Blind Eagle (APT-C-36): Judicial-Lure Wave Delivering an AsyncRAT Fork
Executive Summary
Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) is running a new phishing wave against Latin America, Colombia a priority, with Portuguese and Spanish lures posing as court notices, fiscalía notices, tutela proceedings and administrative documents. The attachment is an SVG disguised as .xhtml that renders a fake Fiscalía General de la Nación page and builds a password-protected ZIP inside the browser (HTML smuggling, ZipCrypto), so the mail gateway never sees the archive. Inside is a JavaScript dropper posing as “Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298”, which chains to a VBScript stage (AMSI and ETW bypass, fake “CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA” decoy), Startup-folder persistence, and a PowerShell loader that decodes and runs the final RAT in memory. The RAT is an AsyncRAT fork with DCRat lineage carrying the developer markers Boss/Client77 and Client77. Zenox reports the cluster as Brazilian-operated and as a recent, purpose-built, single-node infrastructure.
Highest-value defensive angle. Atomic indicators are thin: Zenox withholds every full hash and every configuration value, and only two domains and one IP are published. Detection weight therefore sits on behaviour: script hosts launched from a ZIP extraction folder, the SvcConfig<random>.vbs and index_<suffix>.xhtml filename patterns, wscript-to-PowerShell hand-off, and the three network indicators.
Honest scope. Zenox reproduced the chain in a lab and states it could not confirm any real-world compromise. This pack is a hunt for the technique, not a statement that anyone is compromised.
Defender priority. Run Q3 and Q7 first (highest confidence, lowest noise), then Q1, Q2 and Q6. Treat every indicator as detect only: no indicator has two independent sources, and wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock tools.
Source Review & Web Hunter Notes
| ID | Tier | Source | Published | Key finding | Carry forward |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | Primary (vendor research) | ZenoX, “LAST HEIST: New APT-C-36 infection wave in LATAM” (the article title, not a campaign name) | 2026-11-04 | Full chain, infrastructure, MITRE table, developer signatures. Withholds full hashes and config values; prints only truncated hash prefixes. | Yes: chain, TTPs, 2 domains, 1 IP, ports, filename patterns |
| S02 | Secondary (news) | The Hacker News, Ravie Lakshmanan | 2026-11-10 | Restates S01 and adds a Zenox statement of nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. Carries no indicators. Not independent of S01. | Partial: email-volume figure and targeting context |
| S03 | Background | Zscaler ThreatLabz, BlindEagle / Caminho / DCRAT | 2025-12-16 | Earlier, different Blind Eagle chain (compromised-account lure, Discord and Internet Archive staging, Caminho, DCRAT). Shows the actor's commodity-RAT habit. | Context only. No indicators carried: different cluster |
| S04 | Background | ANY.RUN malware trends: BlindEagle | Accessed 2026-11-11 | Actor profile and a list of recent sandbox submissions of .xhtml files dated 10 November 2026. The page does not link them to the S01 chain. | Context only. No indicators carried |
Decisions and discrepancies
- Independence. S02 is derivative of S01, so no indicator has two independent sources. Every indicator ships as detect, none as prevent.
- Email volume. The “nearly 3,300 emails” figure appears only in S02, attributed to Zenox. The S01 public report describes a corpus of 12 initial emails. Both are quoted with their source; neither is used in a query.
- Port 4782. S01 treats 4782 as the C&C port. It does not call it an AsyncRAT default, so this pack does not either.
- Cloudflare edge addresses. S01 names 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 as the provider's shared edge for crp2026[.]online and says explicitly they are not the operator origin. They are excluded from every indicator list.
- Naming. Only the names the sources use appear here: Blind Eagle, APT-C-36, AsyncRAT, DCRat. No campaign name is coined.
- Embedded instructions. None of the four fetched pages contained text directed at an automated reader.
Hunt Brief & Attack Chain
Hypotheses (ordered by fidelity):
- A script host runs a dropper out of a ZIP extraction folder named after the lure ZIP. Q1 (campaign pattern), Q2 (generic). T1204.002, T1059.007.
- A
SvcConfig<random>.vbsruns under wscript or cscript, at first run and at every logon. Q3. T1059.005, T1547.001. - Hosts resolve or connect to the three published network indicators. Q7, Q8. T1105, T1573.001.
- wscript or cscript hands off to PowerShell, which later opens an external session on 4782. Q6, Q9. T1059.001, T1620.
- A browser opens a local .xhtml attachment, or a process references the persistent
index_<suffix>.xhtmlcopy. Q5, Q4. T1566.001, T1027.006.
| Step | Behaviour | Telemetry (plain terms, then platforms) | Hunt angle |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Phishing email with .xhtml attachment (judicial lure, Portuguese or Spanish) | Mail gateway and mailbox audit (outside endpoint telemetry) | Native hunt N1; Q5 on the endpoint |
| 2 | SVG disguised as XHTML renders fake Fiscalía page | Process creation with command line (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents) | Q5 |
| 3 | HTML smuggling builds Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip in the browser (ZipCrypto) | Browser-side only; the ZIP is never seen by the gateway (outside endpoint telemetry) | Gap G1; lands as Q1/Q2 when run |
| 4 | JavaScript dropper “Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298”, about 4.2 MB, /*2ab3[...]*/ noise markers; recon of OS, network profile, memory, env vars, localised folders | Process creation with command line (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents) | Q1, Q2 |
| 5 | VBScript stage SvcConfig<random>.vbs: AMSI and ETW bypass, decoy “CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA” | Process creation with command line (as above) | Q3. AMSI/ETW tampering is Gap G2 |
| 6 | Delete original XHTML, clear Mark of the Web, persistent copy index_<suffix>.xhtml, Startup-folder shortcut | Process creation (as above); autostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents) | Q3, Q4, Q10. File deletion, Zone.Identifier change and the shortcut write are Gap G3 |
| 7 | PowerShell decodes (AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIP) and reflectively loads the RAT in memory | Process creation with parent (as above) | Q6. In-memory payload is Gap G4 |
| 8 | AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage) calls out; hidden desktop, keylogging, d3d11 screen capture, token impersonation | DNS lookup with requesting process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents, field names unconfirmed); outbound network connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents) | Q7, Q8, Q9. Capability-level behaviour is Gap G5 |
Developer fingerprint (for memory and file scanning, not for CQL)
Boss/Client77, Client77, client77_rat.bin; classes Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, IdSender; configuration fields Hosts, Ports, Version, Key, MTX, Certificate (values withheld). Zenox cautions these class names are not exclusive to this fork, so they are corroborating strings, not a verdict.
