Astaroth WhatsApp Web Spambot

Headless WebDriver automation · browser-profile copying · CrowdStrike CQL hunting and response
Threat
Astaroth / Guildma
Type
Banking malware and propagation module
Severity
High
Version
v0.1 Draft · 2026-09-06
Author
cybersecurity analyst
Confidence
High behavior confidence; tenant unverified
STATIC REVIEW PASSED
01

Executive Summary

What happened: CrowdStrike published a technical analysis on 29 July 2026 of an Astaroth/Guildma component that automates WhatsApp Web to propagate malicious archives. Acronis independently documented the Boto Cor-de-Rosa WhatsApp worm activity in January, and the SANS Internet Storm Center reported a fresh Brazilian Portuguese Guildma infection on 1 September. Together, the sources support both an active malware family and a concrete browser-automation behavior worth hunting.

How the module works: The Windows component copies an existing Chromium user profile into C:\Users\Public\Temp\ChromeAuto_<ID><date>, selects a random local debugging port from 31175 through 39999, and starts Chrome or Edge headlessly through a downloaded WebDriver with flags such as --headless and --disable-infobars. It loads WPPConnect/WA-JS logic, reads WhatsApp contacts from the authenticated browser session, and sends malicious attachments. Acronis observed a related distribution chain using ZIP/VBS delivery and a Python-based WhatsApp worm before the banking payload.

Why detection belongs in browser lineage and filesystem context: Q01 detects the distinctive ChromeAuto profile-copy directory, Q02 and Q03 bind headless browser flags to WebDriver or public-temp context, Q04 hunts WebDriver acquisition, and Q05 provides exact current hash pivots. These behaviors survive domain rotation better than infrastructure alone. A copied browser session also creates account and token exposure risk even when the final banking module is not observed.

Operational limit: Directory and command-line events can show automation but cannot prove that WhatsApp messages were sent or credentials were stolen. Browser-extension content, session-token use, and attachment delivery require browser artifacts, identity records, and host acquisition. All CQL remains static-reviewed only: no Falcon parser, positive fixture, benign baseline, scheduled search, IOA, or prevention deployment is claimed.

Defender priority: Run Q01 and Q02 over 30 days, then preserve the copied browser profile and process tree. Isolate only after confirming unapproved automation, revoke exposed browser sessions under identity-owner authority, and scope recipients before deleting evidence.
PriorityWhy nowCoverage deliveredKey limitation
Find and contain independently corroborated behaviorCurrent 2026 technical and government reporting5 CQL designs with native pivotsStatic-only; tenant and host-result semantics unverified
02

Source and Claim Review

Current-run sanitized plain-text snapshots were hashed before assembly. Every source was treated as untrusted data; no embedded instruction, command, code, payload, or destination was executed.

IDPublisherTierIndependenceAccessedStatus
S01CrowdStrikeT1crowdstrike2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful sanitized technical extraction
S02Acronis Threat Research UnitT1acronis2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful sanitized technical extraction
S03SANS Internet Storm CenterT2sans-isc2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful sanitized technical diary
S04Microsoft LearnT1microsoft2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful authoritative control summary
S05Microsoft LearnT1microsoft2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful authoritative control summary
S06Microsoft LearnT1microsoft2026-09-06T11:06:41Zsuccessful authoritative policy summary
ClaimStatementSourcesConfidence
C01CrowdStrike documented an Astaroth component that automates WhatsApp Web for malware propagation.S01high
C02The component copies a Chromium profile to a ChromeAuto directory under Public Temp and uses a random local port between 31175 and 39999.S01high
C03Chrome or Edge is launched headlessly through WebDriver with automation-related flags and WPPConnect/WA-JS logic.S01high
C04The module reads WhatsApp contacts and sends malicious attachments through an authenticated browser session.S01, S02high
C05Acronis independently documented Astaroth WhatsApp worm propagation using ZIP/VBS and Python components in Brazil.S02high
C06SANS ISC documented a current September 2026 Guildma infection from a Brazilian Portuguese email lure.S03high
C07Microsoft App Control guidance supports audit-first restriction of unapproved binaries and scripts.S04high
C08Microsoft ASR guidance includes rules for script-launched downloaded content and credential stealing from LSASS, with prerequisites and audit modes.S05high
C09Microsoft Edge policy supports controlling extension installation through managed allow and block policy.S06high
Contradictions and gaps: indicator reuse and reassignment are possible; tenant fields and result semantics are unverified; a hit does not prove every payload action or attribution.
03

Hunt Brief and Attack Chain

The scaffold separates discrete endpoint and network observables from host-acquisition gaps. Each queryable hypothesis names an event and safe validation plan.

StepClaimsBehaviorPlatformGoal
1C05,C06user opens malicious archive or script from localized emailWindowsIdentify script and archive execution
2C02malware copies an authenticated Chromium profile to Public TempWindowsFind distinctive ChromeAuto directory creation
3C03WebDriver starts Chrome or Edge headlesslyWindowsBind browser automation to parent and command line
4C03component loads WhatsApp automation logicWindowsPreserve browser and extension artifacts
5C04authenticated session enumerates contacts and sends attachmentsWindowsScope account, recipients, and downstream infections
IDBehaviorTelemetryUseLookbackValidation
H01ChromeAuto browser-profile directory under Public TempTargetDirectoryNamealert-candidate30dCreate and remove an inert ChromeAuto_TEST directory on an isolated host; baseline legitimate test automation directories.
H02Headless Chromium using a copied Public Temp profileProcessRollup2alert-candidate30dRun approved WebDriver against an empty temporary profile; baseline enterprise browser test farms and accessibility tooling.
H03WebDriver parent launching headless browser automationProcessRollup2hunt30dRun an approved driver fixture and confirm lineage fields; inventory known Selenium and browser-testing owners.
H04PowerShell or script host obtaining WebDriver binariesProcessRollup2hunt30dUse an inert local filename in a lab without a remote download and baseline approved driver-management tools.
H05Execution of current Astaroth hashesProcessRollup2hunt90dVerify exact-hash matching against an approved harmless fixture hash; baseline security-research systems.
H06Messages or attachments sent through WhatsApp Webbrowser and identity artifactsgapN/AAcquire browser databases and session records under authorization; portable Falcon endpoint events cannot prove a sent message.

Affected surface and telemetry

Windows endpoints with Falcon process, file, DNS, and network telemetry are in scope. Proxy, IPv6, resolver, process-context, browser, memory, and file-integrity evidence remain repository- and tenant-dependent.

04

Consolidated IOC Table

IDTypeValueSourceUse
I01sha256d891d38b5a15fe750cd48ad29b26d7737c23ef6b47d6ec018dbb74264c578ddbS01detect and investigate
I02sha256c7c62332bb91d144feb53993479244856b4ecfdaed151bab2a1a6a645e4bda5dS01detect and investigate
I03sha256ec43a79fa53b048231cf45f3e7ebee03816d052e280063577f425369ad10a1e2S01detect and investigate
I04domainstretar7.contabilfacil.sbsS01hunt and enrich
I05domaingraconxonjal.empresaeficiente.sbsS01hunt and enrich
I06domainplansonval.impostosrapido.topS01hunt and enrich

Values are defanged only in analyst handling; the machine-readable appendix retains exact source text for matching. Revalidate ownership and time context before blocking.

05

ATT&CK Mapping

Every technique row is an analyst inference from source-backed behavior, not a vendor attribution statement.

TacticTechniqueNameBehaviorBasisSources
ExecutionT1059.005Visual BasicVBS delivery in independently documented campaignanalyst inferenceS02
ExecutionT1059.006PythonPython WhatsApp propagation componentanalyst inferenceS02
Credential AccessT1539Steal Web Session Cookiecopying authenticated Chromium profile materialanalyst inferenceS01
Command and ControlT1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationWhatsApp Web automation for propagationanalyst inferenceS01,S02
DiscoveryT1087.003Cloud Accountenumeration of WhatsApp contacts from authenticated sessionanalyst inferenceS01
ExecutionT1204.002Malicious Fileuser execution of malicious archive or scriptanalyst inferenceS02,S03
06

Native / Non-CQL Hunts

HuntLog sourceLogicResponse
WhatsApp Web artifact reviewAcquired Chromium profile and browser history databasesInspect the copied profile for WhatsApp Web session, IndexedDB, extension, and download artifacts; preserve hashes and timestamps.Coordinate session revocation and recipient scoping with identity and legal owners.
Script and archive entry reviewWindows Security 4688, PowerShell 4104, email gateway, and archive telemetryCorrelate ZIP, VBS, Python, or script-host execution to the process tree and localized delivery message.Preserve the original email and attachment; do not open or execute it.
Recipient and session scopingApproved WhatsApp account and identity recordsReview authenticated sessions and organization-owned recipient evidence for the bounded incident window.Revoke exposed sessions only under account-owner and incident authority.
07

CrowdStrike LogScale CQL Hunt Queries

Pick your tenant's cloud first — every "Open in Falcon" button below uses this selection.
Query strategy: the first one or two cards are the strongest keepers; broader process searches require owner and same-host correlation. Every card is STATIC-ONLY.
Q01 · ChromeAuto browser-profile directory creation
CONFFPCOST

Looks for: creation of the distinctive ChromeAuto profile-copy directory beneath Public Temp. Accomplishes: catches the spambot's browser-session staging before contact enumeration while keeping directory naming and host context for triage.

Trace: H01 · A01

// HUNT: ChromeAuto browser-profile directory creation
// HYPOTHESIS: H01
// USE: alert-candidate
// MITRE: T1539
// CONF: high
// FP: low
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — bounded analyst review window
// REQUIRES: TargetDirectoryName plus ComputerName, UserName, aid
// FALSE POSITIVES: authorized browser-automation research or a deliberately named test directory
// TUNING: exclude only owner-approved lab assets and exact documented test windows
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName = /^(NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten|ZipFileWritten)$/
| test(@timestamp >= now() - 2592000000)
| TargetFileName = /\\Users\\Public\\Temp\\ChromeAuto_[^\\]+/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ContextBaseFileName, TargetFileName, SHA256HashData, aid])
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc, limit=1000)
Q02 · Headless Chromium with copied Public Temp profile
CONFFPCOST

Looks for: Chrome or Edge launched headlessly with a user-data directory under the ChromeAuto Public Temp path. Accomplishes: combines two distinctive automation behaviors into a strong process signal without depending on rotating Astaroth infrastructure.

Trace: H02 · A02

// HUNT: Headless Chromium with copied Public Temp profile
// HYPOTHESIS: H02
// USE: alert-candidate
// MITRE: T1539, T1102.002
// CONF: high
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — bounded analyst review window
// REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 or SyntheticProcessRollup2; ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName
// FALSE POSITIVES: authorized Selenium tests, kiosk automation, or accessibility tooling
// TUNING: exclude only signed owner-approved automation with fixed host and command evidence
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/
| test(@timestamp >= now() - 2592000000)
| ImageFileName = /(?:chrome|msedge)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine = /--headless/i
| CommandLine = /--user-data-dir[^
]*\\Users\\Public\\Temp\\ChromeAuto_/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, TargetProcessId, aid])
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc, limit=1000)
Q03 · WebDriver parent launching headless browser
CONFFPCOST

Looks for: ChromeDriver or EdgeDriver starting a headless Chromium process with automation flags. Accomplishes: exposes the browser-control stage for same-host correlation, while acknowledging legitimate testing frameworks as a substantial benign population.

Trace: H03 · hunt-only

// HUNT: WebDriver parent launching headless browser
// HYPOTHESIS: H03
// USE: hunt
// MITRE: T1102.002
// CONF: medium
// FP: high
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — bounded analyst review window
// REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 or SyntheticProcessRollup2; ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine
// FALSE POSITIVES: Selenium grids, QA automation, kiosk management, and accessibility tooling
// TUNING: inventory automation owners and exclude by signed parent path plus managed host group
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/
| test(@timestamp >= now() - 2592000000)
| ParentBaseFileName = /^(?:chromedriver|msedgedriver)\.exe$/i
| ImageFileName = /(?:chrome|msedge)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine = /(?:--headless|--disable-infobars|--remote-debugging-port)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, TargetProcessId, aid])
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc, limit=1000)
Q04 · Script tooling acquiring WebDriver binaries
CONFFPCOST

Looks for: PowerShell, script host, or Python command lines that reference ChromeDriver or EdgeDriver with retrieval semantics. Accomplishes: catches a preparatory stage before browser automation but needs owner and download context to separate driver management.

Trace: H04 · hunt-only

// HUNT: Script tooling acquiring WebDriver binaries
// HYPOTHESIS: H04
// USE: hunt
// MITRE: T1105
// CONF: medium
// FP: medium
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 30d — bounded analyst review window
// REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 or SyntheticProcessRollup2; ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName
// FALSE POSITIVES: approved browser driver managers, QA bootstrap scripts, and developer tools
// TUNING: exclude signed enterprise driver managers only after owner, path, and destination review
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/
| test(@timestamp >= now() - 2592000000)
| ImageFileName = /(?:powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|python)\.exe$/i
| CommandLine = /(?:chromedriver|msedgedriver)/i
| CommandLine = /(?:invoke-webrequest|iwr|curl|downloadfile|downloadstring|https?:)/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, TargetProcessId, aid])
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc, limit=1000)
Q05 · Execution of current Astaroth component hashes
CONFFPCOST

Looks for: process events carrying one of three SHA-256 values published with the spambot analysis. Accomplishes: gives responders an exact current pivot for known samples while keeping hash volatility and research-system exceptions visible.

Trace: H05 · hunt-only

// HUNT: Execution of current Astaroth component hashes
// HYPOTHESIS: H05
// USE: hunt
// MITRE: T1204.002
// CONF: high
// FP: low
// COST: low
// TIMEFRAME: 90d — bounded analyst review window
// REQUIRES: ProcessRollup2 or SyntheticProcessRollup2; SHA256HashData, ImageFileName, CommandLine
// FALSE POSITIVES: authorized malware-analysis systems or preserved historical telemetry
// TUNING: exclude only isolated research assets with case ownership and a bounded analysis window
// VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY
#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/
| test(@timestamp >= now() - 7776000000)
| SHA256HashData = /^(?:d891d38b5a15fe750cd48ad29b26d7737c23ef6b47d6ec018dbb74264c578ddb|c7c62332bb91d144feb53993479244856b4ecfdaed151bab2a1a6a645e4bda5d|ec43a79fa53b048231cf45f3e7ebee03816d052e280063577f425369ad10a1e2)$/i
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, SHA256HashData, TargetProcessId, aid])
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc, limit=1000)
08

Operationalization and IOA Candidates

Alert-candidate rows have complete design-only packages. No query was scheduled, no notification route was activated, and no IOA or prevention rule was created.

QueryUseDecisionReadinessRationale
Q01alert-candidatealert-packagedesign-onlyTenant parsing, positive testing, and benign baseline are not recorded.
Q02alert-candidatealert-packagedesign-onlyTenant parsing, positive testing, and benign baseline are not recorded.
Q03hunthunt-onlydesign-onlyTenant parsing, positive testing, and benign baseline are not recorded.
Q04hunthunt-onlydesign-onlyTenant parsing, positive testing, and benign baseline are not recorded.
Q05hunthunt-onlydesign-onlyTenant parsing, positive testing, and benign baseline are not recorded.
Readiness gate: observed baseline is unknown and positive/benign evidence is planned-not-run. Every alert package remains DESIGN ONLY.
09

Machine-Readable IOC Appendix

Exact current-run values are source tagged and expire for mandatory review on 2026-12-06; expiration is not evidence of safety.

Source-tagged CSV6 values
type,value,action,severity,expiration,description,tags
sha256,d891d38b5a15fe750cd48ad29b26d7737c23ef6b47d6ec018dbb74264c578ddb,detect,high,2026-12-06,detect and investigate,source:S01
sha256,c7c62332bb91d144feb53993479244856b4ecfdaed151bab2a1a6a645e4bda5d,detect,high,2026-12-06,detect and investigate,source:S01
sha256,ec43a79fa53b048231cf45f3e7ebee03816d052e280063577f425369ad10a1e2,detect,high,2026-12-06,detect and investigate,source:S01
domain,stretar7.contabilfacil.sbs,detect,high,2026-12-06,hunt and enrich,source:S01
domain,graconxonjal.empresaeficiente.sbs,detect,high,2026-12-06,hunt and enrich,source:S01
domain,plansonval.impostosrapido.top,detect,high,2026-12-06,hunt and enrich,source:S01
Values onlyhunt input
d891d38b5a15fe750cd48ad29b26d7737c23ef6b47d6ec018dbb74264c578ddb
c7c62332bb91d144feb53993479244856b4ecfdaed151bab2a1a6a645e4bda5d
ec43a79fa53b048231cf45f3e7ebee03816d052e280063577f425369ad10a1e2
stretar7.contabilfacil.sbs
graconxonjal.empresaeficiente.sbs
plansonval.impostosrapido.top
Handling notereview required
Current source provenance proves transcription, not maliciousness, ownership, or safe blocking. Corroborate every hit.
10

Hardening — Tiered and Deployable

Immediate — expose and interrupt the active chain
  • Revoke exposed browser and WhatsApp sessions after evidence capture (M1018; CTRL01) — capture browser profile and session evidence first, then revoke affected sessions under account-owner authority deployable-design Verify: verify no unrecognized sessions remain and business access is restored Rollback: restore access only through approved reauthentication, not by reusing copied profile data Authority: Vendor account security and incident-response procedure.
  • Audit script-launched downloaded executables (M1038; CTRL02) — set ASR D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D to Audit for a representative pilot before Block deployable-design Verify: retain policy state, ASR events, application-owner decisions, and benign fixture result Rollback: return the rule to its exported prior action through the same policy channel Authority: Microsoft ASR reference accessed 2026-09-06.
Near-term — constrain repeat execution and egress
  • Constrain unapproved WebDriver and public-temp binaries (M1038; CTRL03) — build an audit policy for unsigned drivers and executables from Public Temp; enforce only after pilot review deployable-design Verify: confirm approved Selenium owners still function and retain policy XML plus events Rollback: deploy the prepared rollback policy or return the cohort to audit Authority: Microsoft App Control guidance accessed 2026-09-06.
  • Block unapproved browser extensions by managed policy (M1042; CTRL04) — pilot a default block list with explicit owner-approved extension allow entries deployable-design Verify: inspect edge://policy and verify required extensions plus rollback on pilot endpoints Rollback: restore the exported policy and verify prior extension behavior Authority: Microsoft Edge ExtensionInstallBlocklist accessed 2026-09-06.
Strategic — retire unowned exceptions
  • Govern browser automation and authenticated messaging clients (M1018; CTRL05) — assign owners to WebDriver, extension, and messaging automation exceptions with quarterly expiry review deployable-design Verify: sample ten exceptions for owner, signer, path, purpose, approval, and expiry Rollback: grant a time-bounded emergency exception under change control Authority: Microsoft App Control and Edge policy guidance accessed 2026-09-06.

Deployable playbook · PB01 · guarded pilot and rollback

  1. Export current App Control, ASR, and Edge policy state
  2. inventory browser automation owners
  3. apply audit controls to a limited representative cohort
  4. verify policy convergence with inert browser-automation and script fixtures
  5. perform application-owner and help-desk checks
  6. expand only when every exception is owned
  7. rollback through exported policies if a stop condition fires
  8. retain configuration, events, decisions, and recovery evidence.
Design state: no control was canary-tested or deployed. Complete platform, sensitive-data, continuity, and approval checks first.
11

Containment Runbook

PhaseTriggerAuthorityOwnerEvidenceRecovery
1. Validate and preserveQ01 or Q02 plus unapproved automationSOC leadSOC analystraw rows, directory, process tree, browser profile and hashesnone; preservation is read-only
2. Scope delivery and recipientsmalicious automation corroboratedincident commanderemail and endpoint respondersemail, archive, scripts, browser and recipient evidencerecord approved test explanation or continue
3. Isolate affected endpointsactive propagation or banking payload evidenceincident commander plus service ownerendpoint operationsisolation time, network exceptions, business impacttemporary access only under continuity plan
4. Revoke exposed sessionscopied authenticated profile confirmedincident commander plus account owneridentity operationssession actions, account audit, recipient listrestore access through approved reauthentication
5. Eradicate, recover, re-huntscope stable and evidence preservedincident commander and system ownerendpoint engineering and SOCrebuild/cleanup record and fresh Q01-Q05 resultsreturn after no unexplained hits and owner sign-off

Preservation order: raw results, events, process tree, files and hashes, network/DNS, identity/session state, relevant policy, analyst notes and tool logs. Closure: known-good recovery, explained re-hunt results, and incident-commander plus system-owner approval.

12

Detection Coverage and Validation Evidence

Validation state: STATIC REVIEW PASSED only after the local gate suite completes. This is not Falcon parsing, canary success, schedule creation, or deployment evidence.

TechniqueCoverageQuery or handoffEvidenceLimitation
T1059.005Static or designQ01, Q02, Q03, Q04, Q05local structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent
T1059.006Static or designnative and same-host correlationlocal structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent
T1539Static or designnative and same-host correlationlocal structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent
T1102.002Static or designnative and same-host correlationlocal structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent
T1087.003Static or designnative and same-host correlationlocal structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent
T1204.002Static or designnative and same-host correlationlocal structure, field, syntax, provenance, safety reviewtenant parser, baseline, positive and benign tests absent

Recorded evidence and next tests

  • Every CQL card retains VALIDATION: STATIC-ONLY; no Falcon tenant was contacted.
  • The offline tenant dry run checks extraction and profile readiness only.
  • Next: parse the strongest query in the intended repository over one hour, verify fields, then run approved inert positive and 30-day benign tests.
13

Hunt Summary Ticket

TITLE:        Astaroth / Guildma hunt — v0.1 Draft
SEVERITY:     high — active malware behavior can enable propagation or follow-on compromise
SCOPE:        Windows Falcon endpoint, DNS, file, and network telemetry plus approved host pivots
HYPOTHESIS:   H01 alert-candidate — ChromeAuto browser-profile directory under Public Temp; H02 alert-candidate — Headless Chromium using a copied Public Temp profile; H03 hunt — WebDriver parent launching headless browser automation; H04 hunt — PowerShell or script host obtaining WebDriver binaries; H05 hunt — Execution of current Astaroth hashes; H06 gap — Messages or attachments sent through WhatsApp Web
QUERIES RUN:  Q01 alert-candidate; Q02 alert-candidate; Q03 hunt; Q04 hunt; Q05 hunt
DO FIRST:     Q01 over 30d
FINDINGS:
GAPS:         tenant parsing, baseline, positive/benign tests, and external host semantics
ACTIONS:      SOC validates the strongest query; endpoint engineering preserves and scopes evidence
OWNER:        Security Operations / Endpoint Detection Engineering
VERSION:      v0.1 Draft · 2026-09-06 · STATIC REVIEW PASSED
14

Changelog

v0.1 Draft2026-09-06Initial pack with 5 conservative CQL queries, 6 source-tagged atomic indicators, design-only operationalization, reversible controls, and a five-phase containment runbook. Tenant execution is not claimed.
15

References

IDPublisherVersion/statusAccessedUseURL
S01CrowdStrikesuccessful sanitized technical extraction2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC01, C02, C03, C04https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/inside-astaroths-new-spambot-component/
S02Acronis Threat Research Unitsuccessful sanitized technical extraction2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC04, C05https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/boto-cor-de-rosa-campaign-reveals-astaroth-whatsapp-based-worm-activity-in-brazil/
S03SANS Internet Storm Centersuccessful sanitized technical diary2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC06https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Guildma%20%28Astaroth%29%20malware%20infection%20from%20Brazilian%20Portuguese%20email/33300
S04Microsoft Learnsuccessful authoritative control summary2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC07https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/wdac
S05Microsoft Learnsuccessful authoritative control summary2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC08https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference
S06Microsoft Learnsuccessful authoritative policy summary2026-09-06T11:06:41ZC09https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-browser-policies/extensioninstallblocklist