cross-platformFind discovery children and durable log breadcrumbs
4C06Transient file and log deletioncross-platformRecover file events and missing logs
5C08Remote tool retrieval and service persistenceWindowsFind downloader activity and SimpleHelp service

Hypotheses

IDBehaviorTelemetryUseLookbackValidation
H01PaperCut server process presence establishes the affected asset set.ProcessRollup2inventory30dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H02PaperCut pc-app spawning shells or discovery utilities indicates exploit or unauthorized task execution.ProcessRollup2alert-candidate14dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H03Five-character Java class writes under PaperCut server/lib expose the dynamic-class-loading stage.ProcessRollup2hunt30dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H04Observed Udydn or Moo97 artifacts expose this intrusion cluster even when cleanup is incomplete.ProcessRollup2hunt30dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H05pc-app-origin tool retrieval exposes post-exploitation staging.ProcessRollup2alert-candidate14dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H06SimpleHelp service installation exposes durable remote access after exploitation.ProcessRollup2alert-candidate30dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.
H07PaperCut and Derby application logs expose the exploit sequence and anti-forensic cleanup.PaperCut/Derby application logs not mappedgap30dSafe isolated canary plus representative benign baseline; no external source contact.

Affected surface and telemetry

PaperCut NG/MF Application Servers before 24.1.10, 25.0.13, and 26.0.5 are affected per the current CNA record; earlier branches require upgrade. Coverage assumes endpoint process and selected file-write events. PaperCut/Derby application logs, parser fields, Linux path variants, and the exact file-write event emitted for Java class files require tenant confirmation.

04

Consolidated IOC Table

IDTypeValueContextSourceConfidenceVolatilityAction
I01filenameUdydn.classObserved Java class payloadS02mediumhighhunt
I02filenameMoo97.classObserved Java class payloadS02mediumhighhunt
I03pathserver/data/content/Udydn.cmdExpected transient command fileS02mediummediumhunt
I04pathserver/data/content/Udydn.outExpected transient output fileS02mediummediumhunt
I05serviceRemote Access ServiceObserved SimpleHelp persistence serviceS01mediummediumhunt
I06urlhttps://sendit.sh/Gg7Rp/ace.exeObserved payload retrieval URL; volatileS01mediumhighhunt
I07pathC:/ProgramData/ace.exeObserved downloaded installer pathS01mediummediumhunt
I08pathC:/ProgramData/JWrapper-Remote Access/JWAppsSharedConfig/restricted/SimpleService.exeObserved service binary pathS01mediummediumhunt
No blind blocking: filenames and the download URL are volatile. Correlate them with pc-app lineage, transient artifacts, or the service install before containment.
05

ATT&CK Mapping

Mappings are analyst inferences from source-backed behavior. Inventory Q01 has no ATT&CK mapping.

TacticTechniqueNameBehaviorBasisSourcesClaims
ExecutionT1059.003Windows Command Shellpc-app spawned command shells and discovery utilitiesanalyst inferenceS02C05
Command and ControlT1105Ingress Tool TransferPowerShell retrieved remote toolsanalyst inferenceS01C08
PersistenceT1543.003Windows ServiceSimpleHelp installed as an auto-start LocalSystem serviceanalyst inferenceS01C08
Defense EvasionT1070.004File Deletionpayload deleted transient files and server.loganalyst inferenceS02C06
06

Native / Non-CQL Hunts

Application-native hunts close gaps that endpoint CQL cannot.

HuntLog sourceLogicResponse
Exploit and cleanup stringsPaperCut server.logSearch for jdbc:derby:memory:pwn, VALUES CAST, jdbc:no:x, five-character driver names, and unexpected truncation/deletion.Export raw logs and metadata; correlate with pc-app child processes.
Derby breadcrumbPaperCut server/data/internal/derby.logFind a second Derby boot for an in-memory database path ending in pwn near suspicious execution.Preserve the log and rebuild the timeline around the host timestamp.
Configuration reviewPaperCut Admin UI and configuration backupCompare external Card/ID lookup and driver settings with the last approved baseline.Preserve differences; restore only under incident and service authority.
Remote-service reviewWindows Services console / Event ID 7045Find Remote Access Service or unexpected SimpleHelp/AnyDesk deployment.Capture binary hash, signer, service config, and owner before disablement.
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Query strategy: Q02 and Q06 are the strongest behavioral keepers. Q03-Q05 depend on file-write or intrusion-specific stages and need same-host correlation.

Every query is STATIC-ONLY and must be run manually in the intended repository before scheduling.