Consolidated IOC Table
| Type | Value | Confidence | Action | Context | Expiry |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domain | crp2026[.]online | Medium | detect | Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Source S01 only (S02 is derivative). Block by name only, never by its Cloudflare IPs. | 2027-02-11 |
| Hostname | vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com | Medium | detect | Dedicated C&C. Dynamic-DNS parent myvnc.com is NOT an indicator. Neighbours vpfinal138 to vpfinal146 probed and inactive per S01. | 2027-02-11 |
| IPv4 | 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 | Medium | detect | C&C node (ports 4782, 5357, 5985 seen exposed). Rented server, may be reassigned. | 2027-02-11 |
| Port | 4782/tcp | Medium | hunt | C&C port per S01. Hunt only (Q9); never a standalone block. | 2027-02-11 |
| Filename pattern | Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip | Medium | hunt | Browser-generated ZIP name. Q1. | 2027-02-11 |
| Filename | 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml | Low | hunt | One example attachment, about 4.2 MB. Per-email names vary. Q5 keys on the extension. | 2026-12-11 |
| Filename | Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 | Medium | hunt | Dropper display name, JavaScript, about 4.2 MB, noise markers /*2ab3[...]*/. | 2027-02-11 |
| Filename pattern | SvcConfig<random>.vbs (example SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs) | Medium | hunt | Startup shortcut target. Random suffix per victim. Q3. | 2027-02-11 |
| Path pattern | %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml (example index_ZNn4r6.xhtml); copy under C:\Users\Public\ | Medium | hunt | Persistent fake XHTML. Q4. | 2027-02-11 |
| String | CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA | Medium | enrich | Decoy page title shown by the VBS stage. | 2026-12-11 |
| Strings | Boss/Client77, Client77, client77_rat.bin, Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, IdSender | Medium | enrich | Developer fingerprint of the RAT. Not exclusive to this fork per S01. | 2027-02-11 |
| Hash prefix | Stage 3: efa891[...]; stage 4: 43bf[...]; stage 5: 3bfb[...] | None | not usable | Truncated prefixes only. Cannot be searched, imported or extended. Coverage gap G6. | n/a |
| SHA-256 | REPLACE_WITH_STAGE_AND_RAT_HASHES | None | placeholder | Zenox withholds full hashes in the public report. Obtain from the vendor, then import as detect. | n/a |
| IPv4 (EXCLUDED) | 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 | n/a | do not block | Cloudflare shared edge for crp2026[.]online. S01: not the operator origin. Blocking them hits unrelated sites and does not remove the origin. | n/a |
| Domain (EXCLUDED) | myvnc[.]com (parent) | n/a | do not block | Public dynamic-DNS provider. Only the specific hostname above is actionable. | n/a |
Affected Surface & Telemetry Matrix
| Surface | Telemetry (plain terms, then platforms) | Priority | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows user workstations that receive judicial or administrative mail | Process creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents) | High | None for process start |
| Same hosts, outbound traffic | DNS lookup with process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents, name inside AdditionalFields, unconfirmed) and outbound connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents) | High | Defender has no endpoint DNS table; connection attempts versus completions differ by platform |
| Persistence | Autostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents) | Medium | Startup-folder shortcut and file writes are outside verified event coverage here |
| Mail layer | Gateway and mailbox audit logs | High | Outside endpoint telemetry |
| Browser | Local HTML smuggling (blob download) | Medium | Outside endpoint telemetry for the in-browser step |
| Memory | Reflectively loaded RAT | High | In-memory only; endpoint file telemetry does not see it. Outside endpoint telemetry without memory scanning |
ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | Name | Observed behaviour | Query / control |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Judicial-themed XHTML attachment | Q5, N1 |
| Execution | T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Victim opens attachment, then the JS in the ZIP | Q1, Q2, Q5 |
| Defense Evasion | T1027.006 | HTML Smuggling | ZIP built in the browser with ZipCrypto | Q5 (gap G1 for the ZIP itself) |
| Defense Evasion | T1036 | Masquerading | Dropper named Network Configuration Auditor; SVG named .xhtml | Q1, Q5 |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated/Compressed Files | Noise markers /*2ab3[...]*/, encoded strings | Hardening only (G7) |
| Execution | T1059.007 | JavaScript | Dropper and decoding stages | Q1, Q2 |
| Execution | T1059.005 | Visual Basic | Stage 5 and persistence | Q3 |
| Execution | T1059.001 | PowerShell | Stage 6 decode and load | Q6 |
| Command and Control | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Stage chaining; distribution domain | Q7 |
| Defense Evasion | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIP | Q6 (decode itself is gap G4) |
| Defense Evasion | T1070.004 | File Deletion | Original XHTML deleted | Gap G3 |
| Defense Evasion | T1553.005 | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | Zone.Identifier removed | Gap G3 |
| Persistence | T1547.001 | Startup Folder | SvcConfig shortcut; index_ copy | Q3, Q4, Q10 |
| Defense Evasion | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses | AMSI and ETW bypass in the VBS stage | Gap G2 |
| Defense Evasion | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | RAT loaded via Reflection and delegates | Q6, Q9 (gap G4) |
| Collection | T1056.001 | Keylogging | Active-layout keylogger | Gap G5 |
| Collection | T1113 | Screen Capture | d3d11 capture | Gap G5 |
| Collection | T1125 | Video Capture | MFPlat streaming | Gap G5 |
| Privilege Escalation | T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft | Session token impersonation | Gap G5 |
| Collection | T1005 | Data from Local System | Judicial and tax documents | Gap G5 |
| Command and Control | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography | Encrypted C&C channel | Q7, Q8, Q9 |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | RAT channel | Q7, Q8, Q9 |
| Discovery | T1082 | System Information Discovery | OS, memory, computer name, env vars | Q1, Q2 (host recon is inside the script) |
| Discovery | T1012 | Query Registry | Install date, network profile, product name | Inside the script, no standalone query |
| Discovery | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Localised Downloads/Descargas, Documents/Documentos | Inside the script, no standalone query |
Native Audit-Log Hunts
Non-CQL checks. Run N1 to N5 in parallel with the CQL hunts.
- N1 Mail gateway and mailbox audit. Search the last 30 days for attachments with extension
.xhtml,.xhtor.svgon messages with Spanish or Portuguese judicial subjects (tutela, demanda, citación, fiscalía, despacho, constancia, notificação). Note recipients in judicial, public-administration and education units. Message-header authentication passing does not clear a message (S01). - N2 Proxy and DNS logs. Query for
crp2026[.]onlineand the hostnamevpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com. Query firewall logs for45[.]146[.]81[.]142and any workstation-to-internet traffic on TCP 4782. - N3 Windows event logs (or Sysmon equivalents). Security 4688 / Sysmon 1 for wscript or cscript with a ZIP-extraction path; Sysmon 11 and 23 for
SvcConfig*.vbsandindex_*.xhtml; Sysmon 15 (FileCreateStreamHash) or deletion ofZone.Identifierstreams; PowerShell 4104 script blocks containing GZipStream together with a custom decoder and Reflection. - N4 Startup folder inventory (read-only; run per host or through your RMM):
Get-ChildItem -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Path `
"$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup", `
"$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp", `
"$env:APPDATA\Microsoft", "C:\Users\Public" |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match '^(SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.(vbs|lnk)|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml)$' } |
Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTimeUtc, LastWriteTimeUtc
- N5 Memory scan of suspect hosts. If a host shows Q3 or Q6 hits, capture memory and string-scan for the developer markers Boss/Client77, Client77 and the class names in section 3. The RAT is not on disk, so a disk scan will find nothing.
Hunt Queries: CrowdStrike CQL, SentinelOne PowerQuery and Defender XDR KQL
Paste your own address, taken from your browser with Event Search open in the scope you want: the whole thing, including the _scopeId and _scopeLevel parameters that aim the search. Then "Copy & open SentinelOne" opens Event Search with the query and a time window already set, and copies the query as well. A bare console address still works, but it can only open the console for you to paste into. Your address is kept in this browser alone: it is never part of this page, never sent anywhere, and no address of ours is built in.
Pick your portal. Microsoft documents a Share link in advanced hunting but not its URL format, so each "Copy & open Defender" button copies the query and opens Advanced hunting: paste it into the editor.
All ten queries use event names from the crowdstrike-logscale-v3 reference: ProcessRollup2, DnsRequest, NetworkConnectIP4, AsepValueUpdate. Script and AMSI telemetry events are not used because their fields are not in that reference. Basenames are matched through FileName or ContextBaseFileName so no path slash enters a regex. Static review only: validate Q1 to Q10 in your tenant before scheduling them.
Looks for: wscript or cscript whose command line carries the ZIP name pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip. Explorer extracts a ZIP-hosted script to a temp folder named after the archive, so the archive name lands in the command line of the dropper (stage 4, the “Network Configuration Auditor” JavaScript).
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process.
- KQL – Defender XDR: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: FileName holds the image file name of the created process.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process.
// HUNT: Script host launched from the campaign ZIP name (Demanda_Ejecutiva_*EXP2026) // MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1027.006 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: a legitimate legal-document archive that happens to share the naming pattern and contains a script // LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker) // NOTE: the ZIP name is a pattern from one vendor report; operators can rename it, so a miss proves nothing. Pair with Q2. #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | FileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i | CommandLine=/Demanda_Ejecutiva_.*EXP2026/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.name: Created process nametgt.process.cmdline: Created command line
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Creator process
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name = * tgt.process.cmdline = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
// HUNT: Script host launched from the campaign ZIP name (Demanda_Ejecutiva_*EXP2026)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1027.006
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: a legitimate legal-document archive that happens to share the naming pattern and contains a script
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same predicate on a process-creation event: a wscript or cscript image whose command line names the campaign ZIP pattern. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent. The script host is tgt.process.* because it is the created process.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: The ZIP name is a pattern from one vendor report; pair with the extraction-folder card rather than excluding anything here.
