CVE-2026-9862 — Fortra Core PAM (BoKS) Unauthenticated Command Injection

An unauthenticated, network-reachable OS command-injection flaw (CVSS 9.8) in the boks_autoregisterd autoregistration service on TCP 6507. A crafted registration request injects shell commands that run with the service's privileges on the BoKS server — the Unix/Linux access-control hub. Compromise of a PAM appliance is a keys-to-the-kingdom event. Defensive hunt & harden pack — no offensive code / no exploit.
Threat
CVE-2026-9862 · Fortra advisory FI-2026-007
Severity
CVSS 9.8 · UNAUTH RCE
Type
OS command injection (CWE-78) · pre-auth
Surface
boks_autoregisterd · TCP 6507 · Unix/Linux
Vector
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Version
v0.1 · 2026-06-28
Author
HuntPack
01

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-9862 (Fortra advisory FI-2026-007, CVSS 9.8) is an unauthenticated OS command injection (CWE-78) in Fortra Core Privileged Access Manager (BoKS) — the Unix/Linux access-control and privileged-access product formerly sold as BoKS ServerControl. The flaw lives in the autoregistration functionality exposed by the boks_autoregisterd service, which listens by default on TCP 6507. Because user-supplied input is not properly neutralized, an attacker who can reach that port can craft a registration request that injects shell commands; those commands execute with the service's privileges on the BoKS host. No authentication and no user interaction are required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), with full confidentiality, integrity and availability impact.

The vulnerability was identified on 27 May 2026 and publicly disclosed on 15 June 2026. BoKS is a privileged-access manager: it brokers and enforces access across an entire Unix/Linux estate, so command execution on the BoKS server is effectively a domain-takeover-class event — an attacker can pivot to managed hosts, harvest credentials, and disable access controls. There is no published exploit code or malware family tied to this CVE yet, so detection is behavior-first: the command-injection child processes spawned by boks_autoregisterd, anomalous traffic to TCP 6507, and post-exploitation tooling run from the BoKS service context.

Defender priority: The decisive endpoint signal is Q1/Q2 — boks_autoregisterd spawning ANY child process (it should not under normal operation); a shell, interpreter, or download tool as its child is command injection in progress. Pair with Q3 (anomalous TCP 6507 traffic). The pre-auth request body itself is a network-only artifact (Coverage Map GAP) — patch to the FI-2026-007 fixed build and firewall-restrict 6507 immediately; if you can't patch, disable the autoregister service.

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

TierSourceKey FindingCarry
1 · AuthoritativeNVD — CVE-2026-9862CVSS 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); CWE-78 OS command injection; externally-influenced input lacking neutralizationyes
1 · Vendor PSIRTFortra Security Advisory FI-2026-007Affected product = Core PAM (BoKS); fixed build is the remediation; vendor mitigation = restrict 6507 / disable autoregisterdyes
1 · Advisory DBGitHub Advisory GHSA-32v6-8gq7-4gxmConfirms component boks_autoregisterd; service-level command execution; affected/patched versions listed Unknown — confirm build in tenantyes
2 · Vendor newsCyberSecurityNews · GBHackers — Fortra Access Manager command injectionService on TCP 6507; injection during autoregistration; mitigations: firewall 6507, comment autoregisterd in boksinit, monitor 6507; timeline 27 May → 15 Jun 2026yes

Decisions: No atomic IOCs (hash/IP/domain) are published for this CVE — exploitation is opportunistic and payloads vary — so §9 ships behavioral signatures + a patch/port audit rather than fabricated indicator blocks (the CSV uses explicit REPLACE_WITH placeholders). The durable detections are the boks_autoregisterd child-process tell and TCP 6507 anomalies. Affected/patched version numbers are listed "Unknown" in the public advisory DB, so the pack directs analysts to confirm their installed build against FI-2026-007 rather than asserting a version.

03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Working hypothesis: An attacker who can reach TCP 6507 sends a crafted autoregistration request whose fields contain shell metacharacters; boks_autoregisterd passes them to a shell, executing attacker commands as the service account. From there the attacker retrieves a payload, establishes persistence/remote access, and abuses BoKS's privileged position to reach managed Unix/Linux hosts.