Q01 · PaperCut server process inventory
CONF lowFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: PaperCut server process inventory. Accomplishes: covers papercut application server inventory while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H01 · A01

// HUNT: PaperCut Application Server inventory
// HYPOTHESIS: H01
// USE: inventory
// MITRE: N/A — inventory
// CONF: low
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| (FileName="pc-app.exe" OR FileName="pc-app" OR ImageFileName="*PaperCut MF*pc-app*" OR ImageFileName="*PaperCut NG*pc-app*")
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, FileName, ImageFileName, SHA256HashData], function=[count(as=Executions), min(@timestamp, as=FirstSeen), max(@timestamp, as=LastSeen)], limit=1000)
| sort(LastSeen, order=desc, limit=1000)
Q02 · pc-app child shell and discovery execution
CONF highFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: pc-app child shell and discovery execution. Accomplishes: covers papercut server spawning discovery or shell utilities while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H02 · A02

// HUNT: PaperCut server spawning discovery or shell utilities
// HYPOTHESIS: H02
// USE: alert-candidate
// MITRE: T1059.003, T1082, T1057
// CONF: high
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 14d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ParentBaseFileName=/^pc-app(\.exe)?$/i
| FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|whoami|tasklist|nltest|quser|charmap|sh|bash)(\.exe)?$/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentProcessId, TargetProcessId], limit=1000)
Q03 · PaperCut server/lib class-file writes
CONF mediumFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: PaperCut server/lib class-file writes. Accomplishes: covers five-character java class payloads in papercut paths while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H03 · A03

// HUNT: Five-character Java class payloads in PaperCut paths
// HYPOTHESIS: H03
// USE: hunt
// MITRE: T1105, T1129
// CONF: medium
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=/^(JarFileWritten|NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten)$/
| FileName=/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9]\.class$/i
| (FilePath="*PaperCut MF*server*lib*" OR FilePath="*PaperCut NG*server*lib*")
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, FileName, FilePath, ContextBaseFileName, ContextProcessId], limit=1000)
Q04 · PaperCut transient exploit artifacts
CONF highFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: PaperCut transient exploit artifacts. Accomplishes: covers observed papercut transient class, command, and output artifacts while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H04 · A04

// HUNT: Observed PaperCut transient class, command, and output artifacts
// HYPOTHESIS: H04
// USE: hunt
// MITRE: T1070.004
// CONF: high
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=/^(JarFileWritten|NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten)$/
| ((FileName="Udydn.class" OR FileName="Moo97.class") AND FilePath="*server*lib*" OR (FileName="Udydn.cmd" OR FileName="Udydn.out") AND FilePath="*server*data*content*")
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, FileName, FilePath, ContextBaseFileName, ContextProcessId], limit=1000)
Q05 · pc-app PowerShell or downloader retrieval
CONF highFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: pc-app PowerShell or downloader retrieval. Accomplishes: covers papercut server retrieving remote tools while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H05 · A05

// HUNT: PaperCut server retrieving remote tools
// HYPOTHESIS: H05
// USE: alert-candidate
// MITRE: T1105
// CONF: high
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 14d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ParentBaseFileName=/^pc-app(\.exe)?$/i
| (CommandLine=/Invoke-WebRequest|sendit[.]sh|ace[.]exe|AnyDesk[.]exe/i OR FileName=/^(curl|wget)(\.exe)?$/i)
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentProcessId, TargetProcessId], limit=1000)
Q06 · SimpleHelp service persistence
CONF highFP mediumCOST low

Looks for: SimpleHelp service persistence. Accomplishes: covers simplehelp remote access service installation while retaining host and process context for analyst verification.

Trace: H06 · A06

// HUNT: SimpleHelp Remote Access Service installation
// HYPOTHESIS: H06
// USE: alert-candidate
// MITRE: T1543.003
// CONF: high
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — retrospective window for the August 2026 active exploitation
// REQUIRES: Falcon endpoint event repository; documented fields shown in the query
// FALSE POSITIVES: Approved PaperCut administration, patching, testing, or managed remote-support deployment
// TUNING: Exclude only exact approved PaperCut administrative workflows or managed-tool installations after a measured benign baseline
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| (FileName="SimpleService.exe" OR ImageFileName="*JWrapper-Remote Access*SimpleService.exe" OR CommandLine="*Remote Access Service*SimpleService.exe*")
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, TargetProcessId], limit=1000)
08

Operationalization and IOA Candidates

Every query has an explicit decision. Alert packages are complete designs but not deployment approvals.

AlertQueryDecisionReadinessRationale
A01Q01hunt-onlydesign-onlyInventory or context-dependent hunt remains analyst-led.
A02Q02alert-packagedesign-onlyPotentially alertable behavior, but tenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline are absent.
A03Q03hunt-onlydesign-onlyInventory or context-dependent hunt remains analyst-led.
A04Q04hunt-onlydesign-onlyInventory or context-dependent hunt remains analyst-led.
A05Q05alert-packagedesign-onlyPotentially alertable behavior, but tenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline are absent.
A06Q06alert-packagedesign-onlyPotentially alertable behavior, but tenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline are absent.