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name in:anycase ('wscript.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript.exe', 'cscript') tgt.process.cmdline matches 'Demanda_Ejecutiva_.*EXP2026'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeFileName: Created process nameProcessCommandLine: Created command line
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Initiating process
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | take 5
// HUNT: Script host launched from the campaign ZIP name (Demanda_Ejecutiva_*EXP2026)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1027.006
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: a legitimate legal-document archive that happens to share the naming pattern and contains a script
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a wscript or cscript image whose command line names the campaign ZIP pattern. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: The ZIP name is a pattern from one vendor report; pair with the extraction-folder card rather than excluding anything here.
// LOOKBACK: 7d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "wscript", "cscript.exe", "cscript")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)Demanda_Ejecutiva_.*EXP2026"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: wscript, cscript or mshta executing a .js/.jse/.vbs/.vbe/.wsf that sits inside an Explorer ZIP extraction folder (Temp1_name.zip). This is how a victim runs the stage-4 dropper straight from the browser-generated ZIP. It survives a rename of the archive. FP: IT staff or developers double-clicking a script inside an archive; some legacy installers ship as ZIP plus .vbs. Expect low volume on workstations.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline keeps the extraction path with backslash separators.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
- KQL – Defender XDR: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine keeps the extraction path with backslash separators.
// HUNT: Script host executing a script from inside a ZIP extraction folder // MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1059.005 // CONF: medium FP: medium COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: admins running vendor scripts shipped in a ZIP; legacy installers // TUNING: after a 7-day baseline, exclude approved admin hosts or an approved vendor script name with an extra "| CommandLine!=/approved-script-name/i" stage; do not exclude by user name alone // LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker) #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | FileName=/^(wscript|cscript|mshta)(\.exe)?$/i | CommandLine=/Temp\d+_[^\\]+\.zip\\[^\\]+\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta)/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.name: Created process nametgt.process.cmdline: Created command line
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Creator process
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name = * tgt.process.cmdline = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
// HUNT: Script host executing a script from inside a ZIP extraction folder
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1059.005
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: admins running vendor scripts shipped in a ZIP; legacy installers
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a script host (wscript, cscript or mshta) whose command line runs a script file from inside a TempN_name.zip extraction folder. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: After a 7-day baseline, exclude an approved vendor script name with an extra filter on the command line; do not exclude by user name alone.
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name in:anycase ('wscript.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript.exe', 'cscript', 'mshta.exe', 'mshta') tgt.process.cmdline matches 'Temp\\d+_[^\\\\]+\\.zip\\\\[^\\\\]+\\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta)'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeFileName: Created process nameProcessCommandLine: Created command line
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Initiating process
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | take 5
// HUNT: Script host executing a script from inside a ZIP extraction folder
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1059.005
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: admins running vendor scripts shipped in a ZIP; legacy installers
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a script host (wscript, cscript or mshta) whose command line runs a script file from inside a TempN_name.zip extraction folder. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: After a 7-day baseline, exclude an approved vendor script name with an extra filter on the command line; do not exclude by user name alone.
// LOOKBACK: 7d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "wscript", "cscript.exe", "cscript", "mshta.exe", "mshta")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)Temp\d+_[^\\]+\.zip\\[^\\]+\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta)"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: wscript or cscript running a file named SvcConfig plus a short random suffix and .vbs (the report names SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs and states the suffix differs per victim, so this hunts the pattern). The Startup-folder shortcut re-launches it at every logon, so this fires on first run and on each later logon.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process.
- KQL – Defender XDR: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process.
// HUNT: wscript/cscript running SvcConfig<random>.vbs (stage 5 and Startup persistence) // MITRE: T1059.005, T1547.001 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: an in-house script that happens to be called SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs // LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker; persistence re-fires at each logon) // NOTE: the suffix length is inferred from one example (6 characters); {4,12} allows for variation. #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | FileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i | CommandLine=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.name: Created process nametgt.process.cmdline: Created command line
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Creator process
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name = * tgt.process.cmdline = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
// HUNT: wscript/cscript running SvcConfig<random>.vbs (stage 5 and Startup persistence)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1059.005, T1547.001
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an in-house script that happens to be called SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a wscript or cscript image whose command line names SvcConfig plus 4 to 12 alphanumerics and .vbs. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: The suffix length is inferred from one example; the 4 to 12 range allows for variation. Exclude an in-house script of the same name by full path after a baseline.
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker; persistence re-fires at each logon)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name in:anycase ('wscript.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript.exe', 'cscript') tgt.process.cmdline matches 'SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\\.vbs'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeFileName: Created process nameProcessCommandLine: Created command line
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Initiating process
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | take 5
// HUNT: wscript/cscript running SvcConfig<random>.vbs (stage 5 and Startup persistence)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1059.005, T1547.001
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an in-house script that happens to be called SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a wscript or cscript image whose command line names SvcConfig plus 4 to 12 alphanumerics and .vbs. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: The suffix length is inferred from one example; the 4 to 12 range allows for variation. Exclude an in-house script of the same name by full path after a baseline.
// LOOKBACK: 14d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(14d)
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "wscript", "cscript.exe", "cscript")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: A command line that points at index_<suffix>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder or Users\Public. The report documents the persistent copy at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml and an auxiliary copy under C:\Users\Public\ but does not say which process opens it, so the query is deliberately process-agnostic. CONF is medium for that reason.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process, with backslash path separators.
- KQL – Defender XDR: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process, with backslash path separators.
// HUNT: Process referencing the persistent fake XHTML copy index_<suffix>.xhtml // MITRE: T1547.001, T1036, T1027.006 // CONF: medium FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: an unrelated app that writes index_<name>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder // LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker) #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | CommandLine=/(\\Microsoft|\\Users\\Public)\\index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.cmdline: Created command line
Recommended fields
tgt.process.name: Created process name
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.cmdline = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, tgt.process.cmdline
// HUNT: Process referencing the persistent fake XHTML copy index_<suffix>.xhtml
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1547.001, T1036, T1027.006
// CONF: medium | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an unrelated app that writes index_<name>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: any created process whose command line references index_ plus 4 to 12 alphanumerics and .xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder or the Public profile. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: Exclude an unrelated application that writes index_name.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder by its full path after a baseline.
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.cmdline matches '(\\\\Microsoft|\\\\Users\\\\Public)\\\\index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\\.xhtml'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
2 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeProcessCommandLine: Created command line
Recommended fields
FileName: Created process name
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | take 5
// HUNT: Process referencing the persistent fake XHTML copy index_<suffix>.xhtml
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1547.001, T1036, T1027.006
// CONF: medium | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an unrelated app that writes index_<name>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: any created process whose command line references index_ plus 4 to 12 alphanumerics and .xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder or the Public profile. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: Exclude an unrelated application that writes index_name.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder by its full path after a baseline.
// LOOKBACK: 14d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(\\Microsoft|\\Users\\Public)\\index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: A browser started with a local .xhtml path on its command line, which is how an emailed or downloaded attachment opens (stage 2). Real XHTML documents opened from disk are rare on business workstations, which is what gives this hunt its value despite the generic pattern. FP: Web developers and documentation tooling that open local XHTML; some e-invoicing and e-book workflows. Baseline first.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
- PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
- PowerQuery assumes: A browser launched by double-clicking a file carries the file path in tgt.process.cmdline.
- KQL – Defender XDR: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: A browser launched by double-clicking a file carries the file path in ProcessCommandLine.
// HUNT: Browser launched with a local .xhtml file (SVG disguised as XHTML lure) // MITRE: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1027.006 // CONF: medium FP: medium COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: developers, documentation tooling, e-invoice/e-book workflows opening XHTML locally // TUNING: exclude developer and documentation hosts after a 7-day baseline (add "| ComputerName!=/dev-host-prefix/i"); keep mail-attachment cache paths (INetCache, Content.Outlook, Downloads) in scope // LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker) // NOTE: this is the only step where the lure name is unique per email, so the query keys on the extension, not the name. #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | FileName=/^(msedge|chrome|firefox|brave|iexplore|opera)(\.exe)?$/i | CommandLine=/\.xhtml/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.name: Created process nametgt.process.cmdline: Created command line
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Creator process
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name = * tgt.process.cmdline = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
// HUNT: Browser launched with a local .xhtml file (SVG disguised as XHTML lure)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1027.006
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: developers, documentation tooling, e-invoice/e-book workflows opening XHTML locally
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a browser image whose command line contains .xhtml. contains is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent. The browser is tgt.process.* because it is the created process.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: Exclude developer and documentation hosts after a 7-day baseline; keep mail-attachment cache paths (INetCache, Content.Outlook, Downloads) in scope.
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name in:anycase ('msedge.exe', 'msedge', 'chrome.exe', 'chrome', 'firefox.exe', 'firefox', 'brave.exe', 'brave', 'iexplore.exe', 'iexplore', 'opera.exe', 'opera') tgt.process.cmdline contains '.xhtml'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeFileName: Created process nameProcessCommandLine: Created command line
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Initiating process
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | take 5
// HUNT: Browser launched with a local .xhtml file (SVG disguised as XHTML lure)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1027.006
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: developers, documentation tooling, e-invoice/e-book workflows opening XHTML locally
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same process-creation predicate: a browser image whose command line contains .xhtml. contains and in~ are case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: Exclude developer and documentation hosts after a 7-day baseline; keep mail-attachment cache paths (INetCache, Content.Outlook, Downloads) in scope.
// LOOKBACK: 7d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("msedge.exe", "msedge", "chrome.exe", "chrome", "firefox.exe", "firefox", "brave.exe", "brave", "iexplore.exe", "iexplore", "opera.exe", "opera")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".xhtml"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: powershell or pwsh whose parent is wscript or cscript. In this chain the VBS and JavaScript stages hand off to PowerShell, which decodes the final payload (AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIP) and loads it with Reflection. The RAT is never written to disk, so the PowerShell launch is the last reliable on-disk-visible step. FP: Logon scripts and legacy automation that call PowerShell from VBScript.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
- PowerQuery assumes: On a Process Creation event src.process.* is the creator and tgt.process.* the created process.
- KQL – Defender XDR: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: InitiatingProcessFileName holds the image file name of the creator.
// HUNT: PowerShell spawned by wscript/cscript (stage 6 loader hand-off) // MITRE: T1059.001, T1059.005, T1140, T1620 // CONF: medium FP: medium COST: low // REQUIRES: process creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) // FALSE POSITIVES: VBScript logon scripts or management tooling that shell out to PowerShell // TUNING: baseline for 7 days then exclude the known script by its CommandLine (add "| ParentCommandLine!=/approved-logon-script/i") rather than excluding the parent process // LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker) // NOTE: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries. This is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block. #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | ParentBaseFileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i | FileName=/^(powershell|pwsh)(\.exe)?$/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine])
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Process Creation
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typetgt.process.name: Created process namesrc.process.name: Creator process name
Recommended fields
tgt.process.cmdline: Created command linesrc.process.cmdline: Creator command line
Readiness test
event.type = 'Process Creation' tgt.process.name = * src.process.name = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, src.process.name, tgt.process.name
// HUNT: PowerShell spawned by wscript/cscript (stage 6 loader hand-off)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1059.001, T1059.005, T1140, T1620
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: VBScript logon scripts or management tooling that shell out to PowerShell
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same parent and child predicate on a process-creation event: PowerShell (the created process, tgt.process.*) whose creator (src.process.*) is wscript or cscript. Lineage is re-derived for this event type, not copied field for field.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility process-creation events with command line
// TUNING: Baseline for 7 days, then exclude the known logon script by its creator command line rather than excluding the script host.
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Process Creation' src.process.name in:anycase ('wscript.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript.exe', 'cscript') tgt.process.name in:anycase ('powershell.exe', 'powershell', 'pwsh.exe', 'pwsh')
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.user, src.process.name, src.process.cmdline, tgt.process.name, tgt.process.cmdline
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceProcessEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeFileName: Created process nameInitiatingProcessFileName: Initiating process
Recommended fields
ProcessCommandLine: Created command lineInitiatingProcessCommandLine: Initiating command line
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName | take 5
// HUNT: PowerShell spawned by wscript/cscript (stage 6 loader hand-off)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1059.001, T1059.005, T1140, T1620
// CONF: medium | FP: medium
// FALSE POSITIVES: VBScript logon scripts or management tooling that shell out to PowerShell
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same parent and child predicate: PowerShell (the created process) whose initiating process is wscript or cscript. The CQL's parent field maps to InitiatingProcessFileName.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint process-creation telemetry (DeviceProcessEvents)
// TUNING: Baseline for 7 days, then exclude the known logon script by its initiating command line rather than excluding the script host.
// LOOKBACK: 7d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "wscript", "cscript.exe", "cscript")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell", "pwsh.exe", "pwsh")
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: Lookups of crp2026.online (and subdomains), the dedicated C&C hostname vpfinal142.myvnc.com, and the operator's neighbouring vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com naming pattern. Zenox probed vpfinal138 to vpfinal146 and found only 142 active; the pattern is kept as a cheap pivot in case the operator rotates. It matches the specific hostnames only, never the myvnc.com parent.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: The requesting process is src.process.name here; the CQL pivots on a process id instead.
- PowerQuery assumes: The queried name is in event.dns.request; some tenants populate dns.request instead, so check which one carries values.
- KQL – Defender XDR: DnsQueryResponse is recorded only where the sensor emits it; a tenant without it returns nothing.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: The queried name sits in AdditionalFields under DnsQueryString or QueryName; the readiness test prints AdditionalFields so a reader sees which key the tenant populates.
// HUNT: DNS lookups for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com (never the myvnc.com parent) // MITRE: T1105, T1573.001, T1041 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: DNS lookup with requesting process (CrowdStrike DnsRequest) // FALSE POSITIVES: security researchers or sandboxes resolving the indicator // LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker; the domain is about five weeks old per the report) // NOTE: pivot on ContextProcessId_decimal against ProcessRollup2 TargetProcessId_decimal to name the requesting process. #event_simpleName=DnsRequest | DomainName=/^(([a-z0-9-]+\.)*crp2026\.online|vpfinal1[0-9]{2}\.myvnc\.com)$/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, DomainName, ContextProcessId_decimal])
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DNS Resolved
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typeevent.dns.request: Queried name
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Requesting process
Fallbacks
event.dns.request→dns.request: Which DNS field a tenant populates differs by schema version.
Readiness test
event.type = 'DNS Resolved' event.dns.request = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, event.dns.request
// HUNT: DNS lookups for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com (never the myvnc.com parent)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1105, T1573.001, T1041
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: security researchers or sandboxes resolving the indicator
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same DNS predicate: the lookup name is the distribution apex (any subdomain) or the numbered C&C hostname pattern, never the myvnc.com parent. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent. The requesting process is src.process.* on a DNS event.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility DNS Resolved events
// TUNING: None expected; a security researcher or sandbox resolving the indicator is the only benign source.
// LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker; the domain is about five weeks old per the report)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: The requesting process is src.process.name here; the CQL pivots on a process id instead.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'DNS Resolved' event.dns.request matches '^(([a-z0-9-]+\\.)*crp2026\\.online|vpfinal1[0-9]{2}\\.myvnc\\.com)$'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.name, event.dns.request
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeActionType: Action typeAdditionalFields: DNS detail bag
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Requesting process
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse" | project Timestamp, ActionType, AdditionalFields | take 5
// HUNT: DNS lookups for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com (never the myvnc.com parent)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1105, T1573.001, T1041
// CONF: high | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: security researchers or sandboxes resolving the indicator
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same DNS predicate read from DeviceEvents DnsQueryResponse: the name is the distribution apex (any subdomain) or the numbered C&C hostname pattern, never the myvnc.com parent. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint DNS telemetry (DeviceEvents, ActionType DnsQueryResponse)
// TUNING: None expected; a security researcher or sandbox resolving the indicator is the only benign source.
// LOOKBACK: 30d (Advanced Hunting retention; matches the CQL window)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: DnsQueryResponse is recorded only where the sensor emits it; a tenant without it returns nothing.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(30d)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
| extend QueriedName = tostring(coalesce(parse_json(AdditionalFields)["DnsQueryString"], parse_json(AdditionalFields)["QueryName"]))
| where QueriedName matches regex @"(?i)^(([a-z0-9-]+\.)*crp2026\.online|vpfinal1[0-9]{2}\.myvnc\.com)$"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, QueriedName
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: Any process connecting to the single IPv4 address Zenox ties to the dedicated C&C. Falcon logs connection attempts, so a hit means the host tried to reach it, not that the session completed.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry.
- PowerQuery assumes: dst.ip.address holds the remote address of an outbound connection.
- KQL – Defender XDR: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RemoteIP holds the remote address of the connection.
// HUNT: Outbound connection to the C&C node 45.146.81.142 // MITRE: T1573.001, T1041 // CONF: high FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: outbound network connection (CrowdStrike NetworkConnectIP4) // FALSE POSITIVES: scanners and research traffic; rented-server IPs can be reassigned, so check the timestamp against 2026-10 and 2026-11 // LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker) #event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 | RemoteAddressIP4="45.146.81.142" | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, ContextProcessId_decimal])
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- IP Connect
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typedst.ip.address: Remote address
Recommended fields
src.process.name: Connecting processdst.port.number: Remote port
Readiness test
event.type = 'IP Connect' dst.ip.address = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, dst.ip.address
// HUNT: Outbound connection to the C&C node 45.146.81.142 // SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf // MITRE: T1573.001, T1041 // CONF: high | FP: low // FALSE POSITIVES: scanners and research traffic; rented-server IPs can be reassigned, so check the timestamp against 2026-10 and 2026-11 // EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same network predicate: an outbound IPv4 connection whose remote address is exactly 45.146.81.142. The connecting process is src.process.* on a network event. // REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility IP Connect events // TUNING: None expected; rented-server addresses can be reassigned, so check the event time against 2026-10 and 2026-11. // LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker) // CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required. // KNOWN GAPS: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry. // VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed event.type = 'IP Connect' dst.ip.address = '45.146.81.142' | columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.name, dst.ip.address, dst.port.number | limit 200
Automated validation: static-passed
2 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceNetworkEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeRemoteIP: Remote address
Recommended fields
InitiatingProcessFileName: Connecting processRemotePort: Remote port
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, RemoteIP | take 5
// HUNT: Outbound connection to the C&C node 45.146.81.142 // SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr // MITRE: T1573.001, T1041 // CONF: high | FP: low // FALSE POSITIVES: scanners and research traffic; rented-server IPs can be reassigned, so check the timestamp against 2026-10 and 2026-11 // EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same network predicate: an outbound IPv4 connection whose remote address is exactly 45.146.81.142. // REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint network telemetry (DeviceNetworkEvents) // TUNING: None expected; rented-server addresses can be reassigned, so check the event time against 2026-10 and 2026-11. // LOOKBACK: 30d (Advanced Hunting retention; matches the CQL window) // CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required. // KNOWN GAPS: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry. // VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned // AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0 DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp >= ago(30d) | where RemoteIP == "45.146.81.142" | project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort | sort by Timestamp desc | take 200
Looks for: powershell, pwsh, wscript, cscript, msbuild or mshta making an external connection on TCP 4782, the C&C port in the report. The RAT is loaded in memory, so the connection can originate from whichever host process carried the loader; the report does not name it, which is why the process list is wide. Private ranges are excluded.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: IPv6 destinations are not excluded or matched specially; the CQL tab covers IPv4 only as well.
- PowerQuery assumes: src.process.name is the connecting process on an IP Connect event.
- PowerQuery assumes: dst.port.number is numeric.
- KQL – Defender XDR: A row whose RemoteIP is IPv6 or empty is dropped by the address functions.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RemoteIP holds an IPv4 address for the connections of interest.
// HUNT: Scripting/loader process connecting to external port 4782 // MITRE: T1573.001, T1041, T1620 // CONF: medium FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: outbound network connection (CrowdStrike NetworkConnectIP4) // FALSE POSITIVES: an internal tool that uses 4782 from PowerShell to a public address (rare) // LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker) // NOTE: an in-memory RAT in an unexpected host process (browser, explorer) would be missed; widen ContextBaseFileName during scoping. #event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 | ContextBaseFileName=/^(powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|msbuild|mshta)(\.exe)?$/i | RemotePort=4782 | !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="10.0.0.0/8") | !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="172.16.0.0/12") | !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="192.168.0.0/16") | !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="127.0.0.0/8") | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, ContextProcessId_decimal])
5 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- IP Connect
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typesrc.process.name: Connecting processdst.port.number: Remote portdst.ip.address: Remote address
Readiness test
event.type = 'IP Connect' dst.ip.address = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, src.process.name, dst.port.number, dst.ip.address
// HUNT: Scripting/loader process connecting to external port 4782
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1573.001, T1041, T1620
// CONF: medium | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an internal tool that uses 4782 from PowerShell to a public address (rare)
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same network predicate: a scripting or loader process connecting to port 4782 on an address that is not RFC1918 or loopback. The connecting process is src.process.* on a network event.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility IP Connect events
// TUNING: An in-memory RAT inside an unexpected host process (browser, explorer) is missed; widen the process list during scoping.
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: IPv6 destinations are not excluded or matched specially; the CQL tab covers IPv4 only as well.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'IP Connect' src.process.name in:anycase ('powershell.exe', 'powershell', 'pwsh.exe', 'pwsh', 'wscript.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript.exe', 'cscript', 'msbuild.exe', 'msbuild', 'mshta.exe', 'mshta') dst.port.number = 4782 and !(net_rfc1918(dst.ip.address)) and !(net_ipsubnet(dst.ip.address, '127.0.0.0/8'))
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, src.process.name, dst.ip.address, dst.port.number
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
4 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceNetworkEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeInitiatingProcessFileName: Connecting processRemotePort: Remote portRemoteIP: Remote address
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | project Timestamp, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemotePort, RemoteIP | take 5
// HUNT: Scripting/loader process connecting to external port 4782
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1573.001, T1041, T1620
// CONF: medium | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: an internal tool that uses 4782 from PowerShell to a public address (rare)
// EQUIVALENCE: equivalent-with-schema-assumptions - Same network predicate: a scripting or loader process connecting to port 4782 on an address that is not private or loopback. ipv4_is_private covers the three RFC1918 ranges the CQL excludes.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint network telemetry (DeviceNetworkEvents)
// TUNING: An in-memory RAT inside an unexpected host process (browser, explorer) is missed; widen the process list during scoping.
// LOOKBACK: 14d; extend to 30d for the incident window
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: A row whose RemoteIP is IPv6 or empty is dropped by the address functions.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell", "pwsh.exe", "pwsh", "wscript.exe", "wscript", "cscript.exe", "cscript", "msbuild.exe", "msbuild", "mshta.exe", "mshta")
| where RemotePort == 4782
| where not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP)) and not(ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "127.0.0.0/8"))
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Looks for: The report documents Startup-folder persistence, which is not a registry write, so this query is a hedge for a build that uses a Run key instead of the shortcut. Expect no hits from the documented chain. It is cheap and rules out the variant.
Known limitations and deployment notes
- PowerQuery: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
- PowerQuery assumes: registry.value holds the data written to the value.
- KQL – Defender XDR: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
- KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RegistryValueData holds the data written to the value.
// HUNT: Autostart registry value referencing SvcConfig<random>.vbs or index_<suffix>.xhtml (variant hedge) // MITRE: T1547.001 // CONF: low FP: low COST: low // REQUIRES: autostart registry change (CrowdStrike AsepValueUpdate) // FALSE POSITIVES: none expected // LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker) // NOTE: low CONF because the documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no verified registry or file-write event covers. #event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate | RegStringValue=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml/i | table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, RegObjectName, RegValueName, RegStringValue])
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- Registry Value Modified
Required fields
event.time: Event timeevent.type: Event typeregistry.value: Registry value data
Recommended fields
registry.keyPath: Registry key pathregistry.valueName: Registry value name
Readiness test
event.type = 'Registry Value Modified' registry.value = * | limit 5 | columns event.time, event.type, registry.value
// HUNT: Autostart registry value referencing SvcConfig<random>.vbs or index_<suffix>.xhtml (variant hedge)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
// MITRE: T1547.001
// CONF: low | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: none expected
// EQUIVALENCE: approximate-analytic - The CQL reads an autostart-only registry event; this reads any registry value write whose data names the same file pattern, which is a superset on the event side. The value predicate is identical. matches is case-insensitive, which reproduces the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: SentinelOne Deep Visibility Registry Value Modified events
// TUNING: None expected; the file-name pattern is specific. Review the key path in the results to separate autostart keys from other writes.
// LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: static-reviewed
event.type = 'Registry Value Modified' registry.value matches 'SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\\.vbs|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\\.xhtml'
| columns event.time, endpoint.name, registry.keyPath, registry.valueName, registry.value
| limit 200Automated validation: static-passed
3 required fields · View requirements
Required telemetry
- DeviceRegistryEvents
Required fields
Timestamp: Event timeActionType: Action typeRegistryValueData: Registry value data
Recommended fields
RegistryKey: Registry keyRegistryValueName: Registry value name
Fallbacks
DeviceName→DeviceId: Changes the displayed host identifier only.
Readiness test
DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" | project Timestamp, ActionType, RegistryValueData | take 5
// HUNT: Autostart registry value referencing SvcConfig<random>.vbs or index_<suffix>.xhtml (variant hedge)
// SCHEMA PROFILE: microsoft-defender-xdr
// MITRE: T1547.001
// CONF: low | FP: low
// FALSE POSITIVES: none expected
// EQUIVALENCE: approximate-analytic - The CQL reads an autostart-only registry event; this reads any registry value set whose data names the same file pattern, which is a superset on the event side. The value predicate is identical. The regex carries (?i) to reproduce the CQL /i intent.
// REQUIRES: Defender for Endpoint registry telemetry (DeviceRegistryEvents)
// TUNING: None expected; the file-name pattern is specific. Review the key in the results to separate autostart keys from other writes.
// LOOKBACK: 30d (Advanced Hunting retention; matches the CQL window)
// CONFIGURATION: No lookup objects required.
// KNOWN GAPS: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
// VALIDATION LEVEL: schema-aligned
// AUTOMATED VALIDATION: static-passed; static=passed; fixtures=0/0
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(30d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml"
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData
| sort by Timestamp desc
| take 200Detection Rules by Platform
CrowdStrike: Custom IOA
| IOA name | Promotes | Pattern | Exclusions | Action and deployment path |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbs | Promote Q3 | Image wscript.exe or cscript.exe; command line regex SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs | None needed at launch | Detect only. Custom IOA, severity High. Never prevent: wscript.exe is a stock Windows binary. |
| Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folder | Promote Q2 (and Q1) | Image wscript, cscript or mshta; command line regex Temp\d+_[^\\]+\.zip\\[^\\]+\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta) | Approved admin hosts and vendor script names after a 7-day baseline | Detect only, severity Medium. Stage in a pilot group first. |
| PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscript | Promote Q6 | Parent image wscript or cscript; image powershell or pwsh | Known logon scripts by command line | Detect only, severity Medium. powershell.exe is a stock binary. |
| DNS lookup for campaign hostnames | Promote Q7 | Domain regex for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com | Research and sandbox hosts | Detect only, severity High. Do not add myvnc.com itself. |
Alert package: Q3 and Q7 (the two promoted high-confidence detections)
Scheduled search name: DETECT - Blind Eagle SvcConfig VBS Stage and DETECT - Blind Eagle Campaign Hostname Lookup.
Description: Fires when a script host runs a SvcConfig-pattern VBScript, or when a host resolves the published distribution or C&C hostnames. Both map to an APT-C-36 remote-access chain that reaches an in-memory RAT.
Email subject: [HIGH] Detection: Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) - script host persistence or campaign DNS lookup
WHAT FIRED: <detection name> on HOST-01 (user jdoe) at <time>. Command line / domain: <value>.
WHAT IT MEANS: Matches a documented Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) infection chain. The final RAT runs in memory only.
DO NOW: 1) Network-contain HOST-01 in the console (keep the sensor connected).
2) Do NOT reboot or power off until memory is captured.
3) Preserve the mail message and attachment that started it.
ESCALATE TO: Incident response lead; legal if judicial or tax documents are held on the host.
L1 triage checklist:
- Confirm the process tree: browser or Explorer, then wscript/cscript, then powershell.
- Read the full command line; record the script path and any ZIP name.
- Check the Startup folder (native hunt N4) for a SvcConfig shortcut or script.
- Check DNS and connections from the host for crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 and TCP 4782.
- Find the originating mail message (N1) and search other mailboxes for the same attachment.
- Decide: contain and escalate on any network indicator hit or any PowerShell child of a script host; close only if the script is a verified in-house tool.
Pivot queries:
// Host-scoped: everything the script host launched on one host (replace HOST-01)
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ComputerName="HOST-01"
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i
| table([@timestamp, FileName, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine])
// Environment-wide: other hosts running a SvcConfig-pattern script
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs/i
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName], function=[count(), collect(CommandLine, limit=5)])
SentinelOne: custom detection rules
| Rule | Source query | Run as | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbs | Q3, PowerQuery tab | Scheduled custom detection rule | Bind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device" |
| Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folder | Q1, Q2, PowerQuery tab | Scheduled custom detection rule | Bind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device". This pack's own text mentions a baseline or pilot; follow it as written |
| PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscript | Q6, PowerQuery tab | Scheduled custom detection rule | Bind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device" |
| DNS lookup for campaign hostnames | Q7, PowerQuery tab | Scheduled custom detection rule | Bind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device" |
Create the rule with POST /web/api/v2.1/cloud-detection/rules, queryType: "scheduled" and queryLang: "2.0", with the query in data.scheduledParams.query. Use 2.0 operator spellings: a rule written with the 1.0 token ContainsCIS was accepted and never fired on a tenant. The API does not warn, so lint the body before deploying.
Microsoft Defender: custom detection rules
| Rule | Source query | Run as | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbs | Q3, KQL – Defender XDR tab | Custom detection rule, alert only, every hour | The query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself |
| Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folder | Q1, Q2, KQL – Defender XDR tab | Custom detection rule, alert only, every hour | The query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself. This pack's own text mentions a baseline or pilot; follow it as written |
| PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscript | Q6, KQL – Defender XDR tab | Custom detection rule, alert only, every hour | The query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself |
| DNS lookup for campaign hostnames | Q7, KQL – Defender XDR tab | Custom detection rule, alert only, every hour | The query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself |
Q4, Q5, Q8, Q9 and Q10 stay a hunt in this pack, not a rule. A rule can generate only 150 alerts per run. Continuous (NRT) frequency needs a single table and no comment lines, so delete the generated comment header from the query first.
Machine-Readable IOC Appendix
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags domain,crp2026.online,detect,high,2027-02-11,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 domain,vpfinal142.myvnc.com,detect,high,2027-02-11,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 ipv4,45.146.81.142,detect,high,2027-02-11,C&C node (ports 4782 5357 5985 seen exposed),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 # sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE3_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix efa891 only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 # sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE4_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix 43bf only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 # sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE5_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix 3bfb only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 # sha256,REPLACE_WITH_FINAL_RAT_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36 # Do NOT add Cloudflare edge IPs or the dynamic-DNS parent domain. No row is prevent: no indicator has two independent sources.
indicatorType,indicatorValue,action,title,description,expirationTime,severity,recommendedActions,rbacGroups,category,mitretechniques,GenerateAlert DomainName,crp2026.online,Audit,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True DomainName,vpfinal142.myvnc.com,Audit,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True IpAddress,45.146.81.142,Audit,C&C node,C&C node (ports 4782 5357 5985 seen exposed),2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True
Column names and allowed values are from Microsoft's documented parameter table. Check each expirationTime before importing: an indicator whose date has passed is already expired. Download the sample CSV from the Import page to confirm the column order before a bulk import. Each file takes at most 500 indicators. Learn describes the import per entity type, so if a mixed file is rejected, split it by indicatorType. An imported indicator does nothing unless the matching Advanced features are on (for example Custom network indicators and Allow or block file).
This pack does not ship a SentinelOne import block: the import format could not be verified against SentinelOne's own documentation. Export a sample from your console and the block can be added with confidence.
# Behavioral signatures (hunt, do not block) Script host + ZIP extraction path : (wscript|cscript|mshta) with Temp<N>_<name>.zip\<script> ZIP name pattern : Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip Dropper display name : Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 (JS, about 4.2 MB, /*2ab3[...]*/ noise markers) VBS stage / persistence : SvcConfig<random>.vbs ; Startup-folder shortcut Persistent fake XHTML : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml ; copy under C:\Users\Public\ Decoy page title : CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA Lure attachment : .xhtml that is really an SVG, about 4.2 MB (example: 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml) Process chain : browser/Explorer -> wscript|cscript -> powershell (hidden) -> in-memory RAT Stage 6 encoding : AES-256-ECB -> custom Base85 -> GZIP Network : TCP 4782 to a public IP from a script host or PowerShell
# Named tooling / developer fingerprint (memory and file string scan; corroborating only) Markers : Boss/Client77 ; Client77 ; client77_rat.bin Classes : Client.Settings ; CryptoCore ; Aes256 ; MutexControl ; Packet ; MsgPack ; MsgPackEntry ; ProcessCritical ; IdSender Config : Hosts ; Ports ; Version ; Key ; MTX ; Certificate (values withheld by vendor) Build : PE64 DLL, VB.NET, .NET Framework 4.8, obfuscated/virtualised (S01) Family : AsyncRAT fork with DCRat lineage Caveat : S01 states these class names are not exclusive to this fork
# Audit block (read-only checks) # 1. Script handlers: which program opens .js/.vbs on double-click? Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\JSFile\Shell\Open\Command" | Select-Object "(default)" # 2. Windows Script Host disabled by policy? Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object Enabled # 3. ASR rule state (obfuscated scripts, JS/VBS launching downloads, email executables) $p = Get-MpPreference; $p.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids; $p.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions # 4. Mark-of-the-Web preserved for attachments? (1 = do NOT preserve = bad) Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Attachments" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object SaveZoneInformation # 5. Script block logging on? Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object EnableScriptBlockLogging
Detection Validation Gates
| Gate | Requirement | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Telemetry ready | Process creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents); DNS lookup with process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents); outbound connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents); autostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents) | Confirm per tenant |
| Benign baseline | Run Q2, Q5, Q6 for 7 days with no alerting; list the benign script and XHTML owners; add exclusions inside the query, not as host-wide exclusions | Pending |
| Positive tests | In a lab VM: run a harmless .js out of a ZIP (Q2), a renamed copy of a text file called SvcConfigTEST01.vbs under wscript (Q3), and resolve a test hostname that matches the Q7 pattern in a resolver you control. Never run real malware samples. | Pending |
| Promotion | Q3, Q7 and Q8 may become scheduled detections after one clean baseline week. Q2, Q5, Q6 stay hunt-only until tuned. No query drives a block. | Pending |
| Static review | Structure, field, syntax and IOC-provenance gates (run before publish) | See ticket |
Hardening: Tiered
- Stop double-click execution of script files. Point the open verb for .js, .jse, .vbs, .vbe and .wsf at Notepad (playbook 1). MITRE M1042. best-practice, no formal benchmark Does not stop an explicit
wscript file.js, so keep Q1 to Q3 running. - Attack Surface Reduction rules in audit, then block: “Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts”, “Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content”, “Block executable content from email client and webmail” (playbook 2). MITRE M1040, M1038. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Attack Surface Reduction) and Microsoft Security Baseline. Applies only where Defender Antivirus is active, not passive.
- Quarantine .xhtml, .xht and .svg attachments at the mail layer, audit mode first (playbook 3). MITRE M1049, M1031. best-practice, no formal benchmark
- PowerShell Script Block Logging so stage 6 is recorded (playbook 4). MITRE M1047. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Windows PowerShell, Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging).
- Disable Windows Script Host on user workstations that have no VBScript or JScript dependency (playbook 5). MITRE M1042. best-practice, no formal benchmark Pilot on one ring: logon scripts and legacy tools depend on it.
- AppLocker Script rules in audit mode, allowing scripts only from Windows and Program Files for standard users (playbook 6). MITRE M1038. Cite: Microsoft AppLocker guidance.
- Keep Mark of the Web on attachments. Confirm
SaveZoneInformationis not set to 1 (check in audit block). MITRE M1054. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Attachment Manager). - Egress filtering: workstations reach the internet only through the proxy; alert on dynamic-DNS hostnames and on TCP 4782 outbound. MITRE M1031, M1021. IOC-level blocking of crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com stays a decision for the network owner, because the pack holds them at detect.
- Windows Defender Application Control for script enforcement, which also forces PowerShell into Constrained Language Mode for unsigned scripts. MITRE M1038, M1045. Cite: Microsoft WDAC documentation; DISA STIG for Windows where applicable.
- Judicial and legal-document handling procedure: staff who receive court or fiscal notices verify them through the agency's published channel, never by opening an attachment; a lure that offers a password-protected archive is reported. MITRE M1017. best-practice, no formal benchmark
- Browser download policy that blocks script and archive downloads for roles that never need them. MITRE M1021.
Deployable Playbooks
Raw configuration only. Every step lists Prerequisites, Reboot required and Rollback. Test on a pilot ring first.
Playbook 1: Neutralise double-click for script files (Immediate)
Prerequisites: local administrator or an RMM running as SYSTEM. Take a backup of the current values first.
Reboot required: No (applies to new double-clicks).
# Apply
$classes = 'JSFile','JSEFile','VBSFile','VBEFile','WSFFile'
$backup = foreach ($c in $classes) {
$p = "Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\$c\Shell\Open\Command"
[pscustomobject]@{ Class = $c; Path = $p; Original = (Get-ItemProperty $p).'(default)' }
}
$backup | Export-Csv "$env:ProgramData\script-assoc-backup.csv" -NoTypeInformation
foreach ($b in $backup) {
New-ItemProperty -Path $b.Path -Name '(default)' -Value '"C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe" "%1"' -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
}
Rollback: restore from the backup file (stock value is "%SystemRoot%\System32\WScript.exe" "%1" %*, type REG_EXPAND_SZ):
Import-Csv "$env:ProgramData\script-assoc-backup.csv" | ForEach-Object {
New-ItemProperty -Path $_.Path -Name '(default)' -Value $_.Original -PropertyType ExpandString -Force | Out-Null
}
Verify: Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\JSFile\Shell\Open\Command" | Select-Object "(default)"
Playbook 2: ASR rules, audit first (Immediate)
Prerequisites: Microsoft Defender Antivirus active (not passive). Record current rule state: (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids Reboot required: No. # Apply in AUDIT mode for 7 days (AuditMode), then switch to Enabled $ids = '5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC','D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D','BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550' Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode,AuditMode,AuditMode # After review of the audit events (Defender operational log, events 1121/1122), enforce: Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled,Enabled,Enabled Rollback: Remove-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids (or set Actions to Disabled) Verify: (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions
Playbook 3: Mail-flow rule for .xhtml, .xht and .svg attachments (Immediate)
Prerequisites: Exchange Online administrator; Connect-ExchangeOnline. Agree the exception path for teams that legitimately exchange SVG files. Reboot required: No (service-side). New-TransportRule -Name "HuntPack - Quarantine XHTML/XHT/SVG attachments" ` -AttachmentExtensionMatchesWords xhtml,xht,svg ` -Quarantine $true -Mode Audit -Comments "Blind Eagle HTML-smuggling lure carrier. Review audit results, then Set-TransportRule -Mode Enforce" Rollback: Remove-TransportRule -Identity "HuntPack - Quarantine XHTML/XHT/SVG attachments" (release quarantined mail from the quarantine portal) Verify: Get-TransportRule "HuntPack*" | Format-List Name,Mode,State
Playbook 4: PowerShell Script Block Logging (Immediate)
Prerequisites: administrator; agree log retention (4104 events are verbose). Reboot required: No (new PowerShell sessions pick it up). $k = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging' New-Item -Path $k -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWord -Force | Out-Null Rollback: Remove-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging Verify: Get-ItemProperty $k | Select-Object EnableScriptBlockLogging
Playbook 5: Disable Windows Script Host (Near term, pilot ring)
Prerequisites: confirm no logon script or management agent uses wscript/cscript on the pilot ring (run Q2/Q3/Q6 baseline first). Reboot required: No. $k = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings' New-Item -Path $k -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name Enabled -Value 0 -PropertyType DWord -Force | Out-Null Rollback: Remove-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name Enabled (absent = enabled) Verify: Get-ItemProperty $k | Select-Object Enabled ; wscript.exe now reports that Windows Script Host access is disabled.
Playbook 6: AppLocker Script rules, audit only (Near term)
Prerequisites: Application Identity service (AppIDSvc) set to automatic and running. Export the current policy first: Get-AppLockerPolicy -Local -Xml > applocker-backup.xml
Reboot required: No.
# script-audit.xml
<AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
<RuleCollection Type="Script" EnforcementMode="AuditOnly">
<FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000001" Name="Allow Windows" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
<Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
<FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000002" Name="Allow Program Files" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
<Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="%PROGRAMFILES%\*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
<FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000003" Name="Allow local Administrators" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-5-32-544" Action="Allow">
<Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
</RuleCollection>
</AppLockerPolicy>
Set-AppLockerPolicy -XmlPolicy .\script-audit.xml
Review AppLocker/MSI and Script log events 8005/8006 for a week before changing EnforcementMode.
Rollback: Set-AppLockerPolicy -XmlPolicy .\applocker-backup.xmlContainment Runbook
| Phase | Actions | Owner | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Confirm | Validate the hit: process tree browser/Explorer, then wscript/cscript, then powershell; or a network indicator hit. Check it is not a verified in-house script. | SOC L1/L2 | Process tree, command line, timestamps |
| 2. Isolate | Network-contain the host in the sensor console, keeping the sensor connected. Do not reboot (the RAT is memory-only). Disable the user's sessions and block the sender at the mail layer. | IR lead | Containment confirmation, user and host IDs |
| 3. Preserve | Capture memory first, then triage collection. Save the mail message, the .xhtml, the ZIP and the Startup-folder contents. | IR / forensics | Memory image, hashes of collected files, chain of custody |
| 4. Scope | Run Q1 to Q10 environment-wide for 30 days. Search mailboxes for the same attachment and recipients in judicial, administrative and education units. Check which judicial or tax documents were reachable from the host. | IR / SOC | Hit list by host and user; mailbox search results |
| 5. Eradicate | Remove the Startup-folder shortcut, SvcConfig*.vbs and index_*.xhtml copies; purge the lure from all mailboxes; terminate the loader process; rebuild the host if memory shows the RAT. Reset credentials used on the host and revoke tokens and sessions, since keylogging and token impersonation are in the capability set. | IR / IT ops / identity | Before/after file listing, credential reset log |
| 6. Recover | Return the host after rebuild; keep elevated monitoring for 30 days (Q3, Q6, Q7, Q8). Review legal notification duties if case or personal data was exposed. | IT ops / legal | Rebuild record, monitoring review |
| 7. Learn | Add exclusions found during triage into the queries, record new indicators with their sources, request the withheld hashes from the vendor. | Detection engineering | Updated queries and changelog entry |
Detection Coverage Map
| Technique | Behaviour | CQL | IOA | CrowdStrike coverage | Gap | SentinelOne | Defender XDR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Lure attachment (.xhtml) | Q5 | none | Partial | Mail layer is outside endpoint telemetry (G8) | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1204.002 / T1059.007 | JS dropper from ZIP | Q1, Q2 | Q2 (IOA) | Good | Renamed archives evade Q1; Q2 covers | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1027.006 | HTML smuggling | Q5 | none | GAP | G1: the in-browser ZIP build is not visible; only the browser start and later script run are | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1059.005 / T1547.001 | SvcConfig VBS and Startup shortcut | Q3, Q4, Q10 | Q3 (IOA) | Partial | G3: shortcut creation, file delete and Zone.Identifier change not covered by a verified event | Partial: Q10 approximate | Partial: Q10 approximate |
| T1562.001 | AMSI and ETW bypass | none | none | GAP | G2: no verified Falcon script-telemetry event in the reference; use PowerShell 4104 / AMSI logs (N3) | No query | No query |
| T1059.001 / T1140 | PowerShell decode and load | Q6 | Q6 (IOA) | Partial | G4: decode and in-memory load not visible to file telemetry | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1620 | Reflective RAT load | Q6, Q9 | none | GAP | G4: payload never touches disk; needs memory scanning (N5) | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1573.001 / T1041 | Encrypted C2 | Q7, Q8, Q9 | Q7 (IOA) | Partial | Only three network indicators; C2 config values withheld (G6); other process names can host the RAT | Good, with assumptions | Good, with assumptions |
| T1056.001 / T1113 / T1125 / T1134.001 / T1005 | Keylogging, capture, tokens, documents | none | none | GAP | G5: capability-level behaviour, no discriminating verified event | No query | No query |
| File hashes | Stage and RAT hashes | none | none | GAP | G6: vendor withholds full hashes; truncated prefixes are not searchable | No query | No query |
| T1027 | Noise markers, encoded strings | none | none | GAP | G7: static property of the file, addressed by hardening not detection | No query | No query |
Validation: static review only (structure, field, syntax and IOC-provenance gates). Nothing here has been parsed in a Falcon tenant or fired in a canary. Run the validation gates in section 11 before scheduling.
Hunt Summary Ticket
TITLE: Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) judicial-lure wave delivering an AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage) SEVERITY: HIGH (regional APT; chain reproduced in a lab, no confirmed real-world compromise) SCOPE: Windows workstations receiving judicial or administrative mail; process creation, DNS, outbound connection, autostart registry HYPOTHESIS: A user opens a .xhtml lure, runs a JS dropper from a browser-built ZIP, and a VBS/PowerShell chain loads an in-memory RAT QUERIES: Q1-Q10 (ProcessRollup2, DnsRequest, NetworkConnectIP4, AsepValueUpdate) DO FIRST: Q3, Q7, Q8, then Q1, Q2, Q6; run native hunts N1 and N2 in parallel FINDINGS: GAPS: Withheld hashes and config values; in-memory RAT; AMSI/ETW tampering; Startup-shortcut write; mail layer (outside endpoint telemetry) ACTIONS: Hunt, do not block: all indicators are detect. Never block Cloudflare edge IPs or myvnc.com. Neutralise script double-click; ASR audit; quarantine xhtml/svg OWNER: SOC / Detection Engineering / Mail Admin / Identity VERSION: v0.1 Draft 2026-11-11 STATIC REVIEW ONLY
Changelog
References
| Tier | Source | Used for | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary | ZenoX: LAST HEIST: New APT-C-36 infection wave in LATAM (2026-11-04) | Chain, infrastructure, MITRE table, developer fingerprint, all indicators | 2026-11-11 |
| Secondary | The Hacker News: Blind Eagle Uses Fake Court Notices to Deliver Remote Access Trojan Across Latin America (2026-11-10) | Email-volume figure, actor background, targeting context | 2026-11-11 |
| Background | Zscaler ThreatLabz: BlindEagle Targets Colombian Government Agency with Caminho and DCRAT (2025-12-16) | Actor commodity-RAT habit. No indicators used | 2026-11-11 |
| Background | ANY.RUN: BlindEagle malware trends | Actor profile; recent .xhtml sandbox submissions. No indicators used | 2026-11-11 |
Plain-text snapshots of all four sources are saved beside this pack in BlindEagle-APT-C-36-AsyncRAT-Hunt-sources/ and are what the IOC provenance gate checks.