StepBehaviorTelemetryHunt Angle
1 · ReconDiscover BoKS host with TCP 6507 openFirewall / NetFlow / NetworkListenIP4N1, Q3
2 · Exploit (inject)Crafted autoregistration request → shell metachars in user inputNetwork body (IDS) — not on endpointN1 (GAP)
3 · Command execboks_autoregisterd spawns a shell / interpreter childProcessRollup2 (Linux)Q1 / Q2
4 · Payload retrievalChild runs curl/wget, chmod +x, base64 -d → drop & runProcessRollup2, file writeQ4
5 · Persistence / RATCron/systemd unit, SSH key add, reverse shell from service contextProcessRollup2, NetworkConnectIP4Q5, N3
6 · Config tamperEdit boksinit / BoKS config to weaken controls or persistFile write eventsQ6, N2
7 · Pivot / abuse PAMUse BoKS privilege to reach managed hosts; harvest credentialsBoKS audit + managed-host logonsN2, N3

Affected surface & telemetry

SurfaceRequired TelemetryPriorityGap Risk
BoKS master/server hosts (Unix/Linux)Falcon Linux sensor — process lineage + command lineCriticalMedium — appliance-style hosts often unsensored
TCP 6507 exposureFirewall / IDS / NetworkListenIP4 + NetworkConnectIP4CriticalMedium — appliance network logs often unforwarded
Pre-auth exploit request bodyNetwork IDS / WAF inspection of 6507 trafficHighHigh — opaque to EDR (network-only)
Managed Unix/Linux estateAuth logs + BoKS audit to SIEMHighMedium — confirm collection
04

Consolidated IOC Table

No public atomic IOCs (payload hash, C2 IP, domain) are tied to CVE-2026-9862 — exploitation is opportunistic and payloads vary. The values below are the cited, durable facts of the vulnerability and its behavioral signature; capture per-incident atoms during triage. Copy-ready blocks in §9.
TypeValueConfActionContext
CVECVE-2026-9862 · FI-2026-007highdetectPatch audit — Fortra Core PAM (BoKS)
Serviceboks_autoregisterdhighdetectVulnerable autoregistration daemon
PortTCP 6507highhuntDefault autoregister listener — restrict/monitor
Behaviorboks_autoregisterd → child shell / interpreterhighdetectCommand injection in progress
Behaviorservice-context curl/wget | sh ; chmod +x ; base64 -dhighdetectPost-exploit payload retrieval
Configboksinit (autoregisterd entry)mediumhuntVendor mitigation + tamper-watch target
Payload hash / C2none published — capture in triagelowpivotUse §9 CSV placeholders per incident
05

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueObserved BehaviorQuery / Control
Initial AccessT1190 — Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCrafted autoregistration request to TCP 6507N1; patch; firewall
ExecutionT1059.004 — Unix Shellboks_autoregisterd injects/spawns a shellQ1, Q2
Command & ControlT1105 / T1071 — Ingress Tool Transfer / Web C2curl/wget retrieval of payload from service contextQ4
PersistenceT1053.003 / T1098.004 — Cron / SSH authorized_keysCron/systemd unit; attacker SSH key addQ5, N3
Command & ControlT1059.004 / T1571 — reverse shell from servicesh -c with /dev/tcp or nc back-connectQ5
Defense EvasionT1562.001 — Impair DefensesEdit boksinit / BoKS config to weaken access controlsQ6, N2
Lateral MovementT1021.004 / T1556 — SSH / modify auth to managed hostsAbuse BoKS privilege to reach managed Unix/LinuxN2, N3
Impact / Cred AccessT1003 / T1485 — credential harvest / destructionHarvest brokered credentials; disable access enforcementN2, N3
06

Native Audit-Log Hunts

HuntSourceLogicResponse
N1 · TCP 6507 exposure / exploit trafficFirewall / IDS / WAF / NetFlowInbound to 6507 from outside the known BoKS-client subnets; IDS sigs for shell metacharacters in autoregistration payloadsBlock/restrict 6507; alert; hunt the host (Q1)
N2 · BoKS audit anomalyBoKS audit logUnexpected host autoregistrations; access-rule or config changes outside change windows; new privileged grantsValidate against change tickets; escalate to IR
N3 · New session/key under service accountUnix auth / syslog / /var/log/secureNew SSH key in authorized_keys; new cron/systemd unit; interactive shell under the BoKS service accountTreat as compromise; rotate; remove persistence
N4 · Version / patch auditAsset inventory / package managerEnumerate Core PAM (BoKS) hosts; compare installed build to FI-2026-007 fixed releaseSchedule emergency patch; mitigate unpatched hosts
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
These target the Falcon Linux sensor on the BoKS host(s). Process hunts include SyntheticProcessRollup2. Q3/Q6 need an env edit (your BoKS-client subnets / config paths). The pre-auth request body is network-only — pair these with N1.
Q1 · boks_autoregisterd spawns a child process (core injection tell)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: any process whose parent is boks_autoregisterd. Accomplishes: the highest-fidelity signal — the autoregistration daemon should not spawn children; a child = command injection. FP: low — baseline first to learn any benign helper the daemon legitimately forks, then exclude it.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 command injection — boks_autoregisterd child spawn (T1190 / T1059.004)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low | REQUIRES: Falcon Linux ProcessRollup2 on BoKS hosts
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^boks_autoregisterd$/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q2 · Injected shell / interpreter / recon from autoregister context
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: a child of boks_autoregisterd that is a shell, scripting interpreter, or recon utility. Accomplishes: tightens Q1 to the classic command-injection follow-ons. FP: low — none expected from a registration daemon.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 injected shell/recon (T1059.004)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^boks_autoregisterd$/i
| CommandLine=/\b(sh|bash|dash|ksh|zsh|python\d?|perl|awk)\b\s+-c|\b(id|whoami|uname|hostname|cat|ls|env)\b/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q3 · Anomalous TCP 6507 traffic to BoKS hosts
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: connections involving the autoregister port 6507. Accomplishes: surfaces who is reaching the exposed service. FP: medium — legitimate BoKS clients register over 6507; allow-list your known client subnets so only unexpected sources alert.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 autoregister port exposure (T1190)
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: exclude RemoteAddressIP4 of sanctioned BoKS-client subnets; alert on the rest
#event_simpleName=/NetworkConnectIP4|NetworkListenIP4|NetworkReceiveIP4/
| (RemotePort=6507 or LocalPort=6507)
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, LocalPort], function=[count()])
| sort(_count, order=desc)
Q4 · Post-exploit payload retrieval (curl/wget → sh, chmod, base64)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: download-and-run / decode-and-run patterns parented by a BoKS daemon. Accomplishes: catches ingress tool transfer right after injection. FP: low when scoped to the BoKS daemon parent; verify any hit.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 payload retrieval from service context (T1105)
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| ParentBaseFileName=/^boks_/i
| CommandLine=/(curl|wget|fetch).{0,80}(\bsh\b|bash|\| ?sh)|chmod\s+\+?x|base64\s+-d|\/dev\/tcp\//i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q5 · Persistence / reverse shell from BoKS service account
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: cron/systemd edits, SSH authorized_keys writes, or back-connect shells run on the BoKS host. Accomplishes: catches the persistence/RAT stage. FP: medium — admins legitimately edit cron/keys; allow-list change-window AIDs and known admin accounts.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 persistence / reverse shell on BoKS host (T1053.003 / T1098.004 / T1571)
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: exclude known admin AIDs and scheduled change-window maintenance
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2/
| CommandLine=/(crontab\s+-|systemctl\s+(enable|daemon-reload)|authorized_keys|nc\s+-e|ncat\s+.{0,20}-e|bash\s+-i|\/dev\/tcp\/|mkfifo.{0,30}\| ?(sh|bash))/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
Q6 · BoKS configuration tamper (boksinit / config writes)
CONF MEDFP MEDCOST LOW

Looks for: writes to BoKS configuration (e.g. boksinit) — used both as the vendor mitigation and as an attacker tamper target. Accomplishes: watches for control-weakening edits. FP: medium — legitimate admin/patch activity edits these; correlate with change tickets and allow-list maintenance windows.