Operational design

  • Cadence: alert candidates use a 30-minute search every 15 minutes with 15-minute overlap.
  • Entity: group and route by aid and ComputerName; deduplicate by TargetProcessId.
  • Testing: isolated benign markers plus representative maintenance baselines are required.
  • Rollback: disable the scheduled search or detect-only IOA and preserve execution/configuration metadata.

IOA candidates

IOASourceBehaviorPilotPositive testRollback
IOA01Q02pc-app child shell or discovery utilitydetect-onlyIsolated benign pc-app canaryDisable rule group and preserve configuration
IOA02Q06SimpleService in JWrapper Remote Access pathdetect-onlyApproved canary installDisable rule group and preserve configuration
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

All values are source-tagged and time-bounded. Revalidate them before operational use.

Falcon import CSV4 rows
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
filename,Udydn.class,detect,high,2026-09-30,Observed Java class payload,source:S02 campaign:papercut
filename,Moo97.class,detect,high,2026-09-30,Observed Java class payload,source:S02 campaign:papercut
filename,Udydn.cmd,detect,high,2026-09-30,Observed transient command file,source:S02 campaign:papercut
filename,Udydn.out,detect,high,2026-09-30,Observed transient output file,source:S02 campaign:papercut
service,Remote Access Service,detect,high,2026-09-30,Observed SimpleHelp service,source:S01 campaign:papercut
domain,sendit.sh,enrich,medium,2026-09-30,Observed volatile retrieval host,source:S01 campaign:papercut
url,https://sendit.sh/Gg7Rp/ace.exe,enrich,medium,2026-09-30,Observed volatile retrieval URL,source:S01 campaign:papercut
Observed files4 values
Udydn.class
Moo97.class
server/data/content/Udydn.cmd
server/data/content/Udydn.out
Service and path pivots3 values
Remote Access Service
C:/ProgramData/ace.exe
C:/ProgramData/JWrapper-Remote Access/JWAppsSharedConfig/restricted/SimpleService.exe
10

Hardening — Tiered and Deployable

Immediate — close the exposed chain
  • Remove public management exposure (CTRL01) — Restrict PaperCut web interfaces to trusted administration networks or a controlled VPN path. deployable-design Verify: From an untrusted test network, confirm management ports are unreachable while approved administration remains functional. Rollback: Restore the prior firewall object only under incident/change authority after a documented alternative control exists. Authority: PaperCut bulletin, 2026-08-31.
  • Apply Emergency Patch Release 2 or upgrade (CTRL02) — Upgrade supported v24-v26 installations to the corresponding Release 2 build; upgrade older branches to a current supported release. deployable-design Verify: Confirm version/build and application health on primary, site, and secondary servers. Rollback: Restore the pre-change server and database backup only if service health fails; keep internet restriction in place. Authority: PaperCut bulletin, 2026-08-31.
Near-term — preserve evidence and compatibility
  • Collect endpoint and PaperCut forensic telemetry (CTRL03) — Retain server/logs, derby.log, process lineage, file writes, firewall/proxy, and recent service events in the SIEM. deployable-design Verify: Run a benign marker and confirm timestamped endpoint and application events arrive without secrets. Rollback: Disable the new forwarding rule and restore prior retention if capacity thresholds are exceeded. Authority: Huntress incident guidance, 2026-08-28.
  • Gate external Card/ID lookup compatibility (CTRL04) — Leave external lookup disabled unless required; if required, use the supported Microsoft SQL JDBC driver and explicit security property after pilot testing. deployable-design Verify: Pilot lookups succeed and no unapproved database driver is loaded. Rollback: Set the feature to disabled and restore the pre-change configuration backup. Authority: PaperCut bulletin FAQ, 2026-08-31.
Strategic — constrain post-exploitation
  • Constrain application-server egress (CTRL05) — Allow only documented update, database, print, identity, and monitoring destinations; deny direct general web download paths. deployable-design Verify: Approved dependencies work and a controlled blocked-destination test is logged and denied. Rollback: Temporarily restore the last approved egress policy for a named dependency under change authority. Authority: NIST SP 800-41 Rev.1 network policy guidance.
  • Govern remote-support service installation (CTRL06) — Permit only inventoried remote-support tools and alert on new auto-start services running as LocalSystem. deployable-design Verify: Approved tools match inventory and an isolated canary service event reaches the SOC. Rollback: Disable the detection/policy exception that causes disruption while preserving event evidence. Authority: CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, 2023 edition.

Deployable playbook · CTRL01 + CTRL02

  1. Back up PaperCut application and database state and capture current firewall/version/health.
  2. Restrict public management access first and verify the external denial.
  3. Apply Release 2 to a pilot Application Server and update site/secondary servers.
  4. Verify version, printing, authentication, SAML, and Card/ID lookups where used.
  5. Expand only after service health and telemetry checks pass.
  6. If health fails, restore the backed-up application state while retaining the network restriction.
  7. Retain version, change record, health evidence, and owner approval.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseTriggerAuthorityOwnerEvidenceRecovery
ActivateUnauthorized pc-app child, exploit log string, or class artifactIncident CommanderSOCOriginal alert and raw eventConfirm scope before disruptive action
PreserveActivation confirmedIncident CommanderDFIRPaperCut/Derby logs, process tree, files, networkHash and store evidence before restart
ContainUnauthorized execution corroboratedIncident Commander + service ownerEndpoint/NetworkIsolation and firewall change recordsMaintain print-service continuity exception
EradicateScope and evidence preservedChange authorityPaperCut ownerClean rebuild, patch version, service inventoryRestore only known-clean configuration
RecoverRebuild and validation completeService ownerOperationsHealth, authentication, print testsRollback to clean backup if health fails
CloseNo persistence; exposure restricted; re-hunt cleanIncident CommanderIR leadClosure checklist and 30-day huntReopen on new evidence

Credential handling: rotate only credentials demonstrated reachable from the compromised Application Server, after evidence preservation and in dependency order. Do not disable identity or critical print services without continuity approval.

12

Detection Coverage and Validation Evidence

Validation state: STATIC REVIEW PASSED after local structure, safety, field/event heuristic, CQL heuristic, IOC provenance, and duplicate gates. This is not Falcon parsing or tenant behavior evidence.

TechniqueCoverageQueriesEvidenceLimitation
T1059.003StaticQ02Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1082StaticQ02Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1057StaticQ02Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1105StaticQ03, Q05Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1129StaticQ03Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1070.004StaticQ04Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent
T1543.003StaticQ06Static-only local reviewTenant parse, positive canary, and benign baseline absent

Recorded evidence and gaps

  • Tenant execution evidence is absent.
  • Offline tenant-validation dry run records extraction and blockers only; it does not contact Falcon.
  • H07 remains a gap until PaperCut/Derby application logs are ingested with known fields.
  • File-write event choice for Java class files requires a tenant sample.
  • Next step: run Q01-Q06 manually in the intended repository with a one-hour window, then execute isolated positive and representative benign tests.
13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        PaperCut NG/MF pre-auth RCE hunt — v0.3 Draft
SEVERITY:     critical — active exploitation chains unauthenticated configuration control to code execution
SCOPE:        PaperCut NG/MF Application Servers with Falcon endpoint process/file telemetry and application logs where available
HYPOTHESIS:   H01 inventory; H02 pc-app child execution; H03/H04 class artifacts; H05 tool retrieval; H06 service persistence; H07 log gap
QUERIES RUN:  Q01 inventory; Q03/Q04 hunt; Q02/Q05/Q06 alert-candidate designs
DO FIRST:     Q02 over 14 days, then same-host Q03-Q06 correlation
FINDINGS:
GAPS:         tenant parse/canary/baseline absent; PaperCut/Derby parser and Java class file-event semantics unverified
ACTIONS:      PaperCut owner restricts public access and applies Release 2; Detection Engineering validates queries
OWNER:        SOC / Detection Engineering / PaperCut service owner
VERSION:      v0.3 Draft · 2026-09-04 · STATIC REVIEW PASSED
14

Changelog

v0.3 Rich visual emphasis2026-09-04Added coordinated semantic color to Executive Summary lead-ins, threat metadata, Severity, and IOC counts. Detection logic, evidence, indicators, hardening, and validation claims are unchanged.
v0.2 Theme refresh2026-09-04Applied the deterministic threat-aware HuntPack palette. Detection logic, evidence, indicators, hardening, and validation claims are unchanged.
v0.1 Draft2026-08-31Initial PaperCut CVE-2026-81578/CVE-2026-82078 pack with six CQL queries, provenance-bound indicators, hardening controls, and containment workflow.
15

References

IDPublisherVersion/dateAccessedUseURL
S01PaperCut Software2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZResearch evidencehttps://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/
S02Huntress2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZResearch evidencehttps://www.huntress.com/blog/papercut-actively-exploited
S03CVE Program / PaperCut CNA2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZResearch evidencehttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-81578
S04CVE Program / PaperCut CNA2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZResearch evidencehttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82078
S05Canadian Centre for Cyber Security2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZResearch evidencehttps://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/papercut-security-advisory-av26-858
AUTH01NIST2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZHardening authorityhttps://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/41/r1/final
AUTH02CISA2026-08-31 current page2026-08-31T14:50:00ZHardening authorityhttps://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals