Blind Eagle (APT-C-36): Judicial-Lure Wave Delivering an AsyncRAT Fork

Court-notice phishing, HTML smuggling, JS/VBS/PowerShell chain, in-memory RAT. Latin America, Colombia a priority.
Threat
Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) / AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage)
Severity
HIGH
Type
Nation-state-style APT, phishing to in-memory RAT
Access
Phishing attachment, user execution
Version
v0.1 Draft · 2026-11-11
Author
HuntPack
Confidence
Medium-High on chain, Low on indicators
Primary source
ZenoX 2026-11-04
01

Executive Summary

Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) is running a new phishing wave against Latin America, Colombia a priority, with Portuguese and Spanish lures posing as court notices, fiscalía notices, tutela proceedings and administrative documents. The attachment is an SVG disguised as .xhtml that renders a fake Fiscalía General de la Nación page and builds a password-protected ZIP inside the browser (HTML smuggling, ZipCrypto), so the mail gateway never sees the archive. Inside is a JavaScript dropper posing as “Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298”, which chains to a VBScript stage (AMSI and ETW bypass, fake “CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA” decoy), Startup-folder persistence, and a PowerShell loader that decodes and runs the final RAT in memory. The RAT is an AsyncRAT fork with DCRat lineage carrying the developer markers Boss/Client77 and Client77. Zenox reports the cluster as Brazilian-operated and as a recent, purpose-built, single-node infrastructure.

Highest-value defensive angle. Atomic indicators are thin: Zenox withholds every full hash and every configuration value, and only two domains and one IP are published. Detection weight therefore sits on behaviour: script hosts launched from a ZIP extraction folder, the SvcConfig<random>.vbs and index_<suffix>.xhtml filename patterns, wscript-to-PowerShell hand-off, and the three network indicators.

Honest scope. Zenox reproduced the chain in a lab and states it could not confirm any real-world compromise. This pack is a hunt for the technique, not a statement that anyone is compromised.

Defender priority. Run Q3 and Q7 first (highest confidence, lowest noise), then Q1, Q2 and Q6. Treat every indicator as detect only: no indicator has two independent sources, and wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock tools.

02

Source Review & Web Hunter Notes

IDTierSourcePublishedKey findingCarry forward
S01Primary (vendor research)ZenoX, “LAST HEIST: New APT-C-36 infection wave in LATAM” (the article title, not a campaign name)2026-11-04Full chain, infrastructure, MITRE table, developer signatures. Withholds full hashes and config values; prints only truncated hash prefixes.Yes: chain, TTPs, 2 domains, 1 IP, ports, filename patterns
S02Secondary (news)The Hacker News, Ravie Lakshmanan2026-11-10Restates S01 and adds a Zenox statement of nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. Carries no indicators. Not independent of S01.Partial: email-volume figure and targeting context
S03BackgroundZscaler ThreatLabz, BlindEagle / Caminho / DCRAT2025-12-16Earlier, different Blind Eagle chain (compromised-account lure, Discord and Internet Archive staging, Caminho, DCRAT). Shows the actor's commodity-RAT habit.Context only. No indicators carried: different cluster
S04BackgroundANY.RUN malware trends: BlindEagleAccessed 2026-11-11Actor profile and a list of recent sandbox submissions of .xhtml files dated 10 November 2026. The page does not link them to the S01 chain.Context only. No indicators carried

Decisions and discrepancies

  • Independence. S02 is derivative of S01, so no indicator has two independent sources. Every indicator ships as detect, none as prevent.
  • Email volume. The “nearly 3,300 emails” figure appears only in S02, attributed to Zenox. The S01 public report describes a corpus of 12 initial emails. Both are quoted with their source; neither is used in a query.
  • Port 4782. S01 treats 4782 as the C&C port. It does not call it an AsyncRAT default, so this pack does not either.
  • Cloudflare edge addresses. S01 names 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 as the provider's shared edge for crp2026[.]online and says explicitly they are not the operator origin. They are excluded from every indicator list.
  • Naming. Only the names the sources use appear here: Blind Eagle, APT-C-36, AsyncRAT, DCRat. No campaign name is coined.
  • Embedded instructions. None of the four fetched pages contained text directed at an automated reader.
03

Hunt Brief & Attack Chain

Hypotheses (ordered by fidelity):

  1. A script host runs a dropper out of a ZIP extraction folder named after the lure ZIP. Q1 (campaign pattern), Q2 (generic). T1204.002, T1059.007.
  2. A SvcConfig<random>.vbs runs under wscript or cscript, at first run and at every logon. Q3. T1059.005, T1547.001.
  3. Hosts resolve or connect to the three published network indicators. Q7, Q8. T1105, T1573.001.
  4. wscript or cscript hands off to PowerShell, which later opens an external session on 4782. Q6, Q9. T1059.001, T1620.
  5. A browser opens a local .xhtml attachment, or a process references the persistent index_<suffix>.xhtml copy. Q5, Q4. T1566.001, T1027.006.
StepBehaviourTelemetry (plain terms, then platforms)Hunt angle
1Phishing email with .xhtml attachment (judicial lure, Portuguese or Spanish)Mail gateway and mailbox audit (outside endpoint telemetry)Native hunt N1; Q5 on the endpoint
2SVG disguised as XHTML renders fake Fiscalía pageProcess creation with command line (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents)Q5
3HTML smuggling builds Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip in the browser (ZipCrypto)Browser-side only; the ZIP is never seen by the gateway (outside endpoint telemetry)Gap G1; lands as Q1/Q2 when run
4JavaScript dropper “Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298”, about 4.2 MB, /*2ab3[...]*/ noise markers; recon of OS, network profile, memory, env vars, localised foldersProcess creation with command line (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents)Q1, Q2
5VBScript stage SvcConfig<random>.vbs: AMSI and ETW bypass, decoy “CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA”Process creation with command line (as above)Q3. AMSI/ETW tampering is Gap G2
6Delete original XHTML, clear Mark of the Web, persistent copy index_<suffix>.xhtml, Startup-folder shortcutProcess creation (as above); autostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents)Q3, Q4, Q10. File deletion, Zone.Identifier change and the shortcut write are Gap G3
7PowerShell decodes (AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIP) and reflectively loads the RAT in memoryProcess creation with parent (as above)Q6. In-memory payload is Gap G4
8AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage) calls out; hidden desktop, keylogging, d3d11 screen capture, token impersonationDNS lookup with requesting process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents, field names unconfirmed); outbound network connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents)Q7, Q8, Q9. Capability-level behaviour is Gap G5

Developer fingerprint (for memory and file scanning, not for CQL)

Boss/Client77, Client77, client77_rat.bin; classes Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, IdSender; configuration fields Hosts, Ports, Version, Key, MTX, Certificate (values withheld). Zenox cautions these class names are not exclusive to this fork, so they are corroborating strings, not a verdict.

04

Consolidated IOC Table

TypeValueConfidenceActionContextExpiry
Domaincrp2026[.]onlineMediumdetectDistribution point behind Cloudflare. Source S01 only (S02 is derivative). Block by name only, never by its Cloudflare IPs.2027-02-11
Hostnamevpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]comMediumdetectDedicated C&C. Dynamic-DNS parent myvnc.com is NOT an indicator. Neighbours vpfinal138 to vpfinal146 probed and inactive per S01.2027-02-11
IPv445[.]146[.]81[.]142MediumdetectC&C node (ports 4782, 5357, 5985 seen exposed). Rented server, may be reassigned.2027-02-11
Port4782/tcpMediumhuntC&C port per S01. Hunt only (Q9); never a standalone block.2027-02-11
Filename patternDemanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zipMediumhuntBrowser-generated ZIP name. Q1.2027-02-11
Filename43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtmlLowhuntOne example attachment, about 4.2 MB. Per-email names vary. Q5 keys on the extension.2026-12-11
FilenameNetwork Configuration Auditor v2.7.298MediumhuntDropper display name, JavaScript, about 4.2 MB, noise markers /*2ab3[...]*/.2027-02-11
Filename patternSvcConfig<random>.vbs (example SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs)MediumhuntStartup shortcut target. Random suffix per victim. Q3.2027-02-11
Path pattern%APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml (example index_ZNn4r6.xhtml); copy under C:\Users\Public\MediumhuntPersistent fake XHTML. Q4.2027-02-11
StringCITACION PENAL, FISCALIAMediumenrichDecoy page title shown by the VBS stage.2026-12-11
StringsBoss/Client77, Client77, client77_rat.bin, Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, IdSenderMediumenrichDeveloper fingerprint of the RAT. Not exclusive to this fork per S01.2027-02-11
Hash prefixStage 3: efa891[...]; stage 4: 43bf[...]; stage 5: 3bfb[...]Nonenot usableTruncated prefixes only. Cannot be searched, imported or extended. Coverage gap G6.n/a
SHA-256REPLACE_WITH_STAGE_AND_RAT_HASHESNoneplaceholderZenox withholds full hashes in the public report. Obtain from the vendor, then import as detect.n/a
IPv4 (EXCLUDED)104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190n/ado not blockCloudflare shared edge for crp2026[.]online. S01: not the operator origin. Blocking them hits unrelated sites and does not remove the origin.n/a
Domain (EXCLUDED)myvnc[.]com (parent)n/ado not blockPublic dynamic-DNS provider. Only the specific hostname above is actionable.n/a
05

Affected Surface & Telemetry Matrix

SurfaceTelemetry (plain terms, then platforms)PriorityGap
Windows user workstations that receive judicial or administrative mailProcess creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents)HighNone for process start
Same hosts, outbound trafficDNS lookup with process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents, name inside AdditionalFields, unconfirmed) and outbound connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents)HighDefender has no endpoint DNS table; connection attempts versus completions differ by platform
PersistenceAutostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents)MediumStartup-folder shortcut and file writes are outside verified event coverage here
Mail layerGateway and mailbox audit logsHighOutside endpoint telemetry
BrowserLocal HTML smuggling (blob download)MediumOutside endpoint telemetry for the in-browser step
MemoryReflectively loaded RATHighIn-memory only; endpoint file telemetry does not see it. Outside endpoint telemetry without memory scanning
06

ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueNameObserved behaviourQuery / control
Initial AccessT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentJudicial-themed XHTML attachmentQ5, N1
ExecutionT1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileVictim opens attachment, then the JS in the ZIPQ1, Q2, Q5
Defense EvasionT1027.006HTML SmugglingZIP built in the browser with ZipCryptoQ5 (gap G1 for the ZIP itself)
Defense EvasionT1036MasqueradingDropper named Network Configuration Auditor; SVG named .xhtmlQ1, Q5
Defense EvasionT1027Obfuscated/Compressed FilesNoise markers /*2ab3[...]*/, encoded stringsHardening only (G7)
ExecutionT1059.007JavaScriptDropper and decoding stagesQ1, Q2
ExecutionT1059.005Visual BasicStage 5 and persistenceQ3
ExecutionT1059.001PowerShellStage 6 decode and loadQ6
Command and ControlT1105Ingress Tool TransferStage chaining; distribution domainQ7
Defense EvasionT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationAES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIPQ6 (decode itself is gap G4)
Defense EvasionT1070.004File DeletionOriginal XHTML deletedGap G3
Defense EvasionT1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassZone.Identifier removedGap G3
PersistenceT1547.001Startup FolderSvcConfig shortcut; index_ copyQ3, Q4, Q10
Defense EvasionT1562.001Impair DefensesAMSI and ETW bypass in the VBS stageGap G2
Defense EvasionT1620Reflective Code LoadingRAT loaded via Reflection and delegatesQ6, Q9 (gap G4)
CollectionT1056.001KeyloggingActive-layout keyloggerGap G5
CollectionT1113Screen Captured3d11 captureGap G5
CollectionT1125Video CaptureMFPlat streamingGap G5
Privilege EscalationT1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftSession token impersonationGap G5
CollectionT1005Data from Local SystemJudicial and tax documentsGap G5
Command and ControlT1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEncrypted C&C channelQ7, Q8, Q9
ExfiltrationT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelRAT channelQ7, Q8, Q9
DiscoveryT1082System Information DiscoveryOS, memory, computer name, env varsQ1, Q2 (host recon is inside the script)
DiscoveryT1012Query RegistryInstall date, network profile, product nameInside the script, no standalone query
DiscoveryT1083File and Directory DiscoveryLocalised Downloads/Descargas, Documents/DocumentosInside the script, no standalone query
07

Native Audit-Log Hunts

Non-CQL checks. Run N1 to N5 in parallel with the CQL hunts.

  1. N1 Mail gateway and mailbox audit. Search the last 30 days for attachments with extension .xhtml, .xht or .svg on messages with Spanish or Portuguese judicial subjects (tutela, demanda, citación, fiscalía, despacho, constancia, notificação). Note recipients in judicial, public-administration and education units. Message-header authentication passing does not clear a message (S01).
  2. N2 Proxy and DNS logs. Query for crp2026[.]online and the hostname vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com. Query firewall logs for 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 and any workstation-to-internet traffic on TCP 4782.
  3. N3 Windows event logs (or Sysmon equivalents). Security 4688 / Sysmon 1 for wscript or cscript with a ZIP-extraction path; Sysmon 11 and 23 for SvcConfig*.vbs and index_*.xhtml; Sysmon 15 (FileCreateStreamHash) or deletion of Zone.Identifier streams; PowerShell 4104 script blocks containing GZipStream together with a custom decoder and Reflection.
  4. N4 Startup folder inventory (read-only; run per host or through your RMM):
Get-ChildItem -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Path `
  "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup", `
  "$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp", `
  "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft", "C:\Users\Public" |
  Where-Object { $_.Name -match '^(SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.(vbs|lnk)|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml)$' } |
  Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTimeUtc, LastWriteTimeUtc
  1. N5 Memory scan of suspect hosts. If a host shows Q3 or Q6 hits, capture memory and string-scan for the developer markers Boss/Client77, Client77 and the class names in section 3. The RAT is not on disk, so a disk scan will find nothing.
08

Hunt Queries: CrowdStrike CQL, SentinelOne PowerQuery and Defender XDR KQL

Show all queries in
Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.

All ten queries use event names from the crowdstrike-logscale-v3 reference: ProcessRollup2, DnsRequest, NetworkConnectIP4, AsepValueUpdate. Script and AMSI telemetry events are not used because their fields are not in that reference. Basenames are matched through FileName or ContextBaseFileName so no path slash enters a regex. Static review only: validate Q1 to Q10 in your tenant before scheduling them.

Q1 · Script host launched with the campaign ZIP name (Demanda_Ejecutiva_*EXP2026)
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: wscript or cscript whose command line carries the ZIP name pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip. Explorer extracts a ZIP-hosted script to a temp folder named after the archive, so the archive name lands in the command line of the dropper (stage 4, the “Network Configuration Auditor” JavaScript).

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: A renamed ZIP is missed; the extraction-folder card covers that.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: FileName holds the image file name of the created process.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process.
// HUNT: Script host launched from the campaign ZIP name (Demanda_Ejecutiva_*EXP2026)
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1027.006
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: a legitimate legal-document archive that happens to share the naming pattern and contains a script
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// NOTE: the ZIP name is a pattern from one vendor report; operators can rename it, so a miss proves nothing. Pair with Q2.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i
| CommandLine=/Demanda_Ejecutiva_.*EXP2026/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
Q2 · Script host running a script directly out of a ZIP extraction folder
CONF MEDIUMFP MEDIUMCOST LOW

Looks for: wscript, cscript or mshta executing a .js/.jse/.vbs/.vbe/.wsf that sits inside an Explorer ZIP extraction folder (Temp1_name.zip). This is how a victim runs the stage-4 dropper straight from the browser-generated ZIP. It survives a rename of the archive. FP: IT staff or developers double-clicking a script inside an archive; some legacy installers ship as ZIP plus .vbs. Expect low volume on workstations.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline keeps the extraction path with backslash separators.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: A script extracted to a folder that does not follow the TempN_name.zip pattern is missed.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine keeps the extraction path with backslash separators.
// HUNT: Script host executing a script from inside a ZIP extraction folder
// MITRE: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1059.005
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: admins running vendor scripts shipped in a ZIP; legacy installers
// TUNING: after a 7-day baseline, exclude approved admin hosts or an approved vendor script name with an extra "| CommandLine!=/approved-script-name/i" stage; do not exclude by user name alone
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/^(wscript|cscript|mshta)(\.exe)?$/i
| CommandLine=/Temp\d+_[^\\]+\.zip\\[^\\]+\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta)/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
Q3 · VBScript stage and Startup persistence: SvcConfig<random>.vbs
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: wscript or cscript running a file named SvcConfig plus a short random suffix and .vbs (the report names SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs and states the suffix differs per victim, so this hunts the pattern). The Startup-folder shortcut re-launches it at every logon, so this fires on first run and on each later logon.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: A script host launched through a shortcut that the sensor reports under a different image is not captured.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process.
// HUNT: wscript/cscript running SvcConfig<random>.vbs (stage 5 and Startup persistence)
// MITRE: T1059.005, T1547.001
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: an in-house script that happens to be called SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker; persistence re-fires at each logon)
// NOTE: the suffix length is inferred from one example (6 characters); {4,12} allows for variation.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i
| CommandLine=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
Q4 · Any process referencing the persistent fake XHTML copy (index_<suffix>.xhtml)
CONF MEDIUMFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: A command line that points at index_<suffix>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder or Users\Public. The report documents the persistent copy at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml and an auxiliary copy under C:\Users\Public\ but does not say which process opens it, so the query is deliberately process-agnostic. CONF is medium for that reason.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.cmdline holds the full command line of the created process, with backslash path separators.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: The file itself being written is not seen here, only a process that references it.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: ProcessCommandLine holds the full command line of the created process, with backslash path separators.
// HUNT: Process referencing the persistent fake XHTML copy index_<suffix>.xhtml
// MITRE: T1547.001, T1036, T1027.006
// CONF: medium  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: an unrelated app that writes index_<name>.xhtml under a Microsoft profile folder
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker)
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/(\\Microsoft|\\Users\\Public)\\index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
Q5 · Browser opening a local .xhtml file (weaponised SVG-as-XHTML attachment)
CONF MEDIUMFP MEDIUMCOST LOW

Looks for: A browser started with a local .xhtml path on its command line, which is how an emailed or downloaded attachment opens (stage 2). Real XHTML documents opened from disk are rare on business workstations, which is what gives this hunt its value despite the generic pattern. FP: Web developers and documentation tooling that open local XHTML; some e-invoicing and e-book workflows. Baseline first.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
  • PowerQuery assumes: tgt.process.name holds the image file name without a path.
  • PowerQuery assumes: A browser launched by double-clicking a file carries the file path in tgt.process.cmdline.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: A browser instance that is already running and receives the file through an existing window may not log a new process creation.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: A browser launched by double-clicking a file carries the file path in ProcessCommandLine.
// HUNT: Browser launched with a local .xhtml file (SVG disguised as XHTML lure)
// MITRE: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1027.006
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: developers, documentation tooling, e-invoice/e-book workflows opening XHTML locally
// TUNING: exclude developer and documentation hosts after a 7-day baseline (add "| ComputerName!=/dev-host-prefix/i"); keep mail-attachment cache paths (INetCache, Content.Outlook, Downloads) in scope
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// NOTE: this is the only step where the lure name is unique per email, so the query keys on the extension, not the name.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/^(msedge|chrome|firefox|brave|iexplore|opera)(\.exe)?$/i
| CommandLine=/\.xhtml/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine])
Q6 · PowerShell spawned by a script host (stage 6 in-memory loader)
CONF MEDIUMFP MEDIUMCOST LOW

Looks for: powershell or pwsh whose parent is wscript or cscript. In this chain the VBS and JavaScript stages hand off to PowerShell, which decodes the final payload (AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, GZIP) and loads it with Reflection. The RAT is never written to disk, so the PowerShell launch is the last reliable on-disk-visible step. FP: Logon scripts and legacy automation that call PowerShell from VBScript.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
  • PowerQuery assumes: On a Process Creation event src.process.* is the creator and tgt.process.* the created process.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries: this is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: InitiatingProcessFileName holds the image file name of the creator.
// HUNT: PowerShell spawned by wscript/cscript (stage 6 loader hand-off)
// MITRE: T1059.001, T1059.005, T1140, T1620
// CONF: medium  FP: medium  COST: low
// REQUIRES: process creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2)
// FALSE POSITIVES: VBScript logon scripts or management tooling that shell out to PowerShell
// TUNING: baseline for 7 days then exclude the known script by its CommandLine (add "| ParentCommandLine!=/approved-logon-script/i") rather than excluding the parent process
// LOOKBACK: 7d (set in the console time picker)
// NOTE: wscript.exe and powershell.exe are stock Windows binaries. This is a detect-only signal and must never drive a block.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i
| FileName=/^(powershell|pwsh)(\.exe)?$/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine])
Q7 · DNS lookups for the distribution domain, the C&C hostname and its neighbours
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: Lookups of crp2026.online (and subdomains), the dedicated C&C hostname vpfinal142.myvnc.com, and the operator's neighbouring vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com naming pattern. Zenox probed vpfinal138 to vpfinal146 and found only 142 active; the pattern is kept as a cheap pivot in case the operator rotates. It matches the specific hostnames only, never the myvnc.com parent.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: The requesting process is src.process.name here; the CQL pivots on a process id instead.
  • PowerQuery assumes: The queried name is in event.dns.request; some tenants populate dns.request instead, so check which one carries values.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: DnsQueryResponse is recorded only where the sensor emits it; a tenant without it returns nothing.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: The queried name sits in AdditionalFields under DnsQueryString or QueryName; the readiness test prints AdditionalFields so a reader sees which key the tenant populates.
// HUNT: DNS lookups for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.com (never the myvnc.com parent)
// MITRE: T1105, T1573.001, T1041
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: DNS lookup with requesting process (CrowdStrike DnsRequest)
// FALSE POSITIVES: security researchers or sandboxes resolving the indicator
// LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker; the domain is about five weeks old per the report)
// NOTE: pivot on ContextProcessId_decimal against ProcessRollup2 TargetProcessId_decimal to name the requesting process.
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest
| DomainName=/^(([a-z0-9-]+\.)*crp2026\.online|vpfinal1[0-9]{2}\.myvnc\.com)$/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, DomainName, ContextProcessId_decimal])
Q8 · Outbound connection to the C&C node 45.146.81.142
CONF HIGHFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: Any process connecting to the single IPv4 address Zenox ties to the dedicated C&C. Falcon logs connection attempts, so a hit means the host tried to reach it, not that the session completed.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry.
  • PowerQuery assumes: dst.ip.address holds the remote address of an outbound connection.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: Connections seen only by a perimeter device are not in endpoint telemetry.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RemoteIP holds the remote address of the connection.
// HUNT: Outbound connection to the C&C node 45.146.81.142
// MITRE: T1573.001, T1041
// CONF: high  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: outbound network connection (CrowdStrike NetworkConnectIP4)
// FALSE POSITIVES: scanners and research traffic; rented-server IPs can be reassigned, so check the timestamp against 2026-10 and 2026-11
// LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker)
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| RemoteAddressIP4="45.146.81.142"
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, ContextProcessId_decimal])
Q9 · Script host or PowerShell connecting out to port 4782
CONF MEDIUMFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: powershell, pwsh, wscript, cscript, msbuild or mshta making an external connection on TCP 4782, the C&C port in the report. The RAT is loaded in memory, so the connection can originate from whichever host process carried the loader; the report does not name it, which is why the process list is wide. Private ranges are excluded.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: equivalent-with-schema-assumptionsProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: IPv6 destinations are not excluded or matched specially; the CQL tab covers IPv4 only as well.
  • PowerQuery assumes: src.process.name is the connecting process on an IP Connect event.
  • PowerQuery assumes: dst.port.number is numeric.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: A row whose RemoteIP is IPv6 or empty is dropped by the address functions.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RemoteIP holds an IPv4 address for the connections of interest.
// HUNT: Scripting/loader process connecting to external port 4782
// MITRE: T1573.001, T1041, T1620
// CONF: medium  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: outbound network connection (CrowdStrike NetworkConnectIP4)
// FALSE POSITIVES: an internal tool that uses 4782 from PowerShell to a public address (rare)
// LOOKBACK: 14d (set in the console time picker)
// NOTE: an in-memory RAT in an unexpected host process (browser, explorer) would be missed; widen ContextBaseFileName during scoping.
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| ContextBaseFileName=/^(powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|msbuild|mshta)(\.exe)?$/i
| RemotePort=4782
| !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="10.0.0.0/8")
| !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="172.16.0.0/12")
| !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="192.168.0.0/16")
| !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet="127.0.0.0/8")
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, ContextBaseFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, ContextProcessId_decimal])
Q10 · Autostart registry value pointing at SvcConfig<random>.vbs or index_<suffix>.xhtml (variant hedge)
CONF LOWFP LOWCOST LOW

Looks for: The report documents Startup-folder persistence, which is not a registry write, so this query is a hedge for a build that uses a Run key instead of the shortcut. Expect no hits from the documented chain. It is cheap and rules out the variant.

Validation: schema-aligned, static-reviewedAutomated: static-passedEquivalence: approximate-analyticProfiles: microsoft-defender-xdr, sentinelone-endpoint-ocsf
Known limitations and deployment notes
  • PowerQuery: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
  • PowerQuery assumes: registry.value holds the data written to the value.
  • KQL – Defender XDR: The documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no registry event covers; this card is a variant hedge. The query does not restrict to autostart keys.
  • KQL – Defender XDR assumes: RegistryValueData holds the data written to the value.
// HUNT: Autostart registry value referencing SvcConfig<random>.vbs or index_<suffix>.xhtml (variant hedge)
// MITRE: T1547.001
// CONF: low  FP: low  COST: low
// REQUIRES: autostart registry change (CrowdStrike AsepValueUpdate)
// FALSE POSITIVES: none expected
// LOOKBACK: 30d (set in the console time picker)
// NOTE: low CONF because the documented persistence is a Startup-folder shortcut, which no verified registry or file-write event covers.
#event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate
| RegStringValue=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs|index_[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.xhtml/i
| table([@timestamp, aid, ComputerName, RegObjectName, RegValueName, RegStringValue])
09

Detection Rules by Platform

CrowdStrike: Custom IOA

IOA namePromotesPatternExclusionsAction and deployment path
Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbsPromote Q3Image wscript.exe or cscript.exe; command line regex SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbsNone needed at launchDetect only. Custom IOA, severity High. Never prevent: wscript.exe is a stock Windows binary.
Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folderPromote Q2 (and Q1)Image wscript, cscript or mshta; command line regex Temp\d+_[^\\]+\.zip\\[^\\]+\.(js|jse|vbs|vbe|wsf|hta)Approved admin hosts and vendor script names after a 7-day baselineDetect only, severity Medium. Stage in a pilot group first.
PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscriptPromote Q6Parent image wscript or cscript; image powershell or pwshKnown logon scripts by command lineDetect only, severity Medium. powershell.exe is a stock binary.
DNS lookup for campaign hostnamesPromote Q7Domain regex for crp2026.online and vpfinal1NN.myvnc.comResearch and sandbox hostsDetect only, severity High. Do not add myvnc.com itself.

Alert package: Q3 and Q7 (the two promoted high-confidence detections)

Scheduled search name: DETECT - Blind Eagle SvcConfig VBS Stage and DETECT - Blind Eagle Campaign Hostname Lookup.
Description: Fires when a script host runs a SvcConfig-pattern VBScript, or when a host resolves the published distribution or C&C hostnames. Both map to an APT-C-36 remote-access chain that reaches an in-memory RAT.
Email subject: [HIGH] Detection: Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) - script host persistence or campaign DNS lookup

WHAT FIRED:   <detection name> on HOST-01 (user jdoe) at <time>. Command line / domain: <value>.
WHAT IT MEANS: Matches a documented Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) infection chain. The final RAT runs in memory only.
DO NOW:       1) Network-contain HOST-01 in the console (keep the sensor connected).
              2) Do NOT reboot or power off until memory is captured.
              3) Preserve the mail message and attachment that started it.
ESCALATE TO:  Incident response lead; legal if judicial or tax documents are held on the host.

L1 triage checklist:

  1. Confirm the process tree: browser or Explorer, then wscript/cscript, then powershell.
  2. Read the full command line; record the script path and any ZIP name.
  3. Check the Startup folder (native hunt N4) for a SvcConfig shortcut or script.
  4. Check DNS and connections from the host for crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 and TCP 4782.
  5. Find the originating mail message (N1) and search other mailboxes for the same attachment.
  6. Decide: contain and escalate on any network indicator hit or any PowerShell child of a script host; close only if the script is a verified in-house tool.

Pivot queries:

// Host-scoped: everything the script host launched on one host (replace HOST-01)
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ComputerName="HOST-01"
| ParentBaseFileName=/^(wscript|cscript)(\.exe)?$/i
| table([@timestamp, FileName, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine])

// Environment-wide: other hosts running a SvcConfig-pattern script
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/SvcConfig[A-Za-z0-9]{4,12}\.vbs/i
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName], function=[count(), collect(CommandLine, limit=5)])

SentinelOne: custom detection rules

RuleSource queryRun asNotes
Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbsQ3, PowerQuery tabScheduled custom detection ruleBind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device"
Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folderQ1, Q2, PowerQuery tabScheduled custom detection ruleBind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device". This pack's own text mentions a baseline or pilot; follow it as written
PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscriptQ6, PowerQuery tabScheduled custom detection ruleBind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device"
DNS lookup for campaign hostnamesQ7, PowerQuery tabScheduled custom detection ruleBind entities so the alert names the host instead of "Unknown Device"

Create the rule with POST /web/api/v2.1/cloud-detection/rules, queryType: "scheduled" and queryLang: "2.0", with the query in data.scheduledParams.query. Use 2.0 operator spellings: a rule written with the 1.0 token ContainsCIS was accepted and never fired on a tenant. The API does not warn, so lint the body before deploying.

Microsoft Defender: custom detection rules

RuleSource queryRun asNotes
Script host runs SvcConfig<random>.vbsQ3, KQL – Defender XDR tabCustom detection rule, alert only, every hourThe query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself
Script host runs a script from a ZIP extraction folderQ1, Q2, KQL – Defender XDR tabCustom detection rule, alert only, every hourThe query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself. This pack's own text mentions a baseline or pilot; follow it as written
PowerShell spawned by wscript or cscriptQ6, KQL – Defender XDR tabCustom detection rule, alert only, every hourThe query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself
DNS lookup for campaign hostnamesQ7, KQL – Defender XDR tabCustom detection rule, alert only, every hourThe query returns Timestamp, ReportId and DeviceId, which Microsoft recommends for Defender for Endpoint tables so alerts carry the device group scope and the process tree. Remove the Timestamp filter and the final sort and take before saving the rule: the service applies the rule's lookback itself

Q4, Q5, Q8, Q9 and Q10 stay a hunt in this pack, not a rule. A rule can generate only 150 alerts per run. Continuous (NRT) frequency needs a single table and no comment lines, so delete the generated comment header from the query first.

10

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Coverage gap G6, stated plainly. The vendor withholds every full hash and every configuration value, so this pack ships no file-hash detections and no C&C configuration values. The hash rows are labelled placeholders, commented out so a bulk import cannot ingest them. Nothing here was reconstructed, extended or guessed.
Falcon IOC Management CSV3 atomic rows, all detect
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
domain,crp2026.online,detect,high,2027-02-11,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
domain,vpfinal142.myvnc.com,detect,high,2027-02-11,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
ipv4,45.146.81.142,detect,high,2027-02-11,C&C node (ports 4782 5357 5985 seen exposed),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
# sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE3_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix efa891 only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
# sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE4_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix 43bf only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
# sha256,REPLACE_WITH_STAGE5_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor (prefix 3bfb only),campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
# sha256,REPLACE_WITH_FINAL_RAT_SHA256,detect,high,2027-02-11,Withheld by vendor,campaign:BlindEagle-APT-C-36
# Do NOT add Cloudflare edge IPs or the dynamic-DNS parent domain. No row is prevent: no indicator has two independent sources.
Microsoft Defender indicators CSVSettings, Endpoints, Indicators, Import: audit only
indicatorType,indicatorValue,action,title,description,expirationTime,severity,recommendedActions,rbacGroups,category,mitretechniques,GenerateAlert
DomainName,crp2026.online,Audit,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,Distribution point behind Cloudflare. Block by name only,2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True
DomainName,vpfinal142.myvnc.com,Audit,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,Dedicated C&C hostname. Never the dynamic-DNS parent domain,2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True
IpAddress,45.146.81.142,Audit,C&C node,C&C node (ports 4782 5357 5985 seen exposed),2027-02-11T00:00:00.0Z,High,Investigate the device and pivot into the pack's queries,,,,True

Column names and allowed values are from Microsoft's documented parameter table. Check each expirationTime before importing: an indicator whose date has passed is already expired. Download the sample CSV from the Import page to confirm the column order before a bulk import. Each file takes at most 500 indicators. Learn describes the import per entity type, so if a mixed file is rejected, split it by indicatorType. An imported indicator does nothing unless the matching Advanced features are on (for example Custom network indicators and Allow or block file).

SentinelOne IOC importnot included

This pack does not ship a SentinelOne import block: the import format could not be verified against SentinelOne's own documentation. Export a sample from your console and the block can be added with confidence.

Behavioral Signatureshunt patterns, not importable
# Behavioral signatures (hunt, do not block)
Script host + ZIP extraction path : (wscript|cscript|mshta) with Temp<N>_<name>.zip\<script>
ZIP name pattern                  : Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip
Dropper display name              : Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 (JS, about 4.2 MB, /*2ab3[...]*/ noise markers)
VBS stage / persistence           : SvcConfig<random>.vbs ; Startup-folder shortcut
Persistent fake XHTML             : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml ; copy under C:\Users\Public\
Decoy page title                  : CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA
Lure attachment                   : .xhtml that is really an SVG, about 4.2 MB (example: 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml)
Process chain                     : browser/Explorer -> wscript|cscript -> powershell (hidden) -> in-memory RAT
Stage 6 encoding                  : AES-256-ECB -> custom Base85 -> GZIP
Network                           : TCP 4782 to a public IP from a script host or PowerShell
Named Malware / Toolingstring scan, corroborating
# Named tooling / developer fingerprint (memory and file string scan; corroborating only)
Markers  : Boss/Client77 ; Client77 ; client77_rat.bin
Classes  : Client.Settings ; CryptoCore ; Aes256 ; MutexControl ; Packet ; MsgPack ; MsgPackEntry ; ProcessCritical ; IdSender
Config   : Hosts ; Ports ; Version ; Key ; MTX ; Certificate   (values withheld by vendor)
Build    : PE64 DLL, VB.NET, .NET Framework 4.8, obfuscated/virtualised (S01)
Family   : AsyncRAT fork with DCRat lineage
Caveat   : S01 states these class names are not exclusive to this fork
Config and Policy Auditread-only PowerShell
# Audit block (read-only checks)
# 1. Script handlers: which program opens .js/.vbs on double-click?
Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\JSFile\Shell\Open\Command" | Select-Object "(default)"
# 2. Windows Script Host disabled by policy?
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object Enabled
# 3. ASR rule state (obfuscated scripts, JS/VBS launching downloads, email executables)
$p = Get-MpPreference; $p.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids; $p.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions
# 4. Mark-of-the-Web preserved for attachments? (1 = do NOT preserve = bad)
Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Attachments" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object SaveZoneInformation
# 5. Script block logging on?
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object EnableScriptBlockLogging
11

Detection Validation Gates

GateRequirementStatus
Telemetry readyProcess creation with command line and parent (CrowdStrike: ProcessRollup2. SentinelOne: Process Creation. Defender: DeviceProcessEvents); DNS lookup with process (CrowdStrike: DnsRequest. SentinelOne: DNS Resolved. Defender: DeviceEvents); outbound connection (CrowdStrike: NetworkConnectIP4. SentinelOne: IP Connect. Defender: DeviceNetworkEvents); autostart registry change (CrowdStrike: AsepValueUpdate. SentinelOne: Registry Value Modified. Defender: DeviceRegistryEvents)Confirm per tenant
Benign baselineRun Q2, Q5, Q6 for 7 days with no alerting; list the benign script and XHTML owners; add exclusions inside the query, not as host-wide exclusionsPending
Positive testsIn a lab VM: run a harmless .js out of a ZIP (Q2), a renamed copy of a text file called SvcConfigTEST01.vbs under wscript (Q3), and resolve a test hostname that matches the Q7 pattern in a resolver you control. Never run real malware samples.Pending
PromotionQ3, Q7 and Q8 may become scheduled detections after one clean baseline week. Q2, Q5, Q6 stay hunt-only until tuned. No query drives a block.Pending
Static reviewStructure, field, syntax and IOC-provenance gates (run before publish)See ticket
12

Hardening: Tiered

Immediate (this week)
  • Stop double-click execution of script files. Point the open verb for .js, .jse, .vbs, .vbe and .wsf at Notepad (playbook 1). MITRE M1042. best-practice, no formal benchmark Does not stop an explicit wscript file.js, so keep Q1 to Q3 running.
  • Attack Surface Reduction rules in audit, then block: “Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts”, “Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content”, “Block executable content from email client and webmail” (playbook 2). MITRE M1040, M1038. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Attack Surface Reduction) and Microsoft Security Baseline. Applies only where Defender Antivirus is active, not passive.
  • Quarantine .xhtml, .xht and .svg attachments at the mail layer, audit mode first (playbook 3). MITRE M1049, M1031. best-practice, no formal benchmark
  • PowerShell Script Block Logging so stage 6 is recorded (playbook 4). MITRE M1047. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Windows PowerShell, Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging).
Near term (1 to 4 weeks, pilot first)
  • Disable Windows Script Host on user workstations that have no VBScript or JScript dependency (playbook 5). MITRE M1042. best-practice, no formal benchmark Pilot on one ring: logon scripts and legacy tools depend on it.
  • AppLocker Script rules in audit mode, allowing scripts only from Windows and Program Files for standard users (playbook 6). MITRE M1038. Cite: Microsoft AppLocker guidance.
  • Keep Mark of the Web on attachments. Confirm SaveZoneInformation is not set to 1 (check in audit block). MITRE M1054. Cite: CIS Microsoft Windows Benchmark (Attachment Manager).
  • Egress filtering: workstations reach the internet only through the proxy; alert on dynamic-DNS hostnames and on TCP 4782 outbound. MITRE M1031, M1021. IOC-level blocking of crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com stays a decision for the network owner, because the pack holds them at detect.
Strategic (1 to 3 months)
  • Windows Defender Application Control for script enforcement, which also forces PowerShell into Constrained Language Mode for unsigned scripts. MITRE M1038, M1045. Cite: Microsoft WDAC documentation; DISA STIG for Windows where applicable.
  • Judicial and legal-document handling procedure: staff who receive court or fiscal notices verify them through the agency's published channel, never by opening an attachment; a lure that offers a password-protected archive is reported. MITRE M1017. best-practice, no formal benchmark
  • Browser download policy that blocks script and archive downloads for roles that never need them. MITRE M1021.
13

Deployable Playbooks

Raw configuration only. Every step lists Prerequisites, Reboot required and Rollback. Test on a pilot ring first.

Playbook 1: Neutralise double-click for script files (Immediate)

Prerequisites: local administrator or an RMM running as SYSTEM. Take a backup of the current values first.
Reboot required: No (applies to new double-clicks).
# Apply
$classes = 'JSFile','JSEFile','VBSFile','VBEFile','WSFFile'
$backup = foreach ($c in $classes) {
  $p = "Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\$c\Shell\Open\Command"
  [pscustomobject]@{ Class = $c; Path = $p; Original = (Get-ItemProperty $p).'(default)' }
}
$backup | Export-Csv "$env:ProgramData\script-assoc-backup.csv" -NoTypeInformation
foreach ($b in $backup) {
  New-ItemProperty -Path $b.Path -Name '(default)' -Value '"C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe" "%1"' -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
}
Rollback: restore from the backup file (stock value is "%SystemRoot%\System32\WScript.exe" "%1" %*, type REG_EXPAND_SZ):
Import-Csv "$env:ProgramData\script-assoc-backup.csv" | ForEach-Object {
  New-ItemProperty -Path $_.Path -Name '(default)' -Value $_.Original -PropertyType ExpandString -Force | Out-Null
}
Verify: Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\JSFile\Shell\Open\Command" | Select-Object "(default)"

Playbook 2: ASR rules, audit first (Immediate)

Prerequisites: Microsoft Defender Antivirus active (not passive). Record current rule state: (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids
Reboot required: No.
# Apply in AUDIT mode for 7 days (AuditMode), then switch to Enabled
$ids = '5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC','D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D','BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550'
Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode,AuditMode,AuditMode
# After review of the audit events (Defender operational log, events 1121/1122), enforce:
Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled,Enabled,Enabled
Rollback: Remove-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $ids   (or set Actions to Disabled)
Verify: (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions

Playbook 3: Mail-flow rule for .xhtml, .xht and .svg attachments (Immediate)

Prerequisites: Exchange Online administrator; Connect-ExchangeOnline. Agree the exception path for teams that legitimately exchange SVG files.
Reboot required: No (service-side).
New-TransportRule -Name "HuntPack - Quarantine XHTML/XHT/SVG attachments" `
  -AttachmentExtensionMatchesWords xhtml,xht,svg `
  -Quarantine $true -Mode Audit -Comments "Blind Eagle HTML-smuggling lure carrier. Review audit results, then Set-TransportRule -Mode Enforce"
Rollback: Remove-TransportRule -Identity "HuntPack - Quarantine XHTML/XHT/SVG attachments"   (release quarantined mail from the quarantine portal)
Verify: Get-TransportRule "HuntPack*" | Format-List Name,Mode,State

Playbook 4: PowerShell Script Block Logging (Immediate)

Prerequisites: administrator; agree log retention (4104 events are verbose).
Reboot required: No (new PowerShell sessions pick it up).
$k = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging'
New-Item -Path $k -Force | Out-Null
New-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWord -Force | Out-Null
Rollback: Remove-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging
Verify: Get-ItemProperty $k | Select-Object EnableScriptBlockLogging

Playbook 5: Disable Windows Script Host (Near term, pilot ring)

Prerequisites: confirm no logon script or management agent uses wscript/cscript on the pilot ring (run Q2/Q3/Q6 baseline first).
Reboot required: No.
$k = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings'
New-Item -Path $k -Force | Out-Null
New-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name Enabled -Value 0 -PropertyType DWord -Force | Out-Null
Rollback: Remove-ItemProperty -Path $k -Name Enabled     (absent = enabled)
Verify: Get-ItemProperty $k | Select-Object Enabled   ; wscript.exe now reports that Windows Script Host access is disabled.

Playbook 6: AppLocker Script rules, audit only (Near term)

Prerequisites: Application Identity service (AppIDSvc) set to automatic and running. Export the current policy first: Get-AppLockerPolicy -Local -Xml > applocker-backup.xml
Reboot required: No.
# script-audit.xml
<AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
  <RuleCollection Type="Script" EnforcementMode="AuditOnly">
    <FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000001" Name="Allow Windows" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
      <Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
    <FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000002" Name="Allow Program Files" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
      <Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="%PROGRAMFILES%\*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
    <FilePathRule Id="7e1a0001-0000-4000-8000-000000000003" Name="Allow local Administrators" Description="" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-5-32-544" Action="Allow">
      <Conditions><FilePathCondition Path="*" /></Conditions></FilePathRule>
  </RuleCollection>
</AppLockerPolicy>
Set-AppLockerPolicy -XmlPolicy .\script-audit.xml
Review AppLocker/MSI and Script log events 8005/8006 for a week before changing EnforcementMode.
Rollback: Set-AppLockerPolicy -XmlPolicy .\applocker-backup.xml
14

Containment Runbook

PhaseActionsOwnerEvidence
1. ConfirmValidate the hit: process tree browser/Explorer, then wscript/cscript, then powershell; or a network indicator hit. Check it is not a verified in-house script.SOC L1/L2Process tree, command line, timestamps
2. IsolateNetwork-contain the host in the sensor console, keeping the sensor connected. Do not reboot (the RAT is memory-only). Disable the user's sessions and block the sender at the mail layer.IR leadContainment confirmation, user and host IDs
3. PreserveCapture memory first, then triage collection. Save the mail message, the .xhtml, the ZIP and the Startup-folder contents.IR / forensicsMemory image, hashes of collected files, chain of custody
4. ScopeRun Q1 to Q10 environment-wide for 30 days. Search mailboxes for the same attachment and recipients in judicial, administrative and education units. Check which judicial or tax documents were reachable from the host.IR / SOCHit list by host and user; mailbox search results
5. EradicateRemove the Startup-folder shortcut, SvcConfig*.vbs and index_*.xhtml copies; purge the lure from all mailboxes; terminate the loader process; rebuild the host if memory shows the RAT. Reset credentials used on the host and revoke tokens and sessions, since keylogging and token impersonation are in the capability set.IR / IT ops / identityBefore/after file listing, credential reset log
6. RecoverReturn the host after rebuild; keep elevated monitoring for 30 days (Q3, Q6, Q7, Q8). Review legal notification duties if case or personal data was exposed.IT ops / legalRebuild record, monitoring review
7. LearnAdd exclusions found during triage into the queries, record new indicators with their sources, request the withheld hashes from the vendor.Detection engineeringUpdated queries and changelog entry
15

Detection Coverage Map

TechniqueBehaviourCQLIOACrowdStrike coverageGapSentinelOneDefender XDR
T1566.001Lure attachment (.xhtml)Q5nonePartialMail layer is outside endpoint telemetry (G8)Good, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1204.002 / T1059.007JS dropper from ZIPQ1, Q2Q2 (IOA)GoodRenamed archives evade Q1; Q2 coversGood, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1027.006HTML smugglingQ5noneGAPG1: the in-browser ZIP build is not visible; only the browser start and later script run areGood, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1059.005 / T1547.001SvcConfig VBS and Startup shortcutQ3, Q4, Q10Q3 (IOA)PartialG3: shortcut creation, file delete and Zone.Identifier change not covered by a verified eventPartial: Q10 approximatePartial: Q10 approximate
T1562.001AMSI and ETW bypassnonenoneGAPG2: no verified Falcon script-telemetry event in the reference; use PowerShell 4104 / AMSI logs (N3)No queryNo query
T1059.001 / T1140PowerShell decode and loadQ6Q6 (IOA)PartialG4: decode and in-memory load not visible to file telemetryGood, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1620Reflective RAT loadQ6, Q9noneGAPG4: payload never touches disk; needs memory scanning (N5)Good, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1573.001 / T1041Encrypted C2Q7, Q8, Q9Q7 (IOA)PartialOnly three network indicators; C2 config values withheld (G6); other process names can host the RATGood, with assumptionsGood, with assumptions
T1056.001 / T1113 / T1125 / T1134.001 / T1005Keylogging, capture, tokens, documentsnonenoneGAPG5: capability-level behaviour, no discriminating verified eventNo queryNo query
File hashesStage and RAT hashesnonenoneGAPG6: vendor withholds full hashes; truncated prefixes are not searchableNo queryNo query
T1027Noise markers, encoded stringsnonenoneGAPG7: static property of the file, addressed by hardening not detectionNo queryNo query

Validation: static review only (structure, field, syntax and IOC-provenance gates). Nothing here has been parsed in a Falcon tenant or fired in a canary. Run the validation gates in section 11 before scheduling.

16

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) judicial-lure wave delivering an AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage)
SEVERITY:     HIGH (regional APT; chain reproduced in a lab, no confirmed real-world compromise)
SCOPE:        Windows workstations receiving judicial or administrative mail; process creation, DNS, outbound connection, autostart registry
HYPOTHESIS:   A user opens a .xhtml lure, runs a JS dropper from a browser-built ZIP, and a VBS/PowerShell chain loads an in-memory RAT
QUERIES:      Q1-Q10 (ProcessRollup2, DnsRequest, NetworkConnectIP4, AsepValueUpdate)
DO FIRST:     Q3, Q7, Q8, then Q1, Q2, Q6; run native hunts N1 and N2 in parallel
FINDINGS:
GAPS:         Withheld hashes and config values; in-memory RAT; AMSI/ETW tampering; Startup-shortcut write; mail layer (outside endpoint telemetry)
ACTIONS:      Hunt, do not block: all indicators are detect. Never block Cloudflare edge IPs or myvnc.com. Neutralise script double-click; ASR audit; quarantine xhtml/svg
OWNER:        SOC / Detection Engineering / Mail Admin / Identity
VERSION:      v0.1 Draft 2026-11-11 STATIC REVIEW ONLY
17

Changelog

v0.12026-11-11Initial pack: ten CQL hunts, three detect-only atomic indicators, withheld hashes labelled as a gap, tiered hardening with six rollback-documented playbooks, seven-phase containment runbook. SentinelOne PowerQuery and Microsoft Defender KQL tabs added to Q1-Q10: SIEM Query Rosetta release 0.1.0 (public-beta; static-reviewed translations).
18

References

TierSourceUsed forAccessed
PrimaryZenoX: LAST HEIST: New APT-C-36 infection wave in LATAM (2026-11-04)Chain, infrastructure, MITRE table, developer fingerprint, all indicators2026-11-11
SecondaryThe Hacker News: Blind Eagle Uses Fake Court Notices to Deliver Remote Access Trojan Across Latin America (2026-11-10)Email-volume figure, actor background, targeting context2026-11-11
BackgroundZscaler ThreatLabz: BlindEagle Targets Colombian Government Agency with Caminho and DCRAT (2025-12-16)Actor commodity-RAT habit. No indicators used2026-11-11
BackgroundANY.RUN: BlindEagle malware trendsActor profile; recent .xhtml sandbox submissions. No indicators used2026-11-11

Plain-text snapshots of all four sources are saved beside this pack in BlindEagle-APT-C-36-AsyncRAT-Hunt-sources/ and are what the IOC provenance gate checks.