// HUNT: CVE-2026-9862 BoKS config tamper (T1562.001)
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// TUNING: exclude approved patch/maintenance AIDs and change windows
#event_simpleName=/RawFileModified|FileWritten/
| TargetFileName=/boksinit|boks.{0,12}\.(conf|cfg)$/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, TargetFileName], limit=200)
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)
08

CrowdStrike Custom IOA Recommendations

IOA NameField PatternsBenign ExclusionsDeployment Path
BoKS — autoregisterd child processParentBaseFileName boks_autoregisterd with ANY child imageBaseline-confirmed benign helper fork (if any), excluded by imageCustom IOA → Process Creation (Linux), critical, Detect+Block
BoKS — service-context download+runParent boks_* + CmdLine curl|wget … sh / base64 -dNone expectedCustom IOA → Process Creation (Linux), high
BoKS — back-connect shellCmdLine /dev/tcp/ / nc -e / bash -i on BoKS host groupApproved admin diagnostic AIDs (rare)Custom IOA → Process Creation (Linux), high
Q1/Q2/Q4 are strong Detect+Block promotions on the BoKS host group (near-zero FP, decisive). Q3/Q5/Q6 stay Detect/investigate with subnet and change-window allow-lists. Scope IOAs to a BoKS host group to keep them tight.
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Grouped IOC Quick-Copy

No public payload atoms exist for this CVE — the CSV uses explicit REPLACE_WITH placeholders for per-incident indicators. The durable layer is the behavioral signature and the patch/port audit.

Falcon IOC Management CSVseed — placeholders
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
sha256,REPLACE_WITH_PAYLOAD_SHA256,prevent,critical,2026-12-28,CVE-2026-9862 dropped payload (per incident),cve:CVE-2026-9862
ipv4,REPLACE_WITH_C2_OR_SCANNER_IP,detect,high,2026-09-28,CVE-2026-9862 exploit source / C2 (per incident),cve:CVE-2026-9862
domain,REPLACE_WITH_PAYLOAD_DOMAIN,detect,medium,2026-09-28,CVE-2026-9862 payload host (per incident),cve:CVE-2026-9862
Behavioral Signatureskill-chain detection
Inject:   boks_autoregisterd spawns ANY child process (should never happen normally)
Exec:     child = sh / bash / python / perl with -c ; id / whoami / uname recon
Retrieve: parent boks_* runs curl|wget piped to sh ; chmod +x ; base64 -d
Persist:  crontab - ; systemctl enable ; write to authorized_keys ; /dev/tcp/ back-connect
Tamper:   writes to boksinit / boks*.conf outside a change window
Network:  unexpected source connecting to TCP 6507 on a BoKS host
Affected / Patch AuditCVE + advisory
CVE-2026-9862          # OS command injection (CWE-78), CVSS 9.8, pre-auth
Advisory:  FI-2026-007 # Fortra Core Privileged Access Manager (BoKS)
Service:   boks_autoregisterd      # autoregistration daemon
Port:      TCP 6507                # default listener
Versions:  confirm installed build vs FI-2026-007 fixed release (advisory DB: Unknown)
Fix:       apply Fortra fixed build ; until then firewall 6507 + disable autoregisterd
Mitigation Commandsdeploy on BoKS host
# 1) Restrict TCP 6507 to known BoKS-client subnets (example: iptables)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6507 -s <BOKS_CLIENT_CIDR> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6507 -j DROP

# 2) If you cannot patch immediately, disable autoregistration (vendor mitigation)
#    Comment out the autoregisterd entry in the BoKS boksinit configuration, then:
boksadm -S stop ; boksadm -S start   # restart BoKS to apply (validate in a maintenance window)

# 3) Confirm the listener is no longer exposed
ss -lntp | grep 6507 || echo "6507 not listening"
10

Hardening — Tiered & Deployable

This is a pre-auth RCE on a privileged-access hub — patching and choking network reach to 6507 are the decisive moves; everything else limits blast radius.

Immediate — Patch & cut reach
  • Apply the Fortra FI-2026-007 fixed build to all Core PAM (BoKS) hostsM1051. This is the only complete fix; treat as emergency change.
  • Firewall-restrict TCP 6507 to known BoKS-client subnets; block from everywhere elseM1037. See the §9 iptables block. Removes pre-auth reachability for the exploit.
  • If you can't patch now, disable autoregisterdM1042. Comment the autoregisterd entry in boksinit and restart BoKS (vendor mitigation; validate in a maintenance window).
  • Ensure the Falcon Linux sensor is installed & reporting on every BoKS hostM1040. Q1/Q2 only work if the master/server hosts are sensored.
Near term — Constrain & monitor (pilot first)
  • Segment the PAM management plane; no direct internet path to BoKSM1030. 6507 should be reachable only from the managed estate over controlled links.
  • Deploy Q1/Q2/Q4 as Custom IOAs (Detect+Block) on a BoKS host group; forward BoKS audit + 6507 netflow to SIEMM1040 / M1047. Feeds N1/N2/N3.
  • Least-privilege the BoKS service account; file-integrity-monitor boksinit and BoKS configM1026 / M1022. Limits what injected commands can do and catches Q6 tamper.
  • Rotate credentials BoKS brokers if any exposure window is suspectedM1027. A compromised PAM means assume-breach for managed secrets.
Strategic — Reduce attack surface
  • CIS / DISA STIG Unix hardening on BoKS hosts + egress filteringM1037 / M1030. Blocks the curl/wget payload pull (Q4) and back-connect shells (Q5).
  • Inventory all PAM/privileged-infrastructure appliances and bring them under EDR + patch SLAsM1051. Appliance-style hosts are the common blind spot this CVE exploits.
  • Vendor-advisory monitoring + tabletop for "PAM compromise"M1047. Rehearse credential mass-rotation and managed-host isolation before it's needed.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
IsolateNetwork-contain any BoKS host with Q1/Q2/Q4 hits; block TCP 6507 at the firewall; freeze the BoKS service accountSOC L2Containment timestamps; Q1/Q2 process tree
TriageReconstruct the boks_autoregisterd child-process tree; identify payload, persistence (cron/keys), and any config tamper (Q5/Q6); scope which managed hosts the BoKS host could reachIRProcess timeline; recovered payload + hash
EradicateRemove payloads, cron/systemd units, rogue SSH keys; restore boksinit/config from known-good; patch to FI-2026-007IRRemoved-artifact log; patch confirmation
RecoverRotate every credential BoKS brokers and any secret reachable from the host; rebuild the BoKS host if integrity is in doubt; verify before reconnectingIR + IAMCredential-rotation log; integrity checks
HardenConfirm patch; firewall 6507; deploy Q1/Q2/Q4 IOAs Detect+Block; forward BoKS audit/netflow; FIM on configDetection EngPatch + IOA + logging status
12

Detection Coverage Map & Validation

TechniqueBehaviorCQLIOACoverage
T1190 (request body)Pre-auth exploit payload on 6507GAP network-only — IDS/WAF + patch (N1)
T1190 / T1059.004boks_autoregisterd child spawnQ1, Q2IOA-1Good decisive, needs Linux sensor
T1190 (exposure)TCP 6507 reachabilityQ3Partial tune BoKS-client subnets
T1105Payload retrievalQ4IOA-2Good
T1053 / T1098.004 / T1571Persistence / reverse shellQ5IOA-3Partial tune admin allow-list
T1562.001BoKS config tamperQ6Partial correlate change tickets
T1021.004 / T1003Pivot to managed hosts / cred harvestGAP BoKS audit + managed-host logons (N2/N3)

Validation gates: (1) confirm a Falcon Linux sensor on every BoKS master/server host and that ProcessRollup2 carries ParentBaseFileName + command line; (2) baseline any benign child boks_autoregisterd may legitimately fork, then exclude it so Q1 stays clean; (3) populate sanctioned BoKS-client subnets (Q3) and admin/change-window allow-lists (Q5/Q6) before alerting; (4) lab-test a benign equivalent (a manual curl … | sh under a non-BoKS parent) to confirm Q4 scoping; (5) promote Q1/Q2/Q4 to Custom IOA Detect+Block on the BoKS host group. The CVE/port/service facts are advisory-cited and safe to use as-is; there is no payload hash to deploy.

13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Hunt — CVE-2026-9862 Fortra Core PAM (BoKS) unauth command injection
SEVERITY:     Critical (CVSS 9.8; pre-auth RCE on a privileged-access hub)
SCOPE:        All Fortra Core PAM (BoKS) Unix/Linux hosts; TCP 6507 exposure
HYPOTHESIS:   Crafted autoregistration request to 6507 -> boks_autoregisterd injects a shell
              -> payload retrieval -> persistence/reverse shell -> abuse PAM to pivot.
QUERIES RUN:  Q1 autoregisterd child (IOA) | Q2 injected shell/recon (IOA) | Q3 6507 traffic* |
              Q4 payload retrieval (IOA) | Q5 persistence/revshell* | Q6 config tamper*
              (* = requires env edit: BoKS-client subnets / admin + change-window allow-list)
DO FIRST:     Q1, Q2, Q4 -- escalate any hit; assume PAM compromise = managed-secret exposure
FINDINGS:     <pending analyst execution>
GAPS:         Pre-auth request body (network-only; IDS/WAF) ; pivot to managed hosts (BoKS audit)
ACTIONS:      Patch FI-2026-007; firewall 6507; disable autoregisterd if unpatched;
              deploy Q1/Q2/Q4 IOAs Detect+Block; rotate BoKS-brokered credentials on suspicion
OWNER:        HuntPack
VERSION:      v0.1 - 2026-06-28
14

Changelog

v0.32026-07-24CQL correctness pass. All table() calls now carry an explicit row limit: the default is 200 and truncation is silent, so a capped result was indistinguishable from a complete one. Atomic-IOC sweeps (filters over 5+ hashes or C2 IPs) use limit=max so a wide infection is never silently under-scoped; behavioural hunts use limit=200, where exceeding the cap indicates the query needs tuning. Where present, event names that do not exist in the Falcon data model were corrected (e.g. ServiceInstalled is a Sysmon concept, not a Falcon event; ElfFileWritten is ELFFileWritten) — such queries could never return a row. No detection logic, fields, or IOCs changed.
v0.22026-06-29CQL syntax review (crowdstrike-logscale-v3): removed invalid FileCreateInfo and NewFileWritten events (Q6).
v0.12026-06-28Initial pack built to the review-v2 gold layout (fixed left-sidebar scrollspy TOC, collapsible, cloud selector inside the CQL section, per-card Copy/Open-in-Falcon, Grouped IOC Quick-Copy grid, coverage+validation, .ticket). Sourced from NVD (CVE-2026-9862, CVSS 9.8 CWE-78), Fortra advisory FI-2026-007, GitHub Advisory GHSA-32v6-8gq7-4gxm, and CyberSecurityNews/GBHackers: unauthenticated command injection in boks_autoregisterd on TCP 6507; behavior-first detections (autoregisterd child spawn, injected shell/recon, payload retrieval, persistence/reverse shell, config tamper, 6507 exposure). 6 CQL + 4 native hunts, 3 IOA candidates; no public payload atoms — CSV ships REPLACE_WITH placeholders, with the CVE/port/service as the cited durable facts. Includes deployable mitigation commands (iptables 6507 restriction, autoregisterd disable).
15

References

TierSourceUsed For
1NVD — CVE-2026-9862CVSS 9.8 vector, CWE-78 classification, authoritative description
1Fortra Security Advisory FI-2026-007Affected product, fixed build, vendor mitigation guidance
1GitHub Advisory GHSA-32v6-8gq7-4gxmComponent confirmation (boks_autoregisterd), service-level execution, version status
2CyberSecurityNews — Fortra Access Manager command injection · GBHackers — Fortra Access Manager flawTCP 6507, autoregistration mechanism, mitigations, disclosure timeline

HuntPack v0.1 · CVE-2026-9862 (Fortra Core PAM / BoKS) · Generated 2026-06-28 · Defensive use only — no offensive code or exploit. No public payload atoms exist; the behavioral detections plus the patch/port audit are the durable signal. Confirm your installed BoKS build against FI-2026-007, and validate field names + tune BoKS-client subnet / admin allow-lists in your tenant before promoting any query to alerting.