LummaC2 / Lumma Stealer — Malware-as-a-Service Infostealer

ClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA "paste-and-run" → mshta/PowerShell IEX → loader → process hollowing into OpenWith.exe/more.com → browser creds, cookies, 2FA, wallets & CLI tokens exfiltrated to TeslaBrowser/5.5 C2. Activity dropped after the May-2025 takedown but the ClickFix delivery chain remains pervasive. Defensive hunt & harden pack.
Threat
LummaC2 / Lumma Stealer (Water Kurita MaaS)
Severity
CRED THEFT · MaaS
Type
Infostealer · ClickFix delivery
Status
Reduced since May-2025 takedown; TTPs broadly reused
C2 marker
User-Agent TeslaBrowser/5.5
Version
v0.3 · 2026-06-12
Author
HuntPack
01

Executive Summary

LummaC2 (Lumma Stealer) is a prolific malware-as-a-service infostealer. Its hallmark delivery is ClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA "paste-and-run": a fake verification or browser-update overlay instructs the victim to paste a command into Run/PowerShell, which executes mshta.exe or a powershell -enc / iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(...) one-liner pulling the next stage from an attacker domain (e.g. goatstuff[.]store). A loader (HijackLoader/Legion/PrivateLoader/PureCrypter/CypherIT) then injects the stealer via process hollowing into OpenWith.exe or more.com, running entirely in memory.

The stealer harvests browser credentials and cookies, 2FA tokens, FileZilla/WinSCP, Telegram, Steam, cryptocurrency wallets, VPN profiles, cloud CLI credentials, and Desktop/Documents files. It bypasses Chromium App-Bound Encryption via the --remote-debugging-port technique, stages data in System.txt before archiving, and exfiltrates over HTTPS POST using the distinctive TeslaBrowser/5.5 user agent — historically via Cloudflare, then (post-takedown) diversified to Spamhaus DROP-listed ASNs (AEZA, PROSPERO, PROTON66, etc.). It has no built-in persistence, relying on its loader.

Defender priority & status note: Lumma's volume dropped sharply after the May-2025 takedown (Red Canary notes no detections since Oct 2025), so treat this as resilience hunting — but the ClickFix paste-and-run chain is reused across many stealers, so these detections retain broad value. Highest-fidelity signals: Q1 (ClickFix lineage: browser/Explorer → mshta/PowerShell with iex+http) and Q3 (hollowing into OpenWith.exe/more.com).

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

TierSourceKey FindingCarry
1 · Vendor researchRed Canary — LummaC2 Threat DetectionClickFix chain; hollowing into OpenWith.exe/more.com; IEX+http analytic; --remote-debugging-port ABE bypass; System.txt staging; activity timelineyes
1 · Vendor researchNetskope / Sophos — Lumma fake CAPTCHAs / "coming and going"Fake-CAPTCHA delivery, evasion, resurgence/takedown dynamicsyes
1 · Gov advisoryFBI/CISA AA25-141b — LummaC2TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA, HTTP POST exfil, authoritative IOC set (Nov-2023→May-2025)yes
2 · VendorSilent Push / Microsoft / Trend Micro150+ new C2 IOCs; delivery (cracked software, Discord CDN, Telegram); post-takedown ASN diversificationpartial

Decisions: behavior-first — atomic C2 IOCs are highly perishable and many in the public advisories predate the takedown, so the durable detections key on the ClickFix lineage, in-memory hollowing targets, and the TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA. Status framed honestly as reduced-but-reused; pack remains valuable as the delivery pattern is shared across stealers.

03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Working hypothesis: A user is socially engineered (fake CAPTCHA / browser-update / cracked software) to paste and run a command; mshta/powershell pulls a loader, which hollows OpenWith.exe/more.com and runs the stealer in memory; the stealer reads browser/wallet/CLI secrets, stages to System.txt, and exfiltrates over HTTPS with the TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA.

StepBehaviorTelemetryHunt Angle
1 · LureFake CAPTCHA / browser-update / cracked-software ad → paste-and-runRunMRU / clipboard; proxyN1; N4
2 · Initial execmshta/powershell spawned by a browser/Explorer; IEX downloads next stageProcessRollup2Q1 / Q2
3 · LoaderHijackLoader/Legion/PrivateLoader stages the stealerProcessRollup2Q2
4 · InjectionProcess hollowing into OpenWith.exe / more.comProcessRollup2Q3
5 · CollectionBrowser creds/cookies (ABE bypass via --remote-debugging-port), wallets, CLI tokens; stage to System.txtprocess cmdline; file writeQ4 / Q5
6 · ExfilHTTPS POST, UA TeslaBrowser/5.5, to DROP-listed ASNsNetworkConnectIP4; proxyQ6; N3

Affected surface & telemetry

SurfaceRequired TelemetryPriorityGap Risk
Windows user endpointsProcess lineage + command line (ProcessRollup2)CriticalLow — standard sensor
Browser credential storesProcess cmdline (--remote-debugging-port); file readHighMedium — file-read weak; cmdline reliable
ClickFix lureRunMRU registry; proxy/SWGMediumMedium — needs registry/proxy logging
C2 egressNetworkConnectIP4; proxy UA loggingHighMedium — UA visible only at proxy/TLS-inspect
04

Consolidated IOC Table

Atomic C2 IOCs are highly perishable (and many published ones predate the May-2025 takedown). Behavior — ClickFix lineage, hollowing targets, TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA — is the durable signal. Copy-ready blocks in §9.
TypeValueConfActionContext
User-AgentTeslaBrowser/5.5highdetectDistinctive C2 exfil UA (HTTP POST)
Behaviorbrowser/Explorer → mshta|powershell with iex + http (ClickFix)highdetectPaste-and-run initial execution
Behaviorprocess hollowing into OpenWith.exe / more.comhighdetectIn-memory stealer injection target
Behaviorchrome.exe --remote-debugging-port (ABE bypass)mediumhuntCookie/credential theft technique
Domaingoatstuff.store (example stager)lowhuntPerishable stager domain — enrich/pivot
05

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueObserved BehaviorQuery / Control
Initial Access / ExecutionT1566 / T1204.004 — Phishing / Malicious Copy-PasteClickFix fake-CAPTCHA paste-and-runQ1; N1, N4
ExecutionT1059.001 — PowerShell (IEX download)powershell iex + http one-linerQ2
Defense EvasionT1218.005 — Mshtamshta retrieves PowerShell payload from C2Q1
Defense EvasionT1055.012 — Process HollowingInjection into OpenWith.exe / more.comQ3
Credential AccessT1555.003 / T1539 — Browser creds / session cookiesABE bypass via --remote-debugging-portQ4
CollectionT1005 / T1074.001 — Local data / stagingWallets, CLI tokens; stage to System.txtQ5
Command & Control / ExfilT1071.001 / T1041 — Web C2 / exfil over C2HTTPS POST, UA TeslaBrowser/5.5Q6; N3
06

Native Audit-Log Hunts

HuntSourceLogicResponse
N1 · RunMRU paste-and-runRegistry ...\Explorer\RunMRURecent Run-dialog entries containing powershell/mshta/iex/curl (ClickFix artifact)Confirm lure; pull the command; sweep host
N2 · PowerShell script-blockEID 4104 (Script Block Logging)Deobfuscated blocks with iex + http + DownloadString/DownloadDataExtract C2; block; investigate
N3 · TeslaBrowser/5.5 egressProxy / SWG / TLS inspectionHTTP(S) POST with User-Agent TeslaBrowser/5.5, or connections to DROP-listed ASNsBlock; identify the source process/host
N4 · Fake-CAPTCHA landingProxy / DNSUsers reaching fake-verification/browser-update pages immediately before a paste-and-runBlock domains; warn users
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Field names validated against the Falcon event reference; process hunts include SyntheticProcessRollup2. The ClickFix and hollowing detections (Q1/Q3) generalize across stealers, not just Lumma — strong keepers regardless of Lumma's current volume.
Q1 · ClickFix lineage — browser/Explorer spawning mshta/PowerShell with iex+http
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: mshta/PowerShell parented by a browser or Explorer, with iex+http in the command line. Accomplishes: catches the paste-and-run initial execution — the highest-fidelity ClickFix signal.

// HUNT: ClickFix paste-and-run (browser/Explorer -> mshta|powershell with iex+http)
// MITRE: T1204.004, T1059.001, T1218.005 | CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
// FP NOTES: browsers/Explorer do not normally spawn mshta/powershell running iex+http
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(explorer|chrome|msedge|firefox|brave|opera|iexplore)\.exe$/i
| FileName=/^(mshta|powershell|pwsh|cmd)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine=/(iex|invoke-expression|mshta\s+http|DownloadString|DownloadData|FromBase64String|-enc(odedcommand)?\b).*?(http|\.store|\.shop|\.top)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q2 · PowerShell IEX HTTP download (loader stage)
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: PowerShell command lines combining iex and an HTTP download. Accomplishes: the Red Canary loader analytic. FP: some admin/package tooling — exclude sanctioned package managers; pair with Q1 parent.

// HUNT: PowerShell invoke-expression + HTTP download (stealer loader)
// MITRE: T1059.001 | CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: exclude legitimate package managers (choco/winget/scoop); pair with Q1 parent
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| FileName=/^(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine=/(iex|invoke-expression|\.invoke)/i
| CommandLine=/http/i
| CommandLine!=/(chocolatey|winget|scoop|PSGallery|Install-Module)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q3 · Process hollowing target — OpenWith.exe / more.com anomaly
CONF HIGHFP LOW-MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: OpenWith.exe / more.com spawned by mshta/powershell/a loader, or making network connections. Accomplishes: catches the in-memory stealer injection. FP: legit more.com in pipelines — flag anomalous parent / network.

// HUNT: Stealer hollowing into OpenWith.exe / more.com
// MITRE: T1055.012 | CONF: high  FP: low-med  COST: low
// TUNING: legit more.com runs in pipelines with conhost parent; flag mshta/powershell/loader parent
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| FileName=/^(OpenWith\.exe|more\.com)$/i
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(mshta|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript|rundll32|regsvr32)\.exe$/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, SHA256HashData], limit=200)
Q4 · Chromium --remote-debugging-port (App-Bound Encryption bypass)
CONF MED-HIGHFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: a Chromium browser launched with --remote-debugging-port by a non-user/non-shortcut parent. Accomplishes: the cookie/credential ABE-bypass technique. FP: developers/automation use this — exclude sanctioned, flag unusual parents.

// HUNT: Chromium --remote-debugging-port cookie/credential theft (ABE bypass)
// MITRE: T1555.003, T1539 | CONF: med-high  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: exclude dev/automation; flag launches parented by mshta/powershell/script hosts
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| FileName=/^(chrome|msedge|brave|opera)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine=/--remote-debugging-port|--remote-debugging-pipe|--headless.*--user-data-dir/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
Q5 · System.txt credential staging in user temp
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: creation of System.txt in user temp/profile (the documented staging file). Accomplishes: surfaces collection-staging before exfil. FP: generic filename — correlate with Q1/Q3 on the same host.

// HUNT: Lumma System.txt credential staging
// MITRE: T1074.001 | CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: generic name; correlate with Q1/Q3 hits on same aid/time
#event_simpleName=/NewExecutableWritten|FileWritten/
| TargetFileName=/\\(Temp|AppData)\\.*\\System\.txt$/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ContextBaseFileName, TargetFileName], limit=200)
Q6 · TeslaBrowser/5.5 C2 exfil (if UA telemetry available)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST MED

Looks for: the TeslaBrowser/5.5 user agent in ingested proxy/HTTP telemetry. Accomplishes: high-fidelity C2 exfil signal. FP: none — the UA is unique to Lumma. Requires proxy/HTTP-header ingestion (not raw EDR netflow).

// HUNT: Lumma C2 exfil — TeslaBrowser/5.5 user agent
// MITRE: T1071.001, T1041 | CONF: high  FP: low  COST: med
// REQUIRES: proxy/SWG or HTTP-header telemetry ingested into NG-SIEM (field name varies)
HttpUserAgent=/TeslaBrowser\/5\.5/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, aid, HttpUserAgent, DomainName, RemoteAddressIP4], limit=200)
08

CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations

IOA NameField PatternsBenign ExclusionsDeployment Path
Lumma — ClickFix browser→mshta/PS iex+httpParent *\chrome.exe/msedge.exe/explorer.exe; Child mshta/powershell.exe; CmdLine iex+httpNone expected — promote Detect+BlockEndpoint Security → Custom IOA → Process Creation
Lumma — hollowing into OpenWith/more.comImage *\OpenWith.exe/more.com; Parent mshta/powershell/loaderLegit more.com with conhost parent (excluded)Custom IOA → Process Creation
Q1 and Q3 are strong, generalizable promotions (cover many stealers). Q2/Q4/Q5 stay hunt/investigate-only due to FP risk.
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Grouped IOC Quick-Copy

One-click blocks for Falcon IOC Management, proxy rules, and detection. C2 atoms rotate fast — behavior + the TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA are durable.

Falcon IOC Management CSVbulk import (seed)
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
domain,goatstuff.store,detect,medium,2026-08-12,Lumma stager domain (perishable),campaign:LummaC2
domain,REPLACE_WITH_CURRENT_C2,detect,high,2026-08-12,Lumma C2 (rotate frequently),campaign:LummaC2
sha256,REPLACE_WITH_LOADER_SHA256,prevent,critical,2027-06-12,Lumma loader/payload,campaign:LummaC2
Behavioral Signaturesdetection logic
chrome/msedge/explorer.exe spawns mshta/powershell running iex + http (ClickFix paste-and-run)
PowerShell iex + DownloadString/DownloadData/-enc + http (loader stage)
Process hollowing into OpenWith.exe or more.com (parent = mshta/powershell/loader)
chrome.exe --remote-debugging-port (Chromium App-Bound Encryption cookie bypass)
System.txt created in %TEMP%/%AppData% then archived (credential staging)
HTTP(S) POST with User-Agent TeslaBrowser/5.5 (C2 exfil)
RunMRU registry entries containing powershell/mshta/iex (ClickFix artifact)
Named Loaders / Markersfamilies & C2
TeslaBrowser/5.5     # distinctive C2 exfil User-Agent
HijackLoader / IDAT  # paired loader
Legion Loader        # paired loader
PrivateLoader        # paired loader
PureCrypter / CypherIT  # crypters
# Post-takedown C2 hosting ASNs (Spamhaus DROP): AEZA-AS, AS-VD, CHSN-AS,
#   PROSPERO-AS, PROTON66, ROUTERHOSTING, ZHOUYISAT — alert on egress to these
Hardening / Blockprevent the lure
# Cut the ClickFix chain at the endpoint:
ASR D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D   # Block JS/VBScript launching downloaded executables
Block mshta.exe via WDAC/AppLocker          # HTA rarely needed
PowerShell Constrained Language Mode + ScriptBlock logging (4104)
GPO: disable/monitor the Run dialog (RunMRU) for paste-and-run lures
Browser: enforce App-Bound Encryption; block --remote-debugging-port via policy
Proxy: block/alert User-Agent TeslaBrowser/5.5 and Spamhaus DROP ASNs
10

Hardening — Tiered & Deployable

The cheapest win is breaking the ClickFix paste-and-run chain before the loader runs.

Immediate — Break the ClickFix chain
  • ASR: Block JS/VBScript launching downloaded executablesM1042 (ID D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D). Plus block executable content from email/webmail.
  • Block mshta.exe via WDAC/AppLockerM1038. HTA is rarely needed and is the first ClickFix stage.
  • PowerShell Constrained Language Mode + Script-Block logging (4104) + AMSIM1038 / M1040 / M1049. Neuters the iex+http one-liner and feeds Q2/N2.
  • Proxy: block User-Agent TeslaBrowser/5.5 + Spamhaus DROP ASNsM1037. Cuts C2 exfil.
Near term — Protect browser secrets (pilot first)
  • Enforce Chromium App-Bound Encryption; block --remote-debugging-port via policyM1027 / M1042. Defeats the cookie-theft bypass (Q4).
  • Disable/monitor the Run dialog & clipboard paste-executionM1038 / M1024. Removes the paste-and-run UX; alert on RunMRU (N1).
  • Phishing-resistant MFA + revoke stolen sessions fastM1032. Limits value of stolen cookies/tokens.
Strategic — Default-deny & awareness
  • Application allowlisting (WDAC/AppLocker) enterprise-wideM1038. Blocks unsigned loaders.
  • Block cracked-software / unsanctioned download sources; web-category filteringM1021. Cuts the primary delivery vehicles.
  • User training on fake-CAPTCHA / "paste this to verify" luresM1017. The whole chain needs the user to paste-and-run.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
IsolateNetwork-contain the host in Falcon; preserve memory if possible (stealer runs in-memory)SOC L2Containment timestamp; Q1/Q3 event
TriagePull the ClickFix command (RunMRU/N1/4104), the loader → OpenWith/more.com tree, and System.txt; enumerate which browsers/wallets/CLI tools were presentSOC L2Process tree; staging file; secret inventory
EradicateKill the hollowed process; remove dropped loader + staging; block C2 (UA + ASNs)IRRemoval log; C2 block
RecoverRotate ALL credentials + session cookies stored in browsers on the host; reset crypto-wallet seeds if present; reset cloud-CLI/VPN/FileZilla credsIR + ITCred + cookie rotation log
HardenPush §10 ASR/AppLocker/PowerShell controls; promote Q1/Q3 IOAs; proxy-block TeslaBrowser/5.5Detection EngControl status; IOA enabled
12

Detection Coverage Map & Validation

TechniqueBehaviorCQLNativeCoverage
T1204.004 / T1059.001ClickFix paste-and-runQ1, Q2N1, N2Good
T1055.012Hollowing into OpenWith/more.comQ3Good
T1555.003 / T1539Browser cookie/credential theftQ4Partial cmdline reliable, file-read weak
T1074.001Credential staging (System.txt)Q5Partial generic name — correlate
T1071.001 / T1041TeslaBrowser/5.5 C2 exfilQ6N3Partial needs proxy/UA telemetry
T1566Fake-CAPTCHA lure deliveryN4GAP proxy/web-filtering primary

Validation gates: (1) confirm ProcessRollup2 w/ command line fleet-wide + proxy/UA ingestion for Q6/N3; (2) baseline legit more.com and --remote-debugging-port usage; (3) lab-test a benign browser→powershell iex http chain (Q1/Q2) and a benign more.com spawn from powershell (Q3); (4) promote Q1/Q3 to Custom IOA Detect+Block; proxy-block TeslaBrowser/5.5; keep Q4/Q5 as scheduled hunts.

13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Hunt — LummaC2 / Lumma Stealer (ClickFix infostealer)
SEVERITY:     High (credential theft) — note: reduced volume since May-2025 takedown
SCOPE:        Windows user endpoints; ClickFix delivery is reused across stealers
HYPOTHESIS:   Fake-CAPTCHA paste-and-run -> mshta/powershell iex+http -> loader ->
              hollow OpenWith.exe/more.com -> steal browser/wallet/CLI secrets ->
              stage System.txt -> exfil HTTPS UA TeslaBrowser/5.5.
QUERIES RUN:  Q1 ClickFix lineage (IOA) | Q2 PS iex+http | Q3 hollow OpenWith/more.com (IOA) |
              Q4 chrome --remote-debugging-port | Q5 System.txt staging | Q6 TeslaBrowser/5.5
              + Native N1-N4 (RunMRU, 4104, proxy UA, fake-CAPTCHA landing)
DO FIRST:     Q1, Q3 — escalate any hit; pull the pasted command
FINDINGS:     <pending analyst execution>
GAPS:         C2 atoms perishable; UA/lure need proxy telemetry
ACTIONS:      ASR + block mshta + PowerShell CLM; proxy-block TeslaBrowser/5.5 + DROP ASNs;
              promote Q1/Q3; rotate creds/cookies on confirmed hits
OWNER:        HuntPack
VERSION:      v0.3 - 2026-06-12
14

Changelog

v0.52026-07-24CQL correctness pass. All table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.
v0.42026-06-29CQL syntax review (crowdstrike-logscale-v3): removed invalid FileCreateInfo event (Q5).
v0.32026-06-12Re-hunt + reformatted to the review-v2 gold layout (fixed left-sidebar scrollspy TOC, collapsible, cloud selector inside the CQL section, per-card Copy/Open-in-Falcon, Grouped IOC Quick-Copy grid, coverage+validation, .ticket). Refreshed from Red Canary/Netskope/Sophos/CISA: ClickFix chain, hollowing into OpenWith.exe/more.com, --remote-debugging-port ABE bypass, System.txt staging, TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA, post-takedown ASN diversification + reduced-volume status. 6 CQL + 4 native hunts, 2 IOA candidates.
v0.12026-05-26Initial pack: Lumma Stealer overview + hunts. Pre-gold top-bar layout.
15

References

TierSourceUsed For
1Red Canary — LummaC2 Threat DetectionClickFix chain, hollowing targets, IEX analytic, ABE bypass, status
1Netskope — Fake CAPTCHAs · Sophos — coming and goingFake-CAPTCHA delivery, evasion, takedown/resurgence
1FBI/CISA AA25-141b — LummaC2TeslaBrowser/5.5 UA, HTTP POST exfil, IOC set
2Silent Push — 150+ new C2 IOCs · Microsoft — delivery & capabilitiesC2 IOCs, delivery vehicles, ASN diversification

HuntPack v0.3 · LummaC2 · Generated 2026-06-12 · Defensive use only. C2 infrastructure is highly perishable and Lumma's volume is reduced since the May-2025 takedown — these behavioral detections (ClickFix, hollowing, TeslaBrowser/5.5) generalize across infostealers. Validate field names in your tenant before promoting any